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Abstract 
In recent times, the Supreme Court of Canada has utilized the ancillary powers 
doctrine as a means of expanding police powers at common law.  Less apparent is the 
fact that the proliferation of these coercive powers has been achieved solely on the basis 
of the Court’s unorthodox—and, indeed radical—use of precedent.  Put shortly, it is my 
thesis that the ancillary powers doctrine has precipitated the undemocratic expansion of 
both state and judicial power.  The actual powers created by the Court are, in themselves, 
fraught with deficiencies and incapable of delivering on the twin promises of providing 
fairness and predictability in the law. This is due to the fact that any ad hoc judge-made 
power will be created retrospectively and shown to lack 
comprehensiveness.  Correspondingly, the constitutional protections available to 
Canadians have waned in strength, leaving them more susceptible to governmental 
intrusion.  
In constructing this thesis, I have reviewed both the historic and contemporary 
case law that has forged the ancillary powers doctrine in Canada.  Significantly, the 
emergence of this doctrine could not have occurred without Parliamentary acceptance 
and condonation of the Court’s actions.  However, it is on the basis of the Court’s 
perception that Parliament has failed to close off supposed “gaps” in police powers that 
the Court has been willing to enter the lawmaking fray.  Moreover, the Court’s actions 
have effectively obviated the need for government to legislate and prospectively stipulate 
the powers possessed by its agents.  Therefore, I have situated this institutional interplay 
within the “theory of gaps” devised by Hans Kelsen. This model is offered as a plausible 
explanation for how Waterfield/Dedman became conceived in Canada and, why, it has 
been permitted to take root.   Importantly, the Kelsenian analysis that I advance is 
explanatory only.  It does not present a defence or justify for the proliferation of common 
law powers in favour of the police or judiciary.  
The lawmaking paradigm, as described above, has had a pernicious effect upon 
constitutionalism in Canada.  It is for this reason, I argue that the ancillary powers 
doctrine holds an illegitimate place in Canadian law, and should be reversed.  
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Introduction 
Since the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 the Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC) has assumed an increasingly larger role in the formation of 
criminal justice policy in Canada.  This is reflected by both the volume and breadth of 
decisions that the Court has rendered on matters of substantive criminal law, rules of 
evidence and criminal procedure.  In its capacity as the nation’s highest court, the 
Supreme Court is entrusted with, inter alia, overseeing the criminal justice system and 
ensuring that constitutional standards are met by the state.  Not infrequently, this entails 
hearing challenges brought by those accused of criminal offences contesting either the 
substance of legislation or the investigative actions of the police.  It is the latter range of 
activities, that of judicially determining the lawfulness (or impropriety) of exercises of 
coercive power by the police, that shall be the dominant focus of this thesis. 
Consistent with the prescriptions of the “rule of law”2 (ROL), the government and its 
agents—including the police—are at all times bound by the “supreme law of Canada”3 as 
set out in the Constitution Act, 1982,4 which includes the Charter.  The Court’s role as 
stewards over the constitutional rights of Canadians, along with its authority to make 
declarative rulings on the legality of state action is derived from the Charter itself and is 
thus an outgrowth of the democratic process.  This is an important point to be borne in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
2 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 49, 161 DLR (4th) 385 
[Secession Reference]. See also Glen Luther, “Extra-Legal Police Powers in Canada: The 
Rule of Law and the Enigma of Retroactive Decision Making” in Kelly Gorkoff & 
Richard Jochelson, ed, Thinking About Justice: A Book of Readings (Winnipeg: 
Fernwood, 2012).  See generally Jose Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski, eds, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Allan C Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, eds, The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1987); John Phillip Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty 
in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2004); James S Hart, Jr, The Rule of Law, 1603-1660: Crowns, Courts and Judges 
(New York: Pearson/Longman, 2003).  
3 Constitution Act, 1982, s 52(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c 11. 
4 Ibid.  See also R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 115, 18 DLR (4th) 
321 and R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 63, 26 DLR (4th) 200. 
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mind as we later ponder the architecture and operational design of “constitutionalism”5 in 
Canada, and in particular, where its functionality will be shown to have gone awry as a 
consequence of the Supreme Court’s ancillary powers doctrine (APD) jurisprudence.   
In light of the foregoing, the greater role that is played by the Supreme Court in 
establishing the limits and bounds of state power through the process of judicial review is 
unsurprising and to be expected.  Indeed, it is prima facie, a natural byproduct of the 
mandate given to the Court under the Charter.  However, the expanded role of the SCC 
in the post-Charter era has also been mirrored by the growth of evermore, expansive 
police powers at common law.  This we might find to be more than a little surprising, 
particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recognized role as “guardians of the 
Constitution and of individuals’ rights under it.”6  It is the paradox of this development 
that I set out to examine in my thesis.  More precisely, I will research the advent of 
judicially-created police powers in Canadian law and concentrate, firstly, on the Court’s 
decisions predicated on the APD, and secondly, the reaction that these judgments have 
elicited from Parliamentarians. 
As my research will demonstrate, the APD and its conduit the “Waterfield test”7 
stand as the chief vehicles through which freestanding police powers are generated at 
common law.  However, the use of other “hands-on”8 adjudicative methods used by the 
Court in the broadening of law enforcement powers will also be explored.  While the 
general expansion of police powers can be seen as a matter of concern, it is not the 
growth of government power alone that is troubling.  Rather, it is the non-democratic 
process through which this proliferation has occurred that is most disconcerting.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Secession Reference, supra note 2 at para 32 where alongside federalism, 
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for minorities, constitutionalism was acclaimed 
by the Supreme Court as fundamental and organizing principle of the Canadian 
constitutional framework. For commentary see Joel Colon-Rios, “The End of the 
Constitutionalism-Democracy Debate” (2010) 28 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 25; and 
see also Adam M Dodek, “The Protea and the Maple Leaf: The Impact of the Charter on 
South African Constitutionalism” (2005) 17 NJCL 353. 
6 Hunter et al v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 169, 11 DLR (4th) 641. 
7 Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s. 27(1), [1984] 2 SCR 697 at 718, 14 DLR 
(4th) 546. 
8 Aileen Kavanagh, “Constitutionalism, Counterterrorism, and the Courts: Changes in the 
British Constitutional Landscape” (2011) 9 Intl J Const L 172 at 174.   
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issues engaged in this thesis are much larger and more complex than simply whether or 
not the police ought to possess a particular investigative power.  These are policy choices 
that centre upon the appropriateness of allocating coercive powers in the hands of the 
police for use against the citizenry.  Ultimately, I contend that such decisions can only 
properly be made democratically and through the legislative process in the first instance.  
Thereafter, the Court may be called upon to ascertain whether the balance that has been 
struck between the state’s interest in “crime control”9 and the “due process”10 rights of 
Canadians that are enshrined in the Charter.  This is how Canadian constitutionalism is 
designed to operate.  And, it is when these conditions are being met that the criminal 
justice systems can be said to exist in well-functioning state.  However, as will be shown, 
the APD effectively stymies each of these processes and purports to treat them as 
superfluous (or substitutable) exercises that need not be engaged.  Yet, as I shall argue, 
APD jurisprudence is neither an equivalent substitute (nor legitimate) replacement for 
democratic lawmaking and the kind of governmental accountability that is ensured under 
Section 1 of the Charter.11  Each of these prerequisites is a barometer of constitutional 
good health and each of them has been unduly dispensed with under the APD.  Therefore, 
this body of jurisprudence illuminates–and provides an entry point to examine—a much 
more pressing problem for Canadian constitutionalism and democracy.  As I will 
demonstrate, APD jurisprudence has fostered (and further reinforced) anti-democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1968) at 153. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See generally Sujit Choudry & Kent Roach, “Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory 
Discretion, Constitutional Remedies, and Democratic Accountability” (2003) 41 Osgoode 
Hall LJ 1. 
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tendencies and a stifling of the “dialogue”12 between the legislative and judicial branches 
of government.13  
In recent times the SCC has announced unprecedented police powers enabling 
state agents to, inter alia, enter private dwellings in response to disconnected 911 calls,14 
stop and search citizens without a warrant,15 to erect impromptu road blockades to detain 
and interrogate motorists and other persons,16 and to use sniffer dogs during investigative 
detentions.17  None of these investigatory powers were provided for by legislation.  These 
judicially-created powers are each worrisome in their own unique ways and have been 
roundly criticized.  However, to focus the bulk of our scrutiny on these limited doctrinal 
issues is in the words of Professor John Hart Ely, “to lose the forest in the trees.”18  Taken 
together the judicial conferral of these investigative powers reveals a more fundamental 
and far more pernicious problem in Canadian law.  I agree with the suggestion of 
Professor James Stribopoulos that the most “sensible target of criticism is…not the 
growth in the official authority of the police, but rather, its source.”19  Critical attention 
will therefore be directed towards examining the transformative role that the SCC has 
played in enlarging the ambit of state power.  Ultimately, it is my argument that while we 
are right to be concerned with where the lines demarcating the bounds of permissible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 at paras 136-142, 156 DLR (4th) 385; and R v 
Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668 at paras 20 and 57, 180 DLR (4th) 1.  See also Peter W Hogg, 
Allison A Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited—Or ‘Much 
Ado About Metaphors”’ (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 29 and Peter W Hogg & Allison 
A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislatures (Or Perhaps The 
Charter Of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75.  
13 Richard Jochelson, “Multidimensional Analysis as a Window into Activism 
Scholarship: Searching for Meaning with Sniffer Dogs” (2009) 24 Can JL & Soc 231 at 
244 [Jochelson, “Multidimensional”]. 
14 R v Godoy, [1999] 1 SCR 311, 168 DLR (4th) 257. 
15 R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52 at para 3, [2004] 3 SCR 59. 
16 R v Clayton, 2007 SCC 32 at para 41, [2007] 2 SCR 725.  See also Dedman v The 
Queen [1985] 2 SCR 2, 20 DLR (4th) [Dedman]. 
17 R v Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18 at paras 25, [2008] 1 SCR 456. 
18 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 16. 
19 James Stribopoulos, “Has the Charter Been for Crime Control?  Reflecting on 25 Years 
of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in Canada” in Margaret E Beare, ed, Honouring 
Social Justice: Honouring Dianne Martin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 
363. 
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state conduct are drawn, in principle, it matters a great deal more by whom they are 
drawn and how the state’s adherence to them is subsequently measured.  The 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court under the APD is indicative of a restructuring of the 
conventions of constitutionalism in Canada.  This phenomenon threatens to undercut not 
only the protections available to individuals under the Charter, but the constitutional 
framework itself.  I intend to show that the Supreme Court’s utilization of the ancillary 
powers doctrine in criminal jurisprudence is irretrievably flawed and deserving of 
discontinuance.   
In the course of advancing my argument, I will show that, at law, the APD is 
wholly contingent upon the Court’s unorthodox (and, indeed radical) use of judicial 
precedents.20  Indeed, without the repeated (yet, still questionable) acts of judicial 
ingenuity that we find in APD cases, the Court would be unable to satisfy the “principle 
of legality”21 (POL) and the creation of common law police powers would be at an end. 
Briefly, what the POL demands is that any official encroachment by the state into areas 
that impair an individual’s liberty must be clearly authorized in law.22  The ideals 
reflected by the POL were an integral component—and a bedrock principle—of the 
Anglo-Canadian common law constitutional framework.23  Importantly, these are not 
antiquated notions or mere historical relics.  Rather, the principle of legality continues to 
survive today and as the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed in the recent cases of R 
v Mann,24 “[a]bsent a law to the contrary, individuals are free to do as they please.  By 
contrast, the police (and more broadly, the state) may act only to the extent that they are 
empowered to do so by law.”25   This is the quintessence of POL made famous by 
Professor A.V. Dicey.26  Thus, I will interrogate through my analysis, how the Court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See especially Chapter Four. 
21 James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and 
the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s LJ 1 at 2, 6-13 [Stribopoulos, “In Search”].   
22 TRS Allan, “Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and 
Constitutionalism” (1985) 44 Cambridge LJ 111 at 116 [footnote omitted]. 
23 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 21 at 5, 9. 
24 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 SCR 59. 
25 Ibid at para 15 [emphasis added]. 
26 See AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 3d ed (London: 
Macmillan & Co) at 194-195 where in his articulation of the principle of legality, Dicey 
wrote, “The right to personal liberty as understood in England means in substance a 
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purports to comply with the requirements of the POL whilst simultaneously creating ex 
post facto police powers on an ad hoc basis.  As will be shown, these matters are 
diametrically opposed and fundamentally irreconcilable in nature.  I will also question 
why, in practice, the government has chosen to accept these novel adjudicative practices.  
This entails some consideration of the socio-political environment that has surrounded 
the Court’s judgments where the APD has been utilized and enabled it to flourish. 
Under the existing law, common law police powers can be forged in one of two 
ways: first, the Court may recognize the existence of a historical police power that pre-
dated Canadian law,27 assuming that it is Charter-compliant, or, second, the Court may 
confer a new power upon the police using the APD.  Indisputably, and irrespective of 
one’s view of the merit or undesirability of this non-legislative avenue to enlarge state 
power,28 this is the prevailing law in Canada.  Thus, the common denominator is that 
police actions must have a foundation in law in order to be upheld as lawful.   However, 
it will be argued that former category of powers have now (almost certainly) been 
extinguished by case authorities or overtaken by statute, and in respect of the latter, it will 
be asserted that the APD is an illegitimate platform to expand state power on the basis 
that it is incompatible with the Court’s assigned role within the Canadian constitutional 
framework and its failure to comply bone fides of the POL.  Moreover, the judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
person’s right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in 
any manner that does not admit of legal justification.”  The implications of this statement 
for exercises of coercive powers by police or other state actors becomes clearer—and is 
amplified—when read in conjunction with his earlier remarks at 33, that, “every action 
against a constable or collector of revenues [or, other agents of the state] enforces the 
greatest of all such principles, namely, that obedience to administrative orders is no 
defence to an action or prosecution for acts done in excess of legal authority.” 
27 Cloutier v Langlois, [1990] 1 SCR 158, 53 CCC (3d) 257.  See also United Nurses of 
Alberta v Alberta (Attorney General), [1992] 1 SCR 901 at 930-931, 89 DLR (4th) 609, 
where, the Court, in an analogous way, affirmed the existence of the ancestral common 
law offence of criminal contempt of court as being constitutionally compliant. 
28 While I am adamantly opposed to the judicial creation of coercive state powers, other 
commentators do not hold the same objections.  See Michael Plaxton, “Police Powers 
After Dicey” (2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 99. See also Malcolm Thorburn, “Two Conceptions 
of Equality Before the (Criminal) Law” in Francois Tanguay-Renaud and James 
Stribopoulos eds, Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the 
Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational and International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011) at 3. 
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creation of common law police powers evinces a series of policy choices and thereby 
needlessly exposes the Supreme Court to charges of judicial activism on the basis of its 
chosen policymaking path.29  Although I acknowledge that the requirement of legal 
authority for state actions interfering with individual liberties (or personal property) may 
be satisfied by the common law, I will advance a process-based argument and assert the 
position that the POL is best (and most legitimately) fulfilled when coercive state actions 
are stipulated in legislation that is amenable to constitutional challenge and judicial 
scrutiny.  These arguments will be developed more fully and in due course. 
Having indicated in a general sense what will be addressed, I shall now briefly 
outline some of the matters that fall beyond the purview of this thesis.  The critique that I 
advance is not concerned with any dimension of substantive criminal law and will reserve 
comment on the range of conduct that the state has chosen to criminalize.30  Moreover, I 
take a largely disinterested view of the substantive allocations of coercive power that 
have been made in favour of the state agents—either by the state itself through the 
legislative process or the accretion of additional powers in judicial decisions.  To the 
extent that criticisms of particular police powers are presented, these discussions serve to 
illuminate the flaws in their pedigree and not in their form.31  In particular, my critique 
will be focused on signaling the problems associated with the Court’s use of the APD and 
less upon the doctrinal rules created by it.   
It is also not the intention of this work to fully explicate the police function.  This 
thesis is not about police practices per se.  Rather, a look at the Court’s jurisprudence will 
suffice to show how the art of policing is developing in a manner that is more intrusive, 
increasingly adversarial and too often left without adequate guidance or oversight.  While 
police powers in Canada are ripe for comprehensive law reform,32 I will not attempt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See especially Jochelson, “Multidimensional”, supra note 13 at 231-232 and 247-248.  
See also Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detention: A Critique of R. v. Simpson” 
(2004) 41 Alta L Rev 935 at 949-950 [Quigley, “Brief Investigatory”]. 
30 See generally Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
31 Chapter Three is where the bulk of these discussions will be concentrated. 
32 See generally Don Stuart, "Time to Recodify Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and 
Order Expediency: Lessons from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution" (2001) 28 Man LJ 
89 at 89-90.  See also JL Clendenning, “Police Power and Civil Liberties” (1966) 4 
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specify what I believe to be the appropriate bounds of state power or how police powers 
should be structured.  That task is one reserved for another day and one that demands a 
different forum.  Not only are such efforts bound to fall short, the devising of such a 
scheme (although, not without merit)33 would be antithetical to the solution that I 
ultimately propose.  The prescription that is advanced in this thesis is procedural in nature 
and entails two primary parts: first, the enactment of legislation by the government that 
prospectively and definitively stipulates the powers possessed by its agents, and; second, 
the provision of judicial supervision ensuring that the laws empowering the police are 
themselves constitutional and that police have acted in compliance with Charter 
standards during criminal investigations.  This overarching argument is consonant with 
the balance of Canadian scholarship on the topic. 34  However, each of these requirements 
is presently being stymied in the litigation and adjudication of police powers under the 
APD.  Although it is apparent that the government has failed to modernize the law 
governing the exercise of police powers during criminal investigations, its agents have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Osgoode Hall LJ 174 at 194.  See also Quigley, “Brief Investigatory”, supra note 29 at 
950; and Don Stuart, “Annotation” (1985) 46 CR (3d) 194 at 195 where writing in 
response to the case of Dedman, supra note 16, Stuart remarked, “It is high time for 
Parliament to consider enacting a comprehensive scheme after a full debate on civil 
liberties and the interests of the police in having clear and adequate power.” 
33 For example of a commendable proposal aimed at readdressing the problem of racial 
profiling by government actors see Kent Roach, “Making Progress on Understanding and 
Remedying Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta L Rev 895. 
34 This view is accordance with the position taken by a number of commentators, 
including that of Quigley, “Brief Investigatory”, supra note 29 at 949-950 [emphasis 
added] where he writes, “Another drawback of to the judicial creation of police powers is 
that it blurs the role of the judiciary as a guardian of constitutional rights.  When there are 
legislated police powers, the courts may undertake their proper role to assess arguments 
against the constitutionality of the law…Perhaps more fundamentally, the proper place to 
settle on the parameters of police powers [and the state, more broadly] over citizens is 
surely through the democratic process. While we may lament that Parliamentary scrutiny 
of legislation is not as thorough, informed, vigorous as it might be, it is preferable to 
judges establishing rules without the opportunity for debate and amendment…It would be 
far better to have clear legislative prescriptions for the extent of the powers of state 
actors that might then be applied to individual cases, rather than adapting the common 
law to suit new situations with the attendant risks of expanding state power and 
increasing discriminatory effects.” See also Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & 
James Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 
2011) at 66. 
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seldom been hampered by its inattentiveness to the task of law reform in this area.  
Rather, the Court has elected to pick up the slack and has taken it upon itself to expand 
the range police powers.  Plainly, in doing so the Supreme Court has lapsed in its 
insistence upon the POL in the conventional sense.  Indeed, the rise of the APD in 
Canadian criminal law could not have occurred without the Court’s simultaneous retreat 
from the Diceyan conception of the POL.  It is only through the SCC’s self-devised, self-
reinforcing and unorthodox use of judicial precedent that the common law police powers 
have burgeoned.  As will be argued, the propagation of common law police powers 
through the application of the APD is wholly incongruous with this idea and the 
Charter’s “affirm[ation] [of] the continued importance of the principle of legality”35 in 
Canadian law and jurisprudence.  By drawing attention to this dysfunction and 
institutional disordering, my aim is to highlight the magnitude and gravity of the problem 
posed by the presence of the common law police powers in Canada that have been 
created by the Court and embraced lawmakers.  It is hoped that through this effort my 
thesis will contribute to the existing body of literature on the subject and serve to 
encourage a more focused discourse about the importance of safeguarding individual 
rights against governmental intrusion. 
Outline of Chapters  
This thesis is organized into five separate chapters.  Following these introductory 
remarks, there are four substantive chapters and then a conclusion.  Chapter One shall 
review the Canadian constitutional framework and how the activities (or inaction) of the 
relevant institutional actors within the criminal justice system have the capacity to 
influence and immediately effect the ability of citizens to exercise their civil liberties.  
Chapter Two will document the reception of the “Waterfield test” and its evolution in 
Canadian jurisprudence.  It is this test that has given rise to the APD and the associated 
problems.  In Chapter Three, I will further discuss a series of recent Supreme Court 
judgments in which the APD was employed and led to the introduction of new common 
law police powers.  The aim of this exercise is to illuminate problems endemic to judge-
made law.  Chapter Four will situate the APD within the realm of legal theory and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 21 at 17. 
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present a deconstruction of the Court’s “Waterfield calculus.”36  By employing Kelsenian 
analysis, I will explore the Court’s identification of “gaps”37 in police powers, how it has 
set about filling them and offer an explanation for why Parliament has tolerated this 
judicial impertinence.  Chapter Five will serve to review the dominant themes presented 
throughout the course of this thesis and provide a platform to reassert my argument which 
is that the APD as it is presently applied by the SCC should be jettisoned from Canadian 
law.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Jochelson, “Multidimensional”, supra note 13 at 239.  
37 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, translated by Anders Wedberg 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1946) at 147.  See generally Don Stuart, 
“Godoy: The Supreme Reverts to the Ancillary Powers Doctrine to Fill a Gap in Police 
Power” (1999) 21 CR (5th) 225. 
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Chapter One: Constitutionalism and Individual Rights in Canada 
1.0 Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the established framework for law and 
governance in Canada and the roles assigned to the relevant institutional actors, as 
well as members of the general public.  In particular, I shall explore the legal status of 
individual rights since the inception of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1 and how these constitutionally enshrined rights may be effected by the 
actions (or inaction) of various parties in the criminal justice system, including the 
police, the courts and elected government representatives.     
1.1 Identifying the Key Institutional Actors 
While it is the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) that shall receive the greatest 
attention in this thesis, the Court is not the only institution implicated in, or responsible 
for, the present state of affairs that I am to problematize.  Each of the four groups 
identified will be addressed in the forthcoming analysis.  First, citizens at large constitute 
the all-encompassing group from which the others are derived.  Although holding no 
official power, ordinary people have a hand in the democracy that they enjoy.  This is not 
to suggest the existence of a linear principal-agent relationship, as there are simply too 
many layers of complexity for such to hold.  But citizens do elect the government and 
they owe a measure of responsibility for the institutions that act on their behalf.  The 
citizenry also has a vested interest in seeing that their constitutional rights are protected 
and that these liberties are preserved.  Second, are the legislators that have been chosen 
by the population to represent them and give expression to their collective interests.  
They are responsible for enacting the governing laws and amending them from time to 
time in response to changing sensibilities or conditions in society.  Elected governments 
stand at the apex of the policymaking function in society and give effect to it through the 
passage of legislation.  The Canadian federal government will receive the most scrutiny, 
given its legislative prerogative and exclusive constitutional competency in matters of 
criminal law.  Accordingly, the actions (and inaction) of Parliament will be reviewed.  
Third, are the state-organized policing agencies that are given primary responsibility for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
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the investigation of criminal events and enforcement of the criminal law.  Police also play 
an instrumental (if nebulously defined)2 role in the maintenance of the social order.  Of 
the institutions mentioned, it is the police who most regularly come into direct contact 
with members of the public.  Fourth, stands the judiciary, who are assigned the task of 
interpreting and applying the law.   Court systems provide an oversight mechanism that 
supervises the relationship between the government (the governors) and individuals (the 
governed)—including persons under investigation or facing potential criminal sanctions.  
As a transparent public forum to monitor citizen-state relations, the existence of such a 
body is vital to the health of democracy.   In concluding this simplistic sketch, it is to be 
recognized that each group is subject to various constraints and that they exert varying 
degrees of influence on these processes, and each other.  Like any complex problem, the 
proliferation of judge-made police powers is one that results from a series of multifaceted 
and overlapping contributing causes.  Correspondingly, correcting this problem will 
require changes of thinking and conduct to occur within each of the four constituent 
groups. 
1.2 The Canadian Criminal Justice System  
1.2.1 The State Apparatus and the Role of Government 
  Canada is a nation that is steeped in the traditions of liberalism.3  It emerges from 
the work of seminal liberal thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and Immanuel Kant that “individual freedom, understood as independence 
from the arbitrary will of others”4 was viewed as “the most basic value in political life.”5 
These ideals were foundational to the conceptualization and actualization of the 
democratic nation states that would be subsequently formed in this spirit.  This is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Jerome H Skolnick, “Democratic Order and the Rule of Law” in KRE McCormick & 
LA Visano, eds, Understanding Policing (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 1992) at 47 
[Skolnick, “Democratic Order”].  See also Eric J Miller, “Role-Based Policing: 
Restraining Police Conduct ‘Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere’” (2006) 94 Cal 
L Rev 617 at 658. 
3 Richard Devlin, A Wayne MacKay & Natasha Kim, “Reducing the Democratic Deficit: 
Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a ‘Triple P’ Judiciary” 
(2000) 38 Alta L Rev 734 at 738 [Devlin, “Reducing”]. 
4 Malcolm Thorburn, “Reinventing the Night-Watchman State?” (2010) 60 UTLJ 425 at 
441 [Thorburn, “Reinventing”]. 
5 Ibid. 
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basic premise of democracy and the grand promise of representative forms of 
government.  Of course, “[t]his conception of liberalism predates the modem welfare 
state and the increasing acceptance of state interventions to maximize the ‘common good’ 
and allocate resources”6 for the purpose of improving conditions for the aggregate 
community and to soften the harsher edges of libertarianism.  Thus, today standing 
alongside the “idealization of liberty and the pursuit of freedom” 7—an ethos commonly 
embodied in modern bills of rights—is “a growing awareness of the need to balance 
liberty against other rights, values, and interests,”8 which we can also locate within 
modern Canadian constitutional instruments and even within their precursors.   
Considering briefly the constraints imposed by the substantive criminal law, it 
follows from the preceding discussion that the law should, in theory,9 be indifferent 
toward “an individual [who] chooses to engage in conduct that the rest of us deem to be 
unwise or even immoral so long as this conduct does not infringe others’ freedom to use 
their bodies and property as they see fit in the same way.”10  One would think that this is 
evermore compelling in a pluralistic society where people will share different 
conceptions of the “good”11 and espouse sharply divergent views as to what constitutes 
acceptable conduct.  To mediate the conflicts that invariably emerge between people, 
there must therefore be an entity that is both impartial and qualified to impose binding 
decisions on individuals.  It is for this reason and “in order to fulfill these demands that 
we must have a state.”12  Lacking such a conduit, human societies would be left with 
subjectivist, vengeance-based systems of justice reminiscent of those that were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Devlin, “Reducing”, supra note 3 at 738. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See RA Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law 
(Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 89-90 where the distinction between proscribed 
conduct that is inherently wrongful (mala in se) and that which has been declared illegal 
(mala prohibita) on the basis of some other intended societal aim considered worthy of 
pursuit by those holding political power. 
10 Thorburn, “Reinventing”, supra note 4 at 441 [footnote omitted]. 
11 Richard Devlin, “Reducing”, supra note 3 at 738. 
12 Thorburn, “Reinventing”, supra note 4 at 441. 
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predominate in earlier times.13  
Properly understood, the state, stands conceptually prior to either the criminal law 
or the constitutional framework.  As Professor Malcolm Thorburn explains: 
For the state, if properly constructed, can both represent us collectively (and thus 
speak in the name of all when determining the precise contours of our rights, 
adjudicating disputes, and enforcing the law) and yet speak for no private party in 
particular. The justification for the state’s existence – and for its special powers 
[to proscribe particular forms of conduct and interfere with an individual’s 
liberty] – rests on our need for someone to perform the tasks that only the state 
can perform and on the state’s ability to perform those tasks moderately well.14   
 
Significantly, it is only when these conditions are present that any meaningful notion of 
equality can be capably practiced in society.  And the existence of equality is, of course, 
vital to our conception of the rule of law (ROL).  
1.2.2 Balancing Liberty Against the Need For Collective Security 
   The question of where to draw the dividing lines that establish points at which 
the interests of personal autonomy and individual liberty are properly made to yield to 
broader collective concerns is one that should captivate all Canadians.  The resolution of 
these questions carries profound implications for the ability of citizens to exercise their 
rights and lead their lives as they see fit.   In his articulation of the paradigmatic dilemma 
faced by the criminal law in free societies, Professor Herbert Wechsler, principal 
architect of the Model Penal Code,15 wrote: 
Whatever view one holds about the penal law, no one will question its importance 
to society.  This is the law on which men [and women] place their ultimate 
reliance for protection against all the deepest injuries that human conduct can 
inflict on individuals and institutions.  By the same token, penal law governs the 
strongest force that we permit official agencies to bring to bear on individuals.  
Its promise as an instrument of safety is matched only by its power to destroy.  If 
penal law is weak or ineffective, basic human interests are in jeopardy.  If it is 
harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works a gross injustice on those caught within 
its toils.  The law that carries such responsibilities should surely be as rational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Graham J Steele, “A Brief History of Canadian Criminal Law” in Joel E Pink & David 
C Perrier, eds, From Crime to Punishment: An Introduction to the Criminal Justice 
System, 6th ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 14 [Steele, “Brief History”]. 
14 Thorburn, “Reinventing”, supra note 4 at 441-442 [emphasis added]. 
15 See the discussion of Paul H Robinson & Markus D Dubber, “The American Model 
Penal Code: A Brief Overview” (2007) 10 New Crim L Rev 319 at 322-323. 
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and just as law can be.  Nowhere in the entire legal field is more at stake for the 
community and for the individual.16  
 
As a general postulate few are apt to quibble with the basic sentiments expressed within 
these words.  No one will deny the need for a body of rules to prohibit certain forms of 
conduct, or, that these prohibitions should be reinforced with penalty provisions to 
prospectively deter these unwelcome occurrences and punish those who commit unlawful 
transgressions. Whereas there is wide-scale acceptance of the overall framework used to 
establish and maintain the balance in society, the appropriateness of the various balance 
points are, by contrast, beset with matters of persistent and deep controversy.  Plainly, the 
content of the criminal law and the range of law enforcement measures used in its 
administration attract divergent views.  While the primary responsibility for effectuating 
the appropriate balance is vested in the government that enacts the law, whatever balance 
has been struck is not immutable.  Nor it is immune from challenge.  It requires careful 
attention and a principled approach that must be balanced and comply with constitutional 
standards. That the law be clear, ascertainable and proportionate are undeniably laudable 
objectives that ought to be deeply engrained in the criminal justice system.  Equally, it is 
important that we remind ourselves that “[a]nother part of the criminal law…regulates 
the conduct of state officials charged with processing citizens who are suspected, 
accused, or found guilty of a crime.”17  Too often this aspect of criminal law and 
procedure is overlooked or given inadequate attention within the wider socio-political 
discourse.  The presence of these countervailing forces to constrain government actors is 
imperative and must be of paramount concern for any system of justice deserving of the 
name.18  At its heart, this entails the cultivation of conditions which ensure that the state 
is not rendered impotent to enforce the laws that have been enacted whilst simultaneously 
safeguarding individuals from heavy-handed conduct brought by agents of the state, who 
if left unchecked and to their own devices, may be inclined towards overzealous and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Herbert Wechsler, “The Challenge of a Model Penal Code” (1952) 65 Harv L Rev 
1097 at 1098 [emphasis added]. 
17 Skolnick, “Democratic Order”, supra note 2 at 38 [emphasis added and footnoted 
omitted].  
18 Don Stuart, "Time to Recodify Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order 
Expediency: Lessons from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution" (2001) 28 Man LJ 89 at 
89 [Stuart, “Recodify”]. 
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unprincipled enforcement of the law.  Fortunately, we can locate numerous procedural 
and substantive constraints in the Criminal Code19 aimed at securing these 
objectives.  Matched to these stand the “legal rights” enumerated in the Charter which 
inhibit the roughshod pursuit of law enforcement objectives as declared by law 
enforcement officials themselves or other state actors.  Cumulatively, the broad 
framework presented by Wechsler is harmonious with the assertion offered by Professors 
Steve Coughlan and Glen Luther that, “[t]he central goal of a proper criminal justice 
system must be to maintain a balance between the individual interest of private citizens to 
carry on their lives free from state interference, and the communal interest in maintaining 
a safe society.”20  At bottom, the resolution of these competing tensions are political 
choices that are properly placed, in the first instance, in the democratic arena and with a 
residual oversight role preserved for the judiciary to see that the balance that has been 
struck accords with constitutional standards.  
The law of criminal procedure has been aptly described as “a field of conflicting 
values.”21 It is on this field that the ongoing battle “between the interests of the state to 
ensure the collective security of its subjects and the interest of those subjects liberty and 
privacy”22 is pitched.   It is also here upon this terrain that my thesis is situated. However 
as stated previously, I will take a largely agnostic view of existing police powers and 
instead analyze the deficiencies surrounding the state’s acquisition of coercive law 
enforcement powers beyond those specified in criminal legislation.  Quite apart from the 
question of what substantive aims the government may pursue through its invocation of 
the criminal law, 23 stands the question of what means it can employ to serve these ends.  
Law is of course meaningless if it is unenforceable or merely left unenforced.  It must 
also be recognized that the law can become a retrograde force in society and undercut its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 RSC 1985, c C-46. 
20 Steve Coughlan & Glen Luther, Detention and Arrest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 1 
[Coughlan, Detention]. 
21 Stephen Coughlan, Criminal Procedure (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 4 [Coughlan, 
Criminal]. 
22 Ibid at 3. 
23 Douglas Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1987) at 224 [Husak, Philosophy]. 
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own objectives if it is enforced capriciously by those entrusted with its administration.24  
Incidents involving the uneven application of the law are corrosive to the credibility of 
the legal enterprise as a whole.  The criminal justice system demands that government 
actors be equipped to administer the laws that are in force—to investigate, apprehend, 
and prosecute those who violate the law. They must, however, be exercised judiciously 
and in a manner that is proportionate to the harms that are to be averted.  Where the state 
seeks to curtail individual liberty or impose punitive sanctions on citizens, we can attach 
further obligations on the state under the ROL rubric.  The ROL requires that everyone 
shall be governed by and subject to the same body of laws.25  This is not to suggest that 
the law cannot draw distinctions between different classes of persons, for instance, by 
providing additional powers to police that are not available to ordinary citizens.  In the 
domain of criminal law these conditions become necessary preconditions for the 
legitimate exercise of state power.  Harmonious with this is another basic tenet of the 
criminal law, the “principle of legality” 26 (POL).  The POL requires that any interference 
with individual liberty or personal property be based on lawful authority.27 Within the 
context of Canadian criminal law—shot through as it is with constitutional thresholds—I 
suggest that the only legitimate way for the state to take coercive actions that impair, or 
seize an individual’s liberty (or property) is through the passage of a competent statute.  
In my estimation, the prospect of uncovering any further pre-Canadian common law 
powers stands as an extremely remote possibility.  Therefore, when measured against the 
POL, the creation of common law police powers through the ancillary powers doctrine 
(APD) is a wholly illegitimate form of lawmaking.  
It stands to reason that police should be given “sufficient power to protect the 
public and to enforce [the law], but not so much power that the police become a law unto 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See generally David M Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006); and Todd Gordon, Cops, Crime and Capitalism: The Law-
and-Order Agenda in Canada (Halifax: Fernwood Press, 2006). 
25 See generally Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue” (1977) 93 LQR 195. 
26 James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and 
the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s LJ 1 at 2 [Stribopoulos, “In Search”].   
27 Ibid.   
	   18	  
themselves.”28  However, it is of even greater importance that we understand the process 
by which these thresholds are established to ensure that this framework is properly 
enforced.   The legitimacy of the determinations made in the “politicolegal”29 arena hinge 
upon whether the decisions regarding the balancing of these opposing forces were 
informed and demonstrably supported by principle.  Moreover, in a representative 
democracy such as Canada, bone fide decisions must take into account a full array of the 
appropriate principles bearing on the issue or issues at stake and treat each with due 
regard.30  Otherwise, the policy choices that have been made rest on faulty foundations 
and provide inadequate bases to claim legitimacy.   
Incidents involving the uneven (or “checkerboard”)31 application of the law are 
corrosive to the credibility of the legal enterprise as a whole.  As it is manifest that penal 
law represents “society’s most destructive and intrusive form of intervention against the 
individual,”32 it must be exercised judiciously and in a manner that is proportionate to the 
harms it is directed to combat.   Providing individuals with protection against abuses of 
power is therefore necessary and harkens the need for independent third party oversight.  
Indeed, in a participatory democracy that is committed to, inter alia, the ROL, there must 
be well-defined limits placed on state power.  As Professor Jerome Skolnick perceptively 
writes, 
[W]hen law is used as the instrument of social order, it necessarily poses a 
dilemma.  The phrase ‘law and order’ is misleading because it draws attention 
away from the substantial incompatibilities existing between the two ideas.  Order 
under law suggests procedures different from achievement of ‘social control’ 
through threat of coercion and summary judgment.  Order under law is concerned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Dennis Forcese, “Police and the Public” in Robin Neugebauer, ed, Criminal Injustice: 
Racism in the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000) at 180. 
29 David Erdos, “Judicial Culture and the Politicolegal Opportunity Structure: Explaining 
Bill of Rights Legal Impact” (2009) 34 Law & Soc Inquiry 95 at 95. 
30 See generally Graham Mayeda, “Between Principle and Pragmatism: The Decline of 
Principled Reasoning in the Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court” (2010) 50 SCLR (2d) 
41. 
31 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1986) at179. 
32 David C Perrier, “An Introduction to Criminal Law” in Joel E Pink & David C Perrier, 
eds, From Crime to Punishment: An Introduction to the Criminal Justice System, 6th ed 
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 12.  
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not merely with the achievement of regularized social activity but with the means 
used to come by peaceable behavior, certainly with procedure, but also with 
positive law…In short, ‘law’ and ‘order’ are frequently found to be in opposition, 
because law implies rational restraint upon the rules and procedures utilized to 
achieve order.  Order under law, therefore, subordinates the ideal of conformity to 
the ideal of legality.33 
It is therefore the case that the criminal law is “not merely an instrument of order, 
but may frequently be its adversary.”34  Thus, there is a vital distinction between law on 
the one hand and the bald assertion of authority by the state on the other—even when 
both forces are aimed at ostensibly similar objectives.  While it is apparent that the 
objectives of law enforcement are oftentimes antagonistic to the maintenance and 
exercise of civil liberties, the balancing of these competing interests is not a zero sum 
equation in which one side can fully eclipse the other.  Notwithstanding the fact that, in 
reality, “perfect”35 or full-enforcement of the law is not truly possible,36 it must be said 
that, if it were, such a state of affairs would not be desirable.37  As Professor Herbert 
Packer neatly summarizes, “if the criminal law were followed to its strict letter the results 
would be intolerable.”38  Adding some gloss on the point, Stanley Beck indicates 
correctly that, “there are many powers we deny to the police that, if granted, would 
undoubtedly increase their efficiency.  Yet we withhold the grant, not because we wish to 
hamper law enforcement, but because there are values we place above efficient police 
work.”39  This harkens our attention to the need for the thorny issues associated with 
allocations of police powers to be publicly declared through the democratic process for 
the twin reasons that: one, this stands as the site at which the government can later be 
held politically accountable for unpopular policy choices; and two, the enactment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Skolnick, “Democratic Order”, supra note 2 at 39-40. 
34 Ibid at 38 [footnote omitted]. 
35 Michael Plaxton, “Offence Definitions, Conclusive Presumptions, and Slot Machines” 
(2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 145 at 164. 
36 Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1968) at 286 [Packer, The Limits]. 
37 Stanley A Cohen, “Invasion of Privacy: Police and Electronic Surveillance in Canada" 
(1982) 27 McGill LJ 619 at 636 [Cohen, “Invasion”]. 
38 Packer, The Limits, supra note 36 at 290. 
39 Stanley M Beck, “Electronic Surveillance and the Administration of Criminal Justice” 
(1968) 46 Can Bar Rev 643 at 687 [emphasis added]. 
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legislation stipulating the limits of state power (and, at least implicitly, the corresponding 
diminishment of civil liberties) provides further oversight of government activities by 
making these actions amenable to challenge under s. 1 of the Charter.  
1.2.3 Individual Rights and Judicial Review   
The legal effect of the repatriated Constitution (and the entrenchment of the Charter) 
cannot be overstated.  It profoundly altered the very framework for law and governance 
in Canada. Undoubtedly, the vesting of the SCC with authority as the final arbiter on 
questions of constitutionality stands amongst the greatest changes precipitated by the 
Charter.  However, in addition to the aggrandized duties assigned to judicial institutions, 
the Charter simultaneously imposed important limitations on government power vis-à-vis 
citizens and for the first time conferred constitutional protections on the individual rights 
of citizens.   Under the Charter these rights are enforceable against the state and 
backstopped by justiciable remedies.40  
Prior to 1982, individual rights were not enshrined in any constitutional 
instrument and could be abridged at will by governments.  In this era, the federal and 
provincial governments were free to legislate in ways that allowed for the disparate 
treatment of citizens and other persons,41 provided that the legislation in question fell 
within one of the government’s spheres of legislative competency as set out in the 
Constitution Act, 1867.42  Indeed, under the terms of the original constitution no limits 
were placed upon the powers of government vis-à-vis citizens.43  It is unsurprising then, 
that prior to the Charter any “gaps in the patchwork of statutory and common law rules 
relating to police powers were rarely of any practical concern to law enforcement.”44  
Thus, the police enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion in deciding how to act and faced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Charter, supra note 1, s 24 and 52. 
41 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 26 at 3.  For example see R v Quong-Wing, 
(1914) 49 SCR 440.  
42 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. 
43 James Stribopoulos, “Constitutional Controls on Police Powers In Canada as 
Compared to Japan” (2004) 5 J Centre Int’l Stud 31 at 31 [Stribopoulos, “Constitutional 
Controls”]. 
44 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 26 at 4. 
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little, if any, consequence where they were found to have violated an individual’s civil 
liberties in court. 45   
The advent of the Charter heralded a new day for law and governance in Canada.  
The Court’s role expanded significantly with the responsibility of scrutinizing legislative 
and executive exercises to confirm their constitutional compliance.46  Courts must 
determine not only whether a law authorizes a particular state intrusion on liberty or 
privacy, but assess whether the authorizing source meets with constitutional standards.47 
Implicit in the design, is the requirement that judges are now compelled to interpret and 
give meaning to the clauses set out in the Charter.  In addition, the drafters of the Charter 
also saw fit to expressly provide the judiciary with the authority to grant broad, 
discretionary remedies.48  Such oversight powers should not be seen as conflicting with 
democratic principles,49 rather, when used properly these powers work to preserve and 
strengthen our democracy.50  At least in theory, this is how things are supposed to work.  
As will be shown, the Court’s actions under the APD (coupled with the inaction of 
Parliament) have, however, called some of these foundational premises into question.  
The Charter expressly invites the enforcement of the rights and freedoms that it 
guarantees and provides a mechanism for the vindication of constitutional rights.  
Engrained in the Charter is the basic idea that constitutional rights exist to place limits 
upon the means through which the government may pursue its chosen ends. It does not, 
in itself, compel state action.51  This notion was first articulated by Mr. Justice Dickson 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid [footnote omitted]. 
46 James Stribopoulos, “Has the Charter Been for Crime Control?  Reflecting on 25 Years 
of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in Canada” in Margaret E Beare, ed, Honouring 
Social Justice: Honouring Dianne Martin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 
351-352 [Stribopoulos, “Crime Control”]. 
47 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 26 at 15. 
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50 Ibid. 
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(as he then was) for a unanimous Court in Hunter v Southam,52 where he informed 
Canadians that: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document.  Its 
purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms it enshrines.  It is intended to constrain governmental 
action inconsistent with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an 
authorization for governmental action.53 
 
Although a significant pronouncement, it must be said, however, that the rights contained 
in the Charter are neither absolute nor inviolable.  The “misnomer”54 contained in the 
reputed guarantee of rights in Section 1 of the Charter has been pointed out by Professor 
Don Stuart who illuminates the reality that in actual fact this provision provides an 
entryway for the Court to confirm the limitations of these rights that have been stipulated 
in legislation.  Nevertheless, where the government wishes to pursue actions that infringe 
upon rights, it now must establish that its chosen course of action is demonstrably 
justified and reflects reasonable limits on the rights that are to be abridged.55  Moreover, 
incursions by the state into Charter-protected areas must be “prescribed by law” 56 in 
order to be upheld as constitutional exercises of state authority.  This requirement is the 
embodiment of the POL and reflective of its constitutionalization.  If the government fails 
in this regard it risks having its legislation declared invalid and set aside by the courts.  
Therefore, it is important that we recognize that the Court’s use of the APD deprives 
individual’s of the ability to access their rights under s. 1 of the Charter and 
concomitantly the state of need for it to provide a compelling justification for its actions. 
Section 32 of the Charter extends its reach beyond the simple review of 
legislation to ensure that it is constitutionally fit.  It goes further to place all government 
actions under the watchful gaze of the Court and “put the legality of police actions into 
question.”57  The legal rights (ss. 7-14) stipulated in the Charter address the most 	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53 Ibid at 155 [emphasis added]. 
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55 Charter, supra note 1, s 1. 
56 Ibid. 
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prevalent investigative tactics used during citizen-police encounters.58  Consequently, 
improper or unlawful conduct on the part of the police during a criminal investigation can 
now trigger remedial relief for a defendant facing trial. 59  This was a significant 
advancement in Canadian law and is compatible with the edicts of the ROL.  As such, the 
Charter is foundational to our conception and understanding of lawful policing measures 
as it directly imposes limitations on law enforcement power.60  Not only does it establish 
certain baseline parameters for the police to meet, it also serves as the yardstick against 
which police actions are to be measured.  The inclusion of the remedial provisions 
contained in s. 24 of the Charter has precipitated an unprecedented volume of state 
actions being challenged by individuals. Those contesting the propriety of state action 
now have many planks upon which to advance their arguments. So, when the police 
deviate from these threshold constitutional standards, the state, is now liable, and stands 
to incur legal consequences for the unlawful actions of its agents.  In short, the Charter 
defines the relationship between the governed and the governors.  It sets the limits, 
provides the rules of the game and expects that the Court is there to officiate.  As will be 
demonstrated however, the use of the Waterfield test by the judiciary has seriously 
impaired this dynamic and forces us to reexamine—if not, reposition altogether—our 
understanding of the Court’s role in the administration of the criminal justice system.  
  1.2.4 The Principle of Legality and the Canon of Strict Construction  
As stated previously, we need not cling to the view that the principle of legality 
exclusively demands the legislative conferral of police powers.  Rather, we can (and, 
indeed must) broaden our conception of the POL to include those common law powers 
that pre-date Canadian law.61  This articulation of the POL—and the allowance that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Stanley A Cohen, “Controversies in Need of Resolution: Some Threshold Questions 
Affecting Individual Rights and Police Powers Under the Charter” (1984) 16 Ottawa L 
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59 See Nancy Reichman, “Moving Backstage: Uncovering the Role of Compliance 
Practices in Shaping Regulatory Practices” in Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd, eds, 
White-Collar Crime Reconsidered (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992) at 254 
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made for common law police powers—is harmonious with the law as established by early 
English jurisprudence and thus, the Anglo-Canadian common law tradition.62  The case 
of Entick v Carrington63 is illustrative of how the common law is properly used when 
determining the limits of executive power.  There it was observed that judges are to "see 
if such a justification can be maintained by the text of the statute law, or by the principles 
of common law,”64 which is necessary in order to sanctify, as lawful, any state intrusion 
upon the “sphere of personal sovereignty”65 that resides with citizens.  Where recognized 
common law rules were found to exist, they then became applicable in the case at bar.  
Subject to the demands of the Charter, this position has retained its currency and remains 
the law in Canada.  In this way, we are able to accept, for instance, the Supreme Court’s 
recognition in Cloutier v Langlois66 of the historically rooted common law power 
permitting searches as incident to lawful arrest as being consistent with the POL.  
However, we should equally (and vigorously) reject the announcement of novel 
investigative powers created through the APD.  The reason for this is that the common 
law power recognized in Cloutier is predicated on a substantive rule that is amenable to 
the application of stare decisis in the ordinary course—and also, Charter scrutiny. By 
contrast, police powers generated by the Court using the APD are not forged from any 
articulable substantive common law rule.  Rather, the Court’s APD-based lawmaking 
derives exclusively from Waterfield/Dedman and amounts to a procedural rule in favour 
of the Court—one made by the Court itself—permitting it to fashion unprecedented 
police powers after-the-fact, if and when, it sees fit to do so in a given case.  That is the 
linchpin and sole legal basis for the rules generated through APD jurisprudence.  Plainly, 
this sets the Court’s post-Charter ancillary common law police powers apart from—and 	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stands them on markedly different legal footing—those common law powers that do 
comply with the POL.  It also reveals the Court’s accretion of lawmaking authority in this 
area to have been self-authorized, which must be seen as a deeply troubling development 
in Canadian law.   
Before proceeding, there is another important concept that emerges from Entick. 
The case stands for the proposition that where unambiguous legal authorization is found 
to be wanting, courts are required to disclaim the police actions as ultra vires assertions 
of state power. Thus, we find that the POL stands in close proximity (and is intimately 
related)67 to the canon of strict construction.   Hence, in his explanation of the POL, 
Professor TRS Allan, writes that its primary significance,  
lies in the court’s insistence that the burden of establishing the requisite executive  
authority to act is borne by him who asserts it.  In the absence of convincing proof 
that the issue and execution of general warrants of search and seizure were 
sanctioned in law, the conclusion must be that they were not.68   
 
Continuing this exposition, Allan rightly observes that, “the refusal of courts to sanction 
departures from the ordinary law in the interests of the state, as those interests were 
interpreted by officials [in favour of themselves]”69 is in precise conformity with what the 
POL demands.  It follows from the preceding discussion that the preserve of individual 
liberty remains wide and unimpeded, save for those areas that have been impacted by 
valid legal authority.  Placed in the context of the post-Charter legal framework this 
should compel the finding that unauthorized police actions are, on their face, illegal in 
nature.  Following that determination, it remains open to the state to argue under s. 24(2) 
that any ill-gotten evidence should nevertheless be admitted against an accused in support 
of the criminal conviction that is being sought.  But it should also be abundantly clear 
that POL-abridging violations of the Charter do not provide an appropriate legal 
foundation to confer common law police powers on state actors.  This adjudicative model 
is one that has been adopted previously by the SCC in police powers cases.70  However, 
the Court has not been consistent in its approach and has demonstrably retreated from the 
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Diceyan model in recent times.71  Yet, in doing so, the Court has failed to offer a cogent 
explanation (much less a convincing rationale) for why it has seen fit to depart from its 
traditional role as protectors of civil liberties against untoward encroachments from the 
state.  Even if we are to regard the substantive allocations of power that have been made 
in favour of the state as ones that are desirable in nature, for instance, permitting the 
forcible entry into homes in response to 911 emergency calls to determine public safety 
needs, we must not allow the Court’s apparent pragmatism to blind us to the fact that 
these powers have been doled out non-democratically.  Moreover, the 
Waterfield/Dedman test is not properly attuned (or designed) to weigh the competing 
principles that are inherent in policymaking, for, it is itself an ad hoc and undemocratic 
creation.  As I will show, the use of the APD stands as an unnecessary and unpredictable 
mechanism to determine important matters of social policy effecting the individual rights 
of Canadians, particularly as we find that it has been used to unfairly (and uniformly) 
benefit the state.  Additionally, and notwithstanding the apparent legal position occupied 
by the APD in Canadian law, there remains ample reason for us to oppose the 
undemocratic expansion of coercive state power by an unelected judiciary.  At root, these 
objections are located in equality-based principles and the need for courts to safeguard 
citizens (especially those most vulnerable in society) against oppressive or otherwise 
unconstitutional treatment at the hands of the state.  This is especially so once it is seen 
that there is a substantial risk that discretionary police powers may be misapplied on a 
disproportionately basis against certain communities;72 ones that are comprised of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Michael Plaxton, “Police Powers After Dicey” (2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 99 at 101 
[Plaxton, “Police Powers”]. 
72 For example see R v Golden, 2001 SCC 83 at para 83, [2001] 3 SCR 679 where the 
Supreme Court declared that, “African-Canadians and Aboriginal people are over-
represented in the criminal justice system and are therefore likely to represent a 
disproportionate number of those who are arrested by police and subjected to personal 
searches, including strip searches.”  Similar conclusions pertaining to the injurious effects 
of systemic racism and prejudice pervading the Canadian criminal justice system—along 
with recognition of the underlying problem itself—were unanimously identified by the 
Court in, inter alia, R v Spence, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 SCR 48; R v Gladue, [1999] 1 
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persons who are socially marginalized, economically disadvantaged or otherwise 
vulnerable and that are effectively excluded from the political processes that could (and 
should) offer and afford greater equitableness within the criminal justice system.  Hence, 
if courts are seen to be not only consistently siding with the state, but also failing to give 
meaningful effect to the Charter as I contend occurs under the established APD 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, then a great disservice occurs and grave injuries are 
inflicted upon the constitutional rights of Canadians.  It is also results in a duplication of 
the lawmaking function and signals that the rights-protection post has been essentially 
abandoned, or, at least relegated to status as an afterthought.  It would seem inevitable 
that the gradual erosion of Charter rights, alongside the refashioning of constitutionalism 
to favour its participating institutions at the expense of individual rights, would lead to 
the diminished esteem and public confidence that is essential to any proper functioning of 
court and democratic processes in Canada.   
1.3 Policing in Canada 
The presence of police officers on Canadian streets is not merely accepted, but 
rather an expected aspect of public life.  However, beyond the bare expectation that 
police services be provided, seemingly little thought is given to the various functions and 
roles performed by police in society.  Indeed, as Stanley Cohen notes, “almost since the 
appearance of the modern police force the purposes and tasks of the police have been 
mixed.”73  Policing is comprised of a number of distinct elements, which can be 
described in terms of order-maintenance, community service and law enforcement.74  As 
Erica Pasmeny states, “the police exert tremendous power; they choose whether or not to 
ignore certain behaviour, to issue an unofficial caution or to initiate proceedings which 
will channel the suspect into the formal justice process.”75  In this way the police act as 
the gatekeepers to the criminal process.76  Undeniably, they play an indispensible and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Cohen, “Invasion”, supra note 37 at 623. 
74 Ibid at 620. 
75Erica Pasmeny, “Aboriginal Offenders: Victims of Policing and Society” (1992) 56 
Sask L Rev 403 at 403-404 [footnote omitted]. 
76 Clifford D Shearing, “Subterranean Processes in the Maintenance of Power: An 
Examination of the Mechanisms Coordinating Police Action” in KRE McCormick & LA 
Visano, eds, Understanding Policing (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 1992) at 350 
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front line role in the administration of the criminal justice system.77  Nowhere is this 
contested.  I do, however, wish to contest the legal framework that has thrust the police 
into the role of de facto interpreters of constitutional rights in the first instance, which 
frequently permits them to self-determine and exercise their own mandate in dealing with 
citizens. For reasons that I will explore later in my thesis, unlike Professor Michael 
Plaxton,78 I do not see the police as administrative actors whose decisions should be 
presumptively entitled to deference from the judiciary.79  Instead, the application of 
coercive, discretionary authority over citizens must be closely analyzed and carefully 
monitored to ensure its continual compliance with constitutional standards. 
1.3.1 Duties 
Writing prior to the Charter, Clayton Ruby explained the common law duties 
incumbent upon the police as follows: 
[Police] constables have a duty to prevent crime and a duty when a crime is 
committed to bring the offender to justice; to preserve for use in court evidence of 
crime which has come into their possession without wrong on their part; to 
prevent apprehended breaches of the peace; and to enforce statutes and by-laws.80 
 
The Supreme Court affirmed this in Dedman v The Queen81 where it was held that, “at 
common law the principal duties of police officers are the preservation of the peace, the 
prevention of crime, and the protection of life and property.”82 For the most part these 
duties have now been codified and statutorily incorporated into police services 
legislation.83  Although the Supreme Court has stated that, “[p]olice powers and police 
duties are not necessarily correlative,”84 it is evident nonetheless that such broadly 
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78 Supra note 71. 
79 Ibid at 120. 
80 Clayton C Ruby, “Obstructing a Police Officer” (1973) 15 CLQ 375 at 394 [footnotes 
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81 [1985] 2 SCR 2 para 35, 20 DLR (4th) 321. 
82 Ibid at para 65. 
83 Stanley Cohen, “Policing Security: The Divide Between Crime and Terror” (2004) 15 
NJCL 405 at 434.  See also Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Law of Police Authority: The 
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defined duties do not tell us very much about what the police may do in furtherance of 
their duties.85  The most troubling and problematical of these duties in both legal and 
practical terms is the duty to prevent crime.86  As Cohen points out, the assertion “that 
one of the prime functions of the police is the ‘prevention of crime’ is largely 
uncontroverted due to the looseness which attends to the use and meaning of the 
phrase.”87  Thus, rather than calling attention to the fact that such an overarching duty is 
neither self-executing nor self-limiting, it has instead become accepted as a homily.88  As 
will be shown in Chapter Two, the considerable breadth of police duties is directly 
implicated in the Waterfield test and has had an important effect on its application. 
1.3.2 Sources of Police Power 
The “lack of specificity in police powers”89 is a regrettable hallmark of Canadian 
law.  In Canada, police powers have seldom been conveyed with exactitude.  Indeed, as 
Luther and Coughlan have pointed out, imprecision and a general “lack of clarity”90 has 
long shrouded the governing limits on the exercise of coercive authority by police.91  
Much of this problem stems from the absence of comprehensive statutory provisions.  In 
this regard, Canada as a country lags significantly behind other Commonwealth nations.92  
To the extent that existing legislation fails to provide clear directives, and where 
internally developed policing policy leaves the individual officer on the street with no 
clear mandate, it is then left to officers to determine and to interpret for themselves what 
they should be doing at a given time or in a particular circumstance.93  This should be 
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troubling to everyone, including the police.  Presently, individual police officers in 
Canada are allocated an unnecessarily broad level of discretion when discharging their 
responsibilities as law enforcement agents.94 And, as my analysis will demonstrate they 
are subject to inadequate oversight measures.  This is unfortunate, given that greater 
clarity in the law would benefit everyone holding a stake in the administration of justice 
in society. 
Policing is a matter of overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction within the 
Canadian constitutional framework, and as Coughlan explains,“[b]oth Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures have the jurisdiction to create police forces and both levels of 
government have done so.”95  Indisputably, the enactment of statutory powers is the most 
authoritative way to confer authority upon agents of the state.96  Additionally, the 
legislative process carries the benefit of being the clearest and most comprehensive way 
to specify the lawful bounds of police conduct.  For example, s. 495 of the Criminal 
Code97 grants the police the authority to arrest persons without a warrant and then goes 
on to itemize the criteria that must be satisfied in order to trigger this power.  In other 
words, it stipulates on a prospective basis the parameters of the warrantless arrest power.  
This is the most optimal way to delineate and structure police powers—both in terms of 
substance and process.   By contrast, the creation of ex post facto common law powers on 
an ad hoc basis leads to incomplete (and sometimes nebulous)98 rules that tend to raise 
more questions than they answer.99  It will be argued throughout this thesis that the 
democratic process is to be preferred over the adjudicative process when it comes to the 
matter of introducing new or expanded forms of coercive investigative powers.  Indeed, 
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the position that I advance holds that the legislative process is not only the most 
efficacious, it is only legitimate means of extending state power over citizens because it 
complies with the POL and enables the application of s. 1 analysis.  In short, this is the 
only way in which for police powers to be “structured, confined and checked”100 that 
demands lawmakers and the Court to perform their respective—yet, separate and 
severable—constitutionally-assigned functions.   
Unfortunately, legislation is not the only method through which the police derive 
their authority.  Court decisions have also been a wellspring of police powers.  Indeed, 
this phenomenon is the central preoccupation of this thesis.  Given that the APD will be 
examined extensively throughout the remainder of this work, it is appropriate now to take 
a brief look at the other non-statutory sources of police power.  First, there have been 
several instances where the Court has recognized exercises of state power as being 
implicitly stated within legislation.  On a number of occasions the Supreme Court has 
professed to find “implied statutory powers”101 (ISP) during the interpretation of 
legislation offered by the state in support of the lawfulness of impugned police actions.  
Conceptually, in such cases the Court stops short of creating police powers “out of whole 
cloth”102 as they do when using the APD.  However, such adjudicative techniques still 
evince a form of “hands-on”103 judicial instrumentalism.104 Explaining the distinction 
between ISP-based reasoning and the APD, Mr. Justice LeBel writing in dissent—and 
with no shortage of irony—in the case of R v Orbanski; R v Elias,105 elucidated in his 
remarks, that, “[i]f there is something missing in the statute, let us read in the necessary 
powers [using ISP-anchored logic].  Failing that, let us go to the common law and find or 	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create something there [through Waterfield].”106  However, in spite of their analytical 
differences, the practical effect is the same: both courses of action have served to enlarge 
the ambit of state authority.  Second, there exists a pool of common law powers that pre-
dated not only the Charter, but also Canadian law.107  Much like the use of handcuffs to 
restrain arrested individuals, the police routinely conduct incidental searches of those 
under arrest, which “can vary in intrusiveness from a mere pat-down to a complete strip 
search.”108  Interestingly, all of the search powers alluded to by Stribopoulos have found 
their genesis in Supreme Court jurisprudence and are each common law creations.  The 
decision in Cloutier v Langlois109 gave the police the power to search as an incident of a 
lawful arrest,110 R v Golden111 permitted the use of strip searches and, more recently, the 
Court in R v Mann112 authorized protective pat-down searches in circumstances where a 
person has been detained, but not yet arrested.  The bedrock for each of these historic 
powers was found to reside in ancestral judicial precedents and then adapted to fit the 
circumstances of these cases.  There is an important caveat impeding the future 
recognition of lingering, unarticulated common law powers: they must be Charter 
compliant.  If they are not,113 then the Court must modernize these residual powers and 
bring them in line with constitutional standards or else repudiate them.114  Thus although 
not extinguished, historical common law powers have likely been exhausted.   
Finally, and although not a source per se, we must confront the presence of “de 
facto or default police powers.”115  These powers derive not from any special powers 
given to the police, but rather are ones that flow from an individual officer’s capacity as a 	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citizen.  As agents of the state, when an individual takes on the position of a police 
officer, he or she acquires a new series of responsibilities and rights that set them apart 
from the rest of the community.  Individual police officers each possess dual-capacities.  
To begin, they possess in their capacity as private citizens and all of the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by everyone else in the community.  However, in their capacity as law 
enforcement officials acting on behalf of the state, they are imbued with the further 
privileges and duties.  Accordingly, many common police actions that would otherwise 
be illegal are permitted because they have been allocated by either authorization or 
justification in law.116  This meshes with the rule of law, for as Dicey long ago 
articulated:  
[N]o man is above the law…every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is 
subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary [courts and] tribunals….In[deed] the idea of legal equality, or of the 
universal subjection of all classes, to one law administered by the ordinary Courts, 
has been pushed to its utmost limit [such that] every official, from the Prime 
Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same 
responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen.117  
 
Therefore, it is because—and only because—the law provides for these exceptions that 
the police can legitimately claim the right to exercise what are extraordinary powers vis-
à-vis other members of the same political community.118   Importantly then, the 
aggrandized power enjoyed by law enforcement officials requires a recognized source in 
law to be considered valid.  Otherwise police officers act unlawfully when undertaking 
coercive actions against others and risks legal consequences for the state along with the 
prospect of personal liability.119 Yet, as Stribopoulos has observed, “[t]he reality is that 
much coercion and control take place on an informal level through orders of legally 	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dubious quality, directing individuals to move along or to desist from behaviour that an 
officer considers undesirable”120 even though the police have no legal authority to justify 
their actions as legitimate in the circumstances.  Irrespective of whether it is guided by “a 
respect for or fear of authority,”121 it remains the fact that “where the law is unclear or 
unstated, the police in practice control most situations where they interact with the 
public.”122  These are the practical realities that govern social relations between the police 
and the citizenry on Canadian streets.123 In addition, it has been suggested the courts tend 
to take an “idealized view”124 of policing and commonly display a deferential posture 
with respect to police decision-making.125  These points must be kept in mind, for later, 
when we consider how the confluence of undemocratic decision-making by the police 
and the judiciary has led expansion of both state and judicial powers in Canada. 
1.4 The Politicization of the Criminal Law 
The rise of judge-made police powers has not happened in a vacuum.  Paralleling 
the increased activity of the Court has been the noticeable inactivity of Parliament, and as 
I will argue one could not have happened without the other.  Let us now briefly explore 
the prevailing political climate that has accompanied the expansion of ancillary police 
powers.  To begin, we must understand the ethos that is dominant within Parliament 
when it does exercise its legislative prerogative under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 
1867126 to create criminal law.  From there, when we confront the episodic idleness of 
Parliament following Supreme Court judgments dealing with the common law limits of 
police powers, inferences can be drawn about the desirability of the Court’s rulings under 
the APD from the perspective of elected lawmakers.  It is not my argument that 
Parliament has ceded ground to the Court generally or that it is prepared to permit a more 
robust course of judicial lawmaking in Canada.  Rather, my assertion is more modest.  It 
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is simply that the results arising from the policymaking path that the Supreme Court has 
undertaken in relation to police powers is consistent with Parliament’s orientation and 
conforms to its objectives.  Hence, the government has seemingly been content to simply 
avoid the task of reforming police powers legislatively and gladly accepted the delivery 
of police powers by the Court.127  If Parliament were to instead take up the task of 
comprehensively regulating police powers this would mark a significant step forward in 
Canadian criminal law and be a welcomed development; and, this would hold regardless 
of whether such actions arose from an independent choice by Parliament to do so of its 
own volition, or, if these measure were only undertaken in response to external pressures, 
for instance, when met by the refusal of the Court to supply its agents with ancillary 
common law powers during the litigation process, which it may perceive as an adverse 
judicial ruling and contrary to its interests. 
1.4.1 The Rhetoric of Crime and the Burgeoning of Police Power  
Over time there has been a “rhetorical shift from ‘crime prevention’ or ‘crime 
control’ to ‘war on crime’”128 and a byproduct of this discourse has been to firmly 
entrench the power of law enforcement officers to intrude into the lives of citizens,129 on 
the basis of supposed necessity.  Contemporaneously, Canadian policing agencies have 
come to view themselves as crime fighters engaged in a war against those who perpetrate 
it.130  In this constructed “us-them world view,”131 the police are cast as the bulwark 
against society’s descent into chaos.  Yet, this ignores the fact that, in actuality, law 
enforcement makes up only a small fraction of what police officers do.132  Research has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Kent Roach, “Dialogic Judicial Review and Its Critics” (2004) 23 SCLR (2d) 49 at 
102.  See also Richard Jochelson, “Multidimensional Analysis as a Window into 
Activism Scholarship: Searching for Meaning with Sniffer Dogs” (2009) 24 Can JL & 
Soc 231 at 236 [Jochelson, “Multidimensional”]. 
128 Cohen, “Invasion”, supra note 37 at 627. 
129 See generally David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporary Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
130 Stribopoulos, “Unchecked”, supra note 102 at 245. 
131 Alan Young, “All Along the Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police 
Function” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ 329 at 338 [Young, “Watchtower”]. 
132 Greg Marquis, “Power from the Street: The Canadian Municipal Police” in RC 
Macleod & David Schneiderman, eds, Police Powers in Canada: The Evolution and 
Practice of Authority (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 32.  See also 
Young, “Watchtower”, supra note 131 at 334. 
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shown that police spend the majority of their time—between 75 and 80 percent—engaged 
in activities that are not directly related to either the investigation of crime or the 
apprehension of criminal suspects.133  All of this suggests that the police spend 
significantly less time than is commonly thought engaged in the investigation of criminal 
violations and indicates that lawmakers should give closer consideration to the nature of 
the police function.134  An objective determination of what the police actually do is 
essential and sits logically prior to making any normative decision about what powers 
that police should possess.  Policymaking that is informed by anecdote, conjecture and 
speculation—or, simply an incomplete host of facts—is bound to miss it mark, as it 
fundamentally aimless.  Yet, as George Harrison once wrote, “[i]f you don’t know where 
you’re going, [a]ny road will get you there.”135  Even though the “crime fighting self-
image is more rhetoric than reality, it exerts a considerable influence upon how…police 
officers exercise their discretion,”136 how citizens respond to police commands and how 
the oversight of these discretionary actions unfolds.  Concerning the latter point, one that 
is pertinent to the primary topic of this thesis, I will suggest that these conditions have 
cumulatively led to the police being afforded undue deference too frequently at the street-
level and in courtrooms alike.137   
Underlying the resistance to clarify and modernize the criminal law is the fact that 
the public is generally misinformed and largely ignorant of the actual machinations of the 
criminal justice system and the importance of “due process”138 rights.  As Professor 
Douglas Husak observes, “[f]ew persons empathize with potential defendants and 
understand that these rights protect the general public, and are not devices contrived by 
clever lawyers to enable the guilty to escape their just deserts.”139  This is a point that 
cannot be overstated.  Explaining its centrality, Professor Alan Young writes: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Blake, “The Role”, supra note 93 at 78.   
134 Debra Livingston, “Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment” 
(1998) U Chi Legal F 261 at 263.  See also Charles E Silberman, Criminal Violence, 
Criminal Justice (New York: Random House, 1978) at 203. 
135 George Harrison, “Any Road” on Brainwashed (London: Parlophone, 2002). 
136 Stribopoulos, “Constitutional Controls”, supra note 43 at 37 [footnotes omitted]. 
137 Supra note 123. 
138 Packer, The Limits, supra note 36 at 153. 
139 Husak, Philosophy, supra note 23 at 34 [emphasis added]. 
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Charter rights may incidentally benefit individual litigants, yet their essential 
benefit must be to ensure that the state remains within its constitutionally-limited 
authority.  A Charter violation must be remedied not only to shield the individual 
from prejudice, arising from unconstitutional conduct, but also to force the state to 
comply with the prescriptions of the Charter in future cases.140   
 
The police should not be crippled in their ability to investigate and apprehend those that 
cause serious harm in society.  Such would be contrary to the public interest.  Yet, and 
offering an important caution to those favouring law enforcement and “crime control”141 
at the expense of civil liberties (or even the ROL), Skolnick writes that, “it is equally in 
the public good that police power should be controlled and confined so as not to interfere 
with personal freedom”142 unnecessarily or disproportionately.  Both objectives are 
worthy and do require protection.  There is wisdom in the observation of Beck who 
writes that: 
In a time when crime has become a major public issue, we are prone to grant the 
police the powers they claim they need to protect us.  But it is just such a time that 
we should be most careful to scrutinize the validity of such claims.143 
 
Calibrating the desirable extent of police power thus becomes a political question and one 
that should be resolved democratically in the political arena. 
 1.4.2 Fostering a Healthy “Dialogue” About Police Powers in Canada 
The “law and order”144 bent of Parliament is underpinned by a misguided public 
perception of the magnitude of the problems at hand and a basic ignorance on the part of 
citizens of what is really at stake whenever individual liberty is bartered for the promise 
of increased collective security.  But when “[t]here are no votes in being soft on 
crime,”145 as Stuart suggests, it is hardly surprising that law and policy have taken on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Young, “Watchtower”, supra note 131 at 396. 
141 Packer, The Limits, supra note 36 at 153. 
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(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967) at 10. 
143 Stanley M Beck, “Electronic Surveillance and the Administration of Criminal Justice” 
(1968) 46 Can Bar Rev 643 at 687. 
144 Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 54 at 10-12.  See also Stuart, “Recodify”, supra 
note 18 at 89. 
145 Ibid at 14. See also Kent Roach, “A Charter Reality Check: How Relevant Is the 
Charter to the Justness of Our Criminal Justice System?” (2008) 40 SCLR (2d) 717 at 
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decidedly more punitive and retributive edge.146  As Young has remarked, “[t]here have 
been no significant crime waves to warrant the sudden return to overcriminalization, yet 
there has [nevertheless] been a perception that urban society has been hit by a tidal wave 
of crime.”147  This popular discourse is fueled by how crime related issues are framed in 
the media.148 In spite of declining crime statistics, Canadian “[p]oliticians of all stripes 
have been unable to resist the political expediency of pandering to the perceived need to 
toughen penal responses.”149  Therefore, when judicial decisions come down in favour of 
expanding coercive state power they reflect a windfall that is perceived to be a boon to 
the state and not as indicative of a pressing problem that warrants correction.   
Conversely, when Supreme Court judgments refuse to extend the reach of police 
into areas not covered by legislation, the government seemingly has a much stronger 
incentive to act.  Indeed, history is replete with examples of cases where the Court having 
identified “gaps”150 in the law has nevertheless exercised restraint and declined to create 
new police powers.151  Adjudication of this kind is consonant with what Packer labels the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that they are ‘soft on crime’ or ‘soft on terrorism’, there is a real danger of a punitive 
spiral in criminal justice policies.  The fuel for such spirals is often social anxiety rather 
than evidence about either the threat or the effectiveness of a punitive response.”  Nor, in 
my view, is the public giving an accurate portrayal of the impact that proposed legislative 
measures will have upon Charter rights and lives of those most susceptible to state 
intrusion who are likely to bear the brunt of state exercises of power.   
146 For example see Don Stuart, “The Anti-terrorism Bill (Bill C-36): An Unnecessary 
Law and Order Fix that Permanently Stains the Canadian Criminal Justice System" 
(2002) 14 NJCL 153. See also Don Stuart, “The Dangers of Quick Fix Legislation in the 
Criminal Law: The Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36 Should Be Withdrawn” in Ronald J 
Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds, The Security of Freedom: Essays on 
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); and Kent 
Roach, “Panicking over Criminal Organizations: We Don’t Need Another Offence” 
(2000) 44 CLQ 1. 
147 Alan N Young, “Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum 
Content of the Criminal Law” (2008) 40 SCLR 441 at 454. 
148 See generally, Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman & David Taras, The Last 
Word: Media Coverage of the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006). 
149 Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 54 at 14. 
150 See Kang-Brown, supra note 92 at paras 4, 6 and 50; Orbanski, supra note 105 at para 
83; and Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s. 27(1), [1984] 2 SCR 697 at 727, 14 
DLR (4th) 546. 
151 Don Stuart, “The Unfortunate Dilution of Section 8 Protection: Some Teeth Remain” 
(1999) 25 Queen’s LJ 65 at 85.  
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“strict construction doctrine.”152 This posits that, courts, when called upon, are to err in 
favour of individual liberty rather than empowering state agents with any additional 
authority over citizens that have not been stipulated in statutory form.153 Underlying this 
judicial philosophy is the idea that one of the principal functions of the judiciary is to 
protect individual liberties by standing firmly between individuals and the state.154  This 
view also meshes well with conventional conceptions of the Supreme Court’s post-
Charter role in Canadian society.  Regrettably, however, it is equally clear that the Court 
has faltered in this regard and has slipped away from fidelity to the POL.  Indeed, the 
Court’s departure from the Diceyan ideal has been essential to the development of 
common law police powers under the APD. 
In the instances where the Court has declined to create new police powers and 
instead “explicitly called for Parliamentary action,”155 the calls have been heeded and 
consistently answered.156  For example, where the Court refused to legitimate the use of 
video surveillance in R v Wong,157 a practice not then covered by legislation, Parliament 
responded swiftly by introducing warrant provisions to allow the police to pursue this 
form of investigation.158  A similar dynamic was repeated with respect to the following 
police tactics and technologies: the seizure of teeth impressions;159 the extraction of 
blood160 and bodily samples for DNA testing;161 the use of participant surveillance in the 
making of surreptitious electronic recordings;162 tracking devices;163 and warrantless 
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entry powers into private dwellings.164  The application of the canon of strict construction 
in this line of authorities is reflective of the best traditions of the Court.165 It is consistent 
with well-established orthodoxies of criminal law and in particular, judicial fidelity to the 
principle of legality.  Additionally, whenever the court has taken such a stance, 
Parliament has often responded by enacting statutory powers to ameliorate the position of 
its agents, the Crown and the police.166   Regardless, of one’s view of the substantive 
allocations of power given to the police, one great benefit accrues when legislatures are 
spurred to action: improved clarity and predictability in the law.  The provision of 
certainty in the law is always welcome and to be welcomed by all.  Moreover, the fact 
that these powers are brought into being through the democratic process is immeasurably 
preferable.  That the legislative replies have tended to be reactionary and underwhelming 
is not a valid reason to condemn the inter-institutional “dialogue”167 that has emerged 
between Parliament and the Supreme Court.  At its crux, this interplay evinces a well-
functioning legal structure in which the dominant actors perform the roles entrusted to 
them by the constitutional framework in Canada.  Thus, in both process and form there is 
reason to prefer the creation of statutory police powers to those created on an ad hoc, ex 
post facto basis by court decisions.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164  Feeney, supra note 113. For commentary see Robert W Fetterly & Daniel A 
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Chapter Two: The Origins and Evolution of the Ancillary Powers Doctrine 
2.0 Overview 
In this chapter, I will trace the origins of the ancillary powers doctrine (APD) and its 
ascendency in Canadian jurisprudence.  My analysis will begin in the United Kingdom with a 
look at the decision of the Criminal Court of Appeal in R v Waterfield,1 which propounded a 
common law test to determine whether the police in that case had been acting lawfully and in the 
execution of their duties.  The “Waterfield test”2 involves a two-stage inquiry that asks: first, 
whether the police conduct in question fell within the scope of any recognized statutory or 
common law duty; and if so, second, whether the impugned conduct involved an unjustifiable 
use of police powers in the circumstances.3  From there I will examine the reception of this test 
into Canadian criminal law.  The cases will demonstrate that the Canadian version of Waterfield 
bears little resemblance to its English predecessor.  While the two-pronged test articulated in 
Waterfield remains essentially intact, the test has undergone a radical transformation in the 
manner and purpose for which jurists in Canada now apply it.  Yet, in spite of these alterations, 
Waterfield has become interchangeable with the APD and the two remain synonymous.4  As will 
be shown, the characterization of Waterfield as “an odd godfather for common law police 
powers”5 by Mr. Justice Binnie in R v Clayton6 is an apt one.  It is also revealing in its candour.   	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Although the APD has emerged as the preeminent lawmaking tool in police powers cases 
and been proclaimed as an adjudicative touchstone by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC),7 this 
has not always been so.8  Rather, the Court’s record when confronted with deficiencies in 
codified police powers reveals a deeply conflicted body of cases.9  A certain degree of oscillation 
by the SCC over a period of time and across differently constituted panels might be 
understandable and perhaps even expected.10  However, within the Court’s police powers 
jurisprudence we are also able to identify instances of vacillation by particular members of the 
Court during their tenure.  Drawing attention to the waffling of individual judges is therefore 
instructive.  I will suggest that the presence of such ambivalence and intra-court “judicial flip-
flopping”11 calls into question the cogency of the Court’s judgments and should give us reason to 
be suspect of the APD (and other judicial lawmaking devices) as a legitimate means of 
expanding state power.   
2.1 The Introduction of Waterfield into Canadian Law 
2.1.1 The English Decision   
Waterfield12 involved two individuals: Eli Waterfield and Geoffrey Lynn, both of whom 
were convicted of offences related to their dealings with police officers who had been 
investigating a motor vehicle accident.  Each appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA), 
Lynn against convictions for assaulting a police constable during the due execution of his duties 
and for driving a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner on a roadway and Waterfield for having 
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9 Stribopoulos, “Has Everything”, supra note 4 at 400-401. 
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(2009) 47 SCLR 35 at 51-52 [Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”].  See also Donald A Dripps, “Justice 
Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process School” (2005) Ohio St J Crim 
L 125 at 134-135 and 159. 
11 Michael D Cicchini, “Judicial (In)discretion: How Courts Circumvent the Confrontation 
Clause Under Crawford and Davis” (2008) 75 Tenn L Rev 753 at 761.  See also David L 
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counseled, procured and commanded Lynn to commit the assault and for inciting Lynn to drive 
dangerously.13   
 The central issue before the court was whether the police had acted lawfully and in the 
scope of their duties when they surrounded the appellants’ vehicle and attempted to detain the 
men for questioning.  This was a necessary precondition that the Crown needed to establish in 
order to advance its case and overcome the finding of a non-suit.  In deciding the appeal, Lord 
Justice Ashworth found the police actions were not authorized by any statute.  Following a 
review of the jurisprudence that had developed in the United Kingdom, the court found there to 
be ambiguities with respect to the scope and extent of the duties that were to be discharged by 
the police.14  Ashworth J. then proceeded to enunciate what has come to be known as the 
“Waterfield test.”15  He wrote: 
In most cases it is probably more convenient to consider what the police constable was 
actually doing and in particular whether such conduct was prima facie an unlawful 
interference with a person’s liberty or property.  If so, it is then relevant to consider 
whether (a) such conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or 
recognised at common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general scope 
of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of powers associated with the duty.16 
 
Having already determined there to be no legislative provision capable of supporting the police, 
the CCA went on to confirm that the police actions failed to satisfy the enunciated standard at 
common law and acquit the accused.    
Thus, the case stands for the proposition that the police are not permitted to execute their 
duties—the duty to preserve evidence of crime in this instance—in a manner that interferes with 
an individual’s right of property or liberty in the absence of statutory or common law 
authorization.17  Seen in this light the CCA’s holding is harmonious with the “principle of 
legality”18 (POL) and not antithetical to it.  The POL demands that any coercive action taken by 
the state against an individual be expressly and prospectively declared in a competent legislative 	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[Wiretap Reference]. 
16 Waterfield, supra note 1 at 661. 
17 Clayton C Ruby, “Obstructing a Police Officer” (1973) 15 CLQ 375 at 415. 
18 James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the 
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provision.  Indeed, as Professor Rosemary Cairns Way indicates, Waterfield provides “a strong 
judicial statement of the distinction between duty and authority since, even though the police 
officers were acting within the scope of their duty, they lacked the requisite authority to breach 
common law rights.”19  In other words, police powers do not flow axiomatically from their duties 
and the two are not necessarily correlative.  This is an important point.  Beyond its refusal to 
uphold the actions of the police that were challenged in Waterfield, the judgment similarly 
declined to create any enduring “general police powers”20 that would be available to police in 
future investigations.  Lastly, it bears noting that Waterfield has never been used in the United 
Kingdom to broaden police powers.21  As will be shown, this stands in stark contrast with the 
SCC’s current application of Waterfield, which has reconstituted it as a mechanism to stipulate 
ancillary police powers far and wide.22   
2.1.2 The First Wave of Waterfield in Canada 
As the first instance in which the SCC applied the Waterfield test, R v Stenning23 is a 
decision of historical importance.  The facts can be succinctly distilled.  In response to a reported 
disturbance, the police entered a building without a warrant or any statutory authorization that 
would permit them access to the premises.  Police questioned the occupants of the building and 
instructed them to identify themselves.  The occupants, however, refused to cooperate and an 
altercation ensued.  This resulted in Stenning being charged with assaulting a peace officer in the 
execution of his duties.  The accused was acquitted at trial, however on appeal the SCC 
unanimously reversed this decision and substituted a conviction.  Given the dramatic swing in 
the outcome of the case, we might have expected a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion 
from the Court.  Yet, what one finds instead is a judgment that is remarkable only for its brevity, 
the absence of any Canadian authority and the paucity of reasoning it provides.24  The two and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Law of Police Authority: The McDonald Commission and the 
McLeod Report” (1985) 9 Dalhousie LJ 683 at 709 [emphasis added] [Cairns Way, “The Law”]. 
20 Steve Coughlan & Glen Luther, Detention and Arrest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 17. 
21 Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention in Canada” [2005] Crim LR 98 at 104 [Healy, 
“Investigative Detention”].  See also James Stribopoulos, "Has the Charter Been for Crime 
Control? Reflecting on 25 Years of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in Canada" in Margaret E 
Beare ed, Honouring Social Justice: Honouring Dianne Martin (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2008) at 359 [Stribopoulos, “Crime Control”].  
22 Quigley, Procedure, supra note 3 at 5-16. 
23 [1970] SCR 631, 10 DLR (3d) 224 [Stenning]. 
24 Cairns Way, “The Law”, supra note 19 at 712. 
	   45	  
half page decision concentrates primarily on the underlying facts of the case and makes only a 
fleeting reference to Waterfield—quite strange, considering it was used to anchor the Court’s 
holding.   We are therefore left to ponder why the SCC was not “more circumspect when 
considering whether to adopt a single reference in a solitary case [from] a country with a 
somewhat different attitude towards legislating police powers.”25  The question asked is one 
deserving of an answer, but unfortunately a compelling one was not and has not been delivered. 
The basis of the Court’s opinion was articulated by Martland J. who reasoned as follows: 
 
Assuming that [the police officer] did, technically, trespass on the premises, the fact 
remains that he was there to investigate an occurrence which had happened earlier in the 
evening…He had been sent out for that purpose. He was charged, under s. 47 of The 
Police Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 298, with the duty of preserving the peace, preventing 
robberies and other crimes, and apprehending offenders. He was in the course of making 
an investigation, in the carrying out of that duty, when he was assaulted by the 
respondent.26 
 
In short, the Supreme Court in Stenning equated the overarching duties of the police as being 
correlative with their powers.  No measures were taken to delimit the scope of police powers.  
Nor did the Court take any steps to qualify its pronouncement that potential or actual illegality on 
the part of the police does not necessarily render an officer beyond the ambit of his or her 
duties.27  This is directly at odds with Waterfield.  By carving out such a patently results-oriented 
decision,28 the SCC effectively declared that laws, for instance, those forbidding trespasses or 
breaking and entering may be broken by agents of the state provided that they are acting pursuant 
to one of the broadly cast duties to enforce the law.  Needless to say, this calls into question the 
foundational premise inherent in the rule of law that all persons are subject to the same laws.  
Moreover, and before proceeding any further, let us pause to note how the facts in Stenning are 
in no way similar or any way analogous to those in Waterfield.  This fact alone should challenge 
our basic conception of the use of judicial precedents and begs the question of why it used by the 
Supreme Court, for, it is apparent that the Court’s ruling sits uncomfortably on the bedding of 
stare decisis.  This unconventional use of precedent, which will emerge as a persistent theme in 
Canadian APD cases shall be explored more fully in Chapter Four. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Quigley, “Brief Investigatory”, supra note 3 at 939. 
26 Stenning, supra note 23 at 636.  
27 Ibid.  See generally, Healy, “Investigative Detention”, supra note 21 at 99. 
28 Cairns Way, “The Law”, supra note 19 at 712. 
	   46	  
R v Knowlton29 was the next occasion in which the Court invoked Waterfield.  The 
accused has been charged with obstructing a police officer in the course of his duties as a result 
of refusing to comply with police demands that he restrict his movements.  The issue was 
whether the police had acted lawfully when they erected a barricade and cordoned off a section 
of sidewalk forbidding members of the public to circulate freely.  It was common to the appeal 
that the police actions were not expressly authorized by statute.  Equally, it was beyond dispute 
that citizens have the prima facie right to move unimpeded by police.  In resolving the appeal in 
favour of the state, the Court again emphasized that the police were subject to far-reaching duties 
requiring them, inter alia, to preserve the peace and prevent crime pursuant to both provincial 
legislation and the Criminal Code.  To bolster its opinion, the Court referred to the Alberta 
Police Act,30 which purported to grant the police “the power to…perform all duties that are 
assigned to police officers.”31  Once again, broad duties were met with commensurately broad 
powers in the Court’s opinion.  In the wake of this judgment, seemingly any measures taken in 
furtherance of recognized police duties would be upheld as justified under Waterfield.  The 
vagaries of these decisions were not lost upon Professor Alan Grant, who wrote,  
This is not a very satisfactory basis [to assess the propriety of police actions] since it 
appears to be almost limitless in practical application.  It would be very difficult to 
conceive of cases where police officers would not be able to claim to be engaged in 
investigating some occurrence or other police action with a sufficient nexus to one of the 
sweeping duties recognized by the Court.32 
 
Moreover, determining the legality of actions taken by the police on an ex post facto basis is a 
cumbersome and inefficacious method of protecting individuals against overzealous policing.33 
 In sum, Stenning and Knowlton evince a jurisprudence which impliedly assumes that a 
policeman acting in the course of his duties may not be resisted,”34 even though this cannot be 
determined at the actual time that a police-citizen encounter occurs.  Compounding the 
difficulties of such an assessment is the near limitless treatment given to the range of police 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 [1974] SCR 443, 33 DLR (3d) 755 [Knowlton]. 
30 RSA 1971, c 85, ss 2(1), 3(1) and 26(1). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Alan Grant, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the Police: 1970-76” (1978) 20 CLQ 152 at 
156 [emphasis added]. 
33 Cairns Way, “The Law”, supra note 19 at 712. 
34 James Leavy, “Self-Defence Against the Police” (1973) 19 McGill LJ 413 at 422 [footnote 
omitted].  
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duties.  It seems clear that the Court’s abhorrence for the prospect of putative wrongdoers going 
unpunished precipitated the initial use of Waterfield.  Lamentably, these cases were not relegated 
to the annals of history.  Nor can they be dismissed as mere byproducts of the pre-Charter era.   
2.2 The Supreme Court’s Transformation of Waterfield  
Following its maiden voyage across the Atlantic Ocean, Waterfield arrived in Canada to 
little fanfare.  Indeed, at the time of its reception by the SCC in early 1970s—and for a 
significant period thereafter—the Waterfield test was met by a muted response from legal 
commentators.  Perhaps the greatest explanation for the paucity of criticism and general dearth of 
commentary is attributable to the fact that these decisions came prior to the passage of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.35  During this period citizens had few legal recourses 
through which to challenge state actions.36  Accordingly, the lawfulness of police conduct was 
not a serious matter of concern, nor was it amenable to vigorous judicial scrutiny of the kind that 
is possible today.  Moreover, the Waterfield test was seldom applied and was, strictly speaking, 
only dispositive of the narrow question of whether or not an officer had been acting in the course 
of his or her duties as a “peace officer”37 at the time of a given police-citizen encounter.  The 
Court did not, at this stage in history, license police actions generally nor propound any 
freestanding powers under the aegis of Waterfield.  All of this changed in Dedman v The 
Queen.38 
The appeal in Dedman arose from the appellant’s challenge to his conviction for having 
refused to provide a breath sample when demanded to do so by an officer.  The accused had been 
randomly stopped at a police checkpoint that had been established in order to investigate the 
possible intoxication of motorists.  He had not been driving in a manner contrary to any highway 
traffic rule or done anything to arouse police suspicion.  Using highway traffic concerns as 
pretext to make a stop, police would signal drivers to pull over and then demand to see a valid 
licence and proof of insurance and engage them in conversation.  The real aim of the stop 
program, as the Court concluded, was to assess the driver’s apparent level of sobriety and where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 [Charter]. 
36 James Stribopoulos, “Constitutional Controls on Police Powers In Canada as Compared to 
Japan” (2004) 5 J Centre Int’l Stud 31 at 32. 
37 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 2(c) [Criminal Code]. 
38 [1985] 2 SCR 2, 20 DLR (4th) 321 [Dedman]. 
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the officer formed a suspicion that an individual was impaired by alcohol to then demand a 
breath sample.  Although the use of these investigative tactics was not uncommon at the time,39 
there was no legislative authorization for their use.40   
The accused argued before the Supreme Court that he had been arbitrarily detained and 
that the police lacked the legal authority to conduct the investigation in question.  On the basis of 
existing law, one might have thought the Court would have quickly dispatched with this appeal 
and ruled in favour of the accused.  But this is not what happened.  Rather than simply giving 
effect to the principle of legality, a narrow majority of the SCC instead took the novel step of 
applying Waterfield and using it to create new police powers.  This began the “ill-conceived 
transformation [of the Waterfield test] into an expansive law-making device”41 and is for this 
reason a landmark judgment.   
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Le Dain stated that, “I do not think there can be any 
doubt that it fell within the general scope of the duties of a police officer to prevent crime and to 
protect life and property by the control of traffic”42 and thus concluded that the first branch of the 
Waterfield test was easily satisfied.  This echoed the expansive treatment given to the police 
duties in the earlier Canadian jurisprudence that was decided under Waterfield.  At the second 
stage of the analysis Le Dain J. relied upon the following factors to uphold the police actions: the 
seriousness of the problem of impaired driving; the fact that the privilege of driving is a licensed 
activity which the state regulates in a variety of ways; the police policy and the program that it 
instituted had been widely publicized such that the adverse psychological effect upon drivers 
would be lessened; and finally, the inconvenience suffered by those detained would be marginal 
given the short duration of the detention.43  Implicit in this sort of reasoning is a form of 
utilitarian “cost-benefit analysis.”44  As Stribopoulos explains, the Court’s application of 
Waterfield “involve[d] a weighing of the apparent benefits…for law enforcement and public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 18 at 18. 
40 Ibid. 
41 James Stribopoulos, “Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest 
Reconsidered” (2003) 48 McGill LJ 225 at 233. 
42 Dedman, supra note 38 at para 68. 
43 RJ Delisle, “Judicial Creation of Police Powers” (1993) 20 CR (4th) 29 at 29 [Delisle, 
“Judicial Creation”]. 
44 James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” (2003) 
41 Alta L Rev 335 at 349-350.   
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safety…against any resulting interference with individual liberty interests”45 to determine the 
legality of the measures taken by the police.  On the cost side of the ledger we find the arbitrary 
nature of the detentions approved of by the Court, the recognized psychological discomfort that 
those subjected to detention by the police will experience and the potential for the misuse (or 
abuse) of these discretionary powers.46  Offsetting these harms, on the benefit side of the 
equation, the Court relied upon “the importance of the public purpose served”47 in providing 
police with tools aimed at “the deterrence and detection of impaired driving, a notorious cause of 
injury and death.”48  The Court did not require the state to establish the magnitude of the harms 
to be averted.  Instead, they were merely assumed in the ad hoc “means-ends”49 assessment.  As 
a corollary, the government was not called upon to justify the nexus between the means chosen 
to pursue its desired ends and the proportionality of these measures.  Yet, this is not surprising, 
as the Court did not take the Charter into account during its analysis, given that the case arose 
from an incident that happened prior to 1982.50  The Court’s judgment did not therefore squarely 
address whether the police powers generated by its decision complied with constitutional 
standards.  Nor did the Court assess the Charter fitness of the Waterfield test itself.  All of these 
matters were left unresolved.  Spurred by what it perceived to be a terrible social problem, that of 
drunk driving, the Court concluded that redressing the problem required the police to be 
equipped with extraordinary law enforcement powers and they were prepared to provide them,51 
rather than await legislative action to tackle these concerns.  In the result, the Court effectively 
held that the police had the power at common law to randomly stop and detain motorists for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”, supra note 10 at 35-36. 
46 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 18 at 20. 
47 Dedman, supra note 38 at para 69.   
48 Ibid at para 68. 
49 Graham Mayeda, “Between Principle and Pragmatism: The Decline of Principled Reasoning 
in the Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court” (2010) 50 SCLR 41 at 47 [Mayeda, “Between 
Principle”]. 
50 Quigley, Procedure, supra note 3 at 5-37. 
51 Glen Luther, “Random Stopping: A Right to Discriminate?” (1989) 19 Victoria U Wellington 
LR 11 at 17.  See also Clayton, supra note 5 at para 98, where Binnie J. observed that, 
“[a]uthority [to make law] was found in Dedman because of the major problem of road carnage 
produced by mixing alcohol and driving.” 
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purposes of determining their sobriety at any time and in any place that the police should 
choose.52   
What is lost from the proportionality assessment in Dedman is any meaningful 
consideration of the more diffuse costs that are borne by the Court’s decision.  I would argue that 
we must broaden our conception of costs and by whom (and with what) they are being paid.  We 
must take into account the lack of clear guidance given to the police in exercising their nascent 
powers, the retrospective application of law against the accused, and the non-democratic nature 
of the powers implemented by the judiciary.   Each of these problems constitutes a serious matter 
of concern, and each of them attaches to the Court’s “Waterfield/Dedman”53 jurisprudence.  
Unfortunately, these are expenses that are paid in the currency of individual rights and the 
diminution of Parliamentary responsibility. 
Chief Justice Dickson, writing in dissent, was sharply critical of the Court’s adoption of 
Waterfield and more precisely the adaptation given to it by his brethren.  In response to the 
Court’s re-conceptualization of the Waterfield test he declared that, “[a]ny such principle would 
be nothing short of a fiat for illegality on the part of the police whenever the benefit of police 
action appeared to outweigh the infringement of an individual’s rights.”54  Surely, this is the 
preferable view and the one that is most in keeping with the Court’s role and the longstanding 
traditions of the common law.55  Seen in this light the actions of the majority were a clear 
anachronism at the time.  I unequivocally agree with the position asserted by Stuart that, “it 
would have been more appropriate for the Supreme Court to hold that such random stop 
programs were unlawful and to await a legislative scheme.”56  This was hardly a speculative 
suggestion, as legislation was passed enabling these programs, even after the SCC granted its 
imprimatur to them at common law.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Delisle, “Judicial Creation”, supra note 43 at 29. 
53 Kang-Brown, supra note 7 at paras 50-52, 56 and 62. See also R v Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 at 
paras 114 and 191, [2010] 2 SCR 310.  Interestingly, and indicative of the malleability of the test 
in Canadian law, it is variously referred to as the “Dedman/Waterfield test at paras 110, 114 and 
191 in two separate dissenting opinions. 
54 Dedman, supra note 38 at para 24. 
55 Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada 
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2011) at 66. 
56 Don Stuart, “Annotation” (1985) 46 CR (3d) 194 at 195. 
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Building on the foundations established in Dedman, the Supreme Court subsequently 
upheld the use of both fixed57 location and random, roving58 checkstops that had been provided 
for in amended Ontario highway traffic legislation.  Unlike the Court’s use of Waterfield in 
Stenning (or indeed in Dedman), these are the sort of incremental changes that are associated 
with normal developments of the common law and the orthodox use of judicial precedents.  In 
each instance, the SCC identified a violation of s. 9 of the Charter, finding that the legislation 
permitted the police to stop individuals on arbitrary grounds without specifying any criteria or 
placing any fetters on police decisions of whom to stop.59  Nevertheless, in each case the Court 
found that legislation was saved under s. 1 analysis—implicitly confirming that the common law 
detention power created in Dedman under the Waterfield test was consistent with the Charter.  
To overcome the infringement of s. 9 that flows self-evidently from “the unlimited right of police 
officers to stop motor vehicles”60 conferred by the statute, the Court decided that it was appropriate 
for it to imply limitations into the impugned provision.  Specifically, in R v Ladouceur61 the SCC 
stipulated that in order for these detentions to be considered lawful, they must be undertaken for 
one or more of the following purposes: to check driver sobriety, the driver’s licence, insurance 
and registration, or the mechanical fitness of the vehicle.62  None of these limitations however 
were contained in the open-ended grant of power provided to the police in the authorizing 
legislation.63  Instead, it was solely through the SCC’s reining-in of the enabling statute and its 
“contraction”64 of the statutory language that the legislation was upheld as constitutional. While 
it would have been preferable for the Court to have simply struck down this legislation on the 
basis of vagueness or overbreadth,65 the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ladouceur at least 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 R v Hufsky, [1988] 1 SCR 621, 40 CCC (3d) 398. 
58 R v Ladouceur, [1990] 1 SCR 1257, 56 CCC (3d) 22 [Ladouceur]. 
59 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 18 at 45. 
60 Ladouceur, supra note 58 at para 1. 
61 Supra note 58. 
62 Quigley, Procedure, supra note 3 at 5-16. 
63 Stribopoulos, “Crime Control”, supra 21 at 360. 
64 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 18 at 17. 
65 Regrettably, the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence on these matters has established a very high 
threshold for an accused to meet and provided significant latitude to government.   For example, 
see R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 SCR 606 at 643, 93 DLR (4th) 36 where it 
was held that, “a law will be found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to 
give sufficient guidance for legal debate.”  See also Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth 
and the Law v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCR 4 at paras 15-17, [2004] 1 SCR 76.  For 
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engages the use of Section 1 of the Charter and places a legal onus upon the government to 
justify its actions and policy choices.  This necessity under the Oakes test is dispensed with 
under Waterfield.66  Thus, one of the most immediate consequences arising from the Court’s 
APD jurisprudence is the bypassing of s.1 analysis and the neutering of this constitutional right 
in police powers cases where Waterfield/Dedman is used.  
2.3 Venturing Across the Adjudicative Rubicon: Waterfield’s Second Wave 
2.3.1(i) R v Godoy 
Following the 1985 decision of the Court in Dedman, the APD fell into disuse and 
“seemed to lie dormant”67 on the Canadian legal landscape.  Indeed, for a significant period of 
time it stood out as an anomalous judgment.  For many years it appeared as though the Court’s 
decision in that case marked an aberrational application of foreign legal doctrine and was 
destined to be regarded as a historical relic.  Regrettably, any such optimism was proven to have 
been misplaced when the Waterfield test was reasserted by the SCC in R v Godoy.68 
Harkening back to the days of Stenning, the accused in Godoy faced a charge of having 
assaulted a peace officer in the course of his duties.  The police were responding to a 911 call 
that was received by a dispatcher. In the circumstances, however, the caller was interrupted and 
the call terminated before she could communicate the whole of her message.  Upon arriving at 
the residence from where the call had been placed, the police encountered the appellant.  He 
indicated that everything was fine and refused to allow access to the apartment.  Ignoring his 
refusals, the police forcibly entered the dwelling and became entangled with Godoy who resisted 
against the police, protesting that they were unlawfully occupying his residence.  During the 
investigation of the premises, the police located the appellant’s common law partner and 
discovered that she had been recently beaten.  This resulted in Godoy being charged with two 
separate counts of assault.  At trial both counts were dismissed.  Applying Waterfield, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
commentary see Eric Colvin & Sanjeev Anand, Principles of Criminal Law, 3d ed (Toronto: 
Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 391-397; Morris Manning & Peter Sankoff, Manning, Mewett & 
Sankoff: Criminal Law, 4th ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) at 6-7, 78-85; and 
Don Stuart, “Criminal Justice in the McLachlin Court: Many More Kudos Than Brickbats” in 
David A Wright & Adam M Dodek, eds, Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The First Decade 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 338-342. 
66 Quigley, “Brief Investigatory”, supra note 3 at 949. 
67 Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”, supra note 10 at 47. 
68 [1999] 1 SCR 311, 168 DLR (4th) 257 [Godoy]. 
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Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA) reversed the lower court decision and ordered a new trial.  
Rejecting the position asserted by the appellant, the SCC confirmed the ONCA decision in both 
substance and form. 
After retracing the lineage of the APD in Canada,69 Chief Justice Lamer went on to state 
that: 
If police conduct constitutes a prima facie interference with a person’s liberty or 
property, the court must consider two questions: first, does the conduct fall within the 
general scope of any duty imposed by statute or recognized at common law; and second, 
does the conduct, albeit within the general scope of such a duty, involve an unjustifiable 
use of powers associated with the duty?70 
 
This iteration of the Waterfield test led the Court to the unanimous conclusion that “police have a 
duty to enter a private dwelling where they reasonably believe the occupant is in distress and 
entry is necessary not to arrest, but to protect life, prevent death [or] serious injury.”71  Nowhere 
is this power explicitly contained in any statute.  Rather, it was derived from the overarching 
duties incumbent upon the police and then used as the springboard to generate the new power 
articulated by the Court.  In the result, the SCC constructed a narrow power to enter domiciles in 
order to locate the originator of an emergency call, determine the reasons for the call and to 
provide assistance to the caller where required.72  This at least reflects a somewhat restrained 
application of the APD.  The judgment did not construe the power more broadly or make it 
applicable in other emergency situations.  Nor did Godoy grant licence to the police to 
investigate or search in relation to matters unrelated to the call they had received—this is a 
laudable dimension of the decision.  Therefore, the ancillary power generated by the Court was 
limited to the purpose of ensuring public safety and not permitted as a means of facilitating a 
criminal investigation.  Though it did not resonate with the Court, Professor Tim Quigley is 
correct in his observation that, “there is a great deal of difference between using the Waterfield 
approach to determine whether a police officer, already engaged in a duty imposed by statute or 
common law, has unjustifiably used the powers associated with the duty,”73 which was the 	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72 Quigley, Procedure, supra note 3 at 5-33. 
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original purpose of the Waterfield test and the manner it was used by the Court in Godoy.  
Moreover, the chosen ends-means reasoning of the Court and the invocation of the APD may 
well have been unnecessary to resolve the case.  Although finding the police entry unlawful 
would have negated Godoy’s culpability for assaulting the officer in the course of duties, he 
could have potentially still been found guilty of assault simpliciter on the basis of having used 
excessive force to ward off the police.74  Had the Court embarked upon this path of reasoning 
then Dedman might have still been left to wither.  Lastly, if the Court had applied the rule of 
strict construction and instead declined to create the power that it did, it is foreseeable that such a 
decision would have sparked a legislative response from Parliament.75  Giving effect to an 
ostensibly desirable social purpose, even where predicated on a commonsensical and pragmatic 
basis,76 cannot make up for the fact that an enlargement of state power has occurred and that it 
was delivered by non-democratic means.   
 2.3.1(ii) R v Mann 
Following the Court’s 1999 decision in Godoy, another lull of activity surrounded the 
APD and its tide again seemed to have receded.  However, this was only a temporary and 
relatively brief period of idleness.  Beginning with R v Mann,77 we can identify the cresting of a 
third wave of cases that owe their genesis to Waterfield/Dedman.  Encompassed in this body of 
cases are the high court’s judgments in R v Clayton,78 R v Kang-Brown79 and its companion case 
R v AM.80  It is this recent proliferation of cases and the momentum that has gathered around the 
APD that will be subject of analysis in the next chapter.  Bearing this in mind, I will introduce 
the main APD-laced decisions here for the purpose of isolating instances of analytical 
meandering on the part of certain justices.  
The accused in Mann was walking down the street when the police detained him because 
he matched the general description of the suspect in a reported break-in that had recently 
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occurred nearby.81  The issue at bar was whether the police were lawfully entitled to detain 
citizens for any reason short of arrest.  It is beyond dispute that on a de facto basis the police had 
been detaining and questioning individuals routinely for decades.82  Echoing its pronouncement 
in Godoy, the SCC again approved of an application of Waterfield by the ONCA.  In particular, 
the Court confirmed the reasoning of the ONCA’s decision in R v Simpson,83 an earlier case 
touching on the issue that had been adopted in many other Canadian jurisdictions.  Specifically, 
in Mann, the Court declared that the police are entitled at common law to subject individuals to 
brief investigative detentions (BID) where the police can establish “reasonable grounds to 
suspect…[that an] individual is connected to a particular crime and that such a detention is 
necessary”84 in the “totality of the circumstances”85 present at the time.   Separately, the Court 
grafted on to the detention power, an additional power permitting police to conduct pat-down 
searches incidental to a BID when certain conditions are met.  What cannot be overlooked when 
reviewing the grants of power given to the police by the Supreme Court is that the police in 
Mann overshot in their execution of these powers in the case and violated the s. 8 rights of the 
accused.  This infringement ultimately led to an acquittal following s. 24(2) analysis.   
Nevertheless, the Court deemed these facts to present a sufficient platform to institute 
freestanding police powers.  Given the impossibility of compliance with rules not yet in force, 
the police can be forgiven for failing to abide by the standards set by the Court.   However, this 
does not provide an excuse for why the police were gambling with Charter rights in the first 
place.   As a framework that is reliant upon the police exercising unauthorized powers 
unilaterally against individuals and in the course risking Charter breaches, it is one that should 
be revisited by jurists and hopefully repudiated. 
Before proceeding it is important that we distinguish police actions predicated under 
Waterfield/Dedman from other sorts of tactical or interpretive decision-making taken by the 
police.  It is fair to suggest that the police are entitled to rely upon a presumption that legislation 
authorizing their actions is constitutionally valid until it is proven otherwise.  It is also fair to 	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suggest that the police are entitled to estimate certain limits pertaining to their powers and what 
is permissible in the authorization given to them by legislation where statutory language is 
opaque and open to more than one plausible interpretation.86  However, there is no reason for 
police decisions to be afforded any measure of deference in the determination that they have 
made in relation to prescribed limits of their statutory powers.  In other words, at law, the police 
must both correctly interpret and apply the powers entrusted to them.  Where the police have 
faltered in their compliance with the law these actions should be rebuked by the Court, not 
rewarded by the conferral of new enduring common law powers.  In cases where the police are 
found to have erred in their decision-making, or, where placed wholesale reliance upon 
legislation that is subsequently declared unconstitutional and run afoul of the law, this should 
only allow for the presentation of an argument under s. 24(2) and no more.  The crucial 
difference between the scenarios just discussed and that, which occurs under the APD, is that 
with the latter, the police, cannot point prospectively to any ascertainably legal authority for their 
actions.  By contrast, if the police were to anchor their actions under the “general warrant” 
power, for example,87 instead of engaging in speculative gambles, then they would not expose 
themselves (on behalf of the state) to the critique that their actions are merely unilateral (and 
putative) assertions of authority by street-level policymakers.  It is, of course, open to Parliament 
to craft sweeping police powers, but the government must be able to justify them and 
demonstrate their constitutionality when called upon to do so.  Significantly, the government 
must also be prepared to be held politically accountable for its actions and policy choices.88  
2.3.1(iii) R v Orbanski; R v Elias  
During the interval of time between the decisions in Godoy and Mann the composition of 
the Court changed significantly.  Yet, this did not immediately disrupt the harmony surrounding 
the APD.  The Court was unanimous in Godoy in its use of Waterfield and again in Mann there 
was full consensus in concluding that it was appropriate for the APD to be used to create non-
statutory police powers.   Iacobucci J. who was joined by several other members of the Court, 
including Justices Fish and LeBel, authored the reasons of the majority in Mann.  The dissenting 
judgment of Madam Justice Deschamps related only to the s. 24(2) determination which is not 	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pertinent to the Court’s use of the APD in the case—so on this, the primary matter, the SCC was 
in fact unified.  As we shall shortly see, the unanimity of the Court soon came unraveled. 
The cases of R v Orbanski; R v Elias89 did not involve the use of the APD.  Rather, the 
results in these cases were achieved through another “hands-on”90 form of adjudication.  As in R 
v Ladouceur91 before it, a majority of the Court saw fit to imply (or read in)92 limitations to the 
broad grants of power given to the police.  These cases dealt with some of the unresolved issues 
related to the investigation of impaired driving.  In these jointly decided cases the police had 
detained the motorists to determine whether the drivers might have been intoxicated.  Different 
investigative measures were used in each of the cases.  In Orbanski, the accused was requested 
by the police to perform field sobriety tests along the roadside, while the accused in Elias was 
questioned about his prior consumption of alcohol.     
Common to both appeals was a failure by the police to advise the individuals under 
detention of their right to counsel.  In light of the s. 10(b) violations found by the SCC, the issue 
then became whether the limitations placed on this Charter right were “prescribed by law” 
during s. 1 analysis.93  The Court concluded in each instance that they were, and correspondingly 
that the police actions were constitutional.  The determination of these questions however 
splintered the Court.  These judgments exposed deep fissures within the ranks of the high court 
on the matter of its role and the appropriateness of using the common law to generate ancillary 
police powers.  
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The majority, led by Madam Justice Charron stated that this conferral of authority arose 
“by necessary implication from the operational requirements of the combined provincial and 
federal statutes,”94 even though it was not expressly provided for in the legislation before the 
Court.  In reaching this decision the Court rejected the argument that “unless a statute prescribes 
specific investigatory measures, a police officer has a duty to provide motorists with their right to 
counsel before taking any steps to assess their sobriety.”95  Furthermore the court went on to 
decry as “impractical,”96 the idea that Parliament and the various legislatures could together 
“legislate exhaustive details as to how [these detentions] must be conducted.”97  While this is 
perhaps so, it ignores the fact that exhaustive detail is unnecessary and obfuscates the real issue 
enveloping the limitation on the right to counsel.  What makes this even more remarkable is that 
between the time of the incident giving rise to the appeal and the hearing of the matter by the 
SCC, the legislature in Manitoba had amended its legislation to provide precisely the limitation 
that the Court saw fit to imply.  Moreover, as Susan Gratton points out: 
[T]hat the officer’s conduct was [found to be] prescribed by law because it was 
‘necessarily implicit’ in the operating requirements of the statute…is simply inaccurate.  
The officer’s decision to deny the accused the right to counsel was not necessarily 
implicit in the provision…The limit was not precluded by the language of the provision 
but neither was it included; the officer’s conduct was simply an exercise of discretion 
under neutral enabling legislation.98 
 
Therefore, although purporting to locate the limitation of s. 10(b) rights within the operational 
requirements of legislation, the practical consequence of the Court’s decision was to accord full 
deference to an investigating officer’s own assessment of his or her authority from the imprecise 
grant of power contained in the statute.99  Seen in this light, the emanating view from the Court is 
one reflective of pragmatic concerns and that affords undue deference to the police.100  This was 
laid bare when the SCC professed that, “it cannot be disputed that the police had the general 
power, indeed the duty, to check the sobriety of Orbanski and Elias and that, logically, certain 
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measures could lawfully be taken to fulfill this duty.”101  Respectfully, this conflates duties with 
powers and begins to encroach upon the rejection of powers being correlative with an officer’s 
duties as the Court disclaimed in Mann.102 
 Justices Fish and LeBel, who had been newcomers to the Court in Mann, subsequently 
broke ranks with the rest of the SCC in Orbanski and issued a scathing dissent in the process.  
Although the Court utilized other methods to broaden police powers in the case, the reasons of 
LeBel J. squarely addressed the perceived missteps of the Court in its utilization of the APD.  
Cautioning against “the lodestar of our constitutional law…becom[ing] the needs of the 
police,”103 LeBel J. offered the reminder that, “[w]e must bear in mind the differing 
constitutional functions and responsibilities of the courts on the one hand, and of legislatures on 
the other.  Also, legislatures are better equipped to investigate and assess the need for enhanced 
police powers.”104  In admonishing the development of police powers by the Court at common 
law, the dissent in Orbanski declared: 
The adoption of a rule limiting Charter rights on the basis of what amounts to a utilitarian 
argument in favour of meeting the needs of police investigations through the 
development of common law police powers would tend to give a potentially 
uncontrollable scope to the doctrine developed in the Waterfield-Dedman line of cases, 
which—and we sometimes forget such details—the court that created it took care not to 
apply on the facts before it (R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (C.C.A.)).  The 
doctrine would now be encapsulated in the principle that what the police need, the police 
get, by judicial fiat if all else fails or if the legislature finds the adoption of legislation to 
be unnecessary or unwarranted.  The courts would limit Charter rights to the full extent 
necessary to achieve the purpose of meeting the needs of the police.  The creation of and 
justification for the limit would arise out of an initiative of the courts.  In the context of 
cases such as those we are considering here, this kind of judicial intervention would pre-
empt any serious Charter review of the limits, as the limits would arise out of initiatives 
of the courts themselves.105   
 
Strong words, but ones that speak to the gravity of the situation and aptly recount what is at stake 
in these cases when the Court places the wrong constitutional shoe on the wrong institutional 
foot.  This I suggest is precisely what occurred and what the majority confused in Mann.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Orbanski, supra note 89 at para 44. 
102 Mann, supra note 77 at para 35. 
103 Orbanski, supra note 89 at para 82. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid at para 81 [emphasis added]. 
	   60	  
analytical schism that erupted in Orbanski and the depth of these fractures are matters that will 
be revisited in later discussions as we see them resurface in the Court’s jurisprudence.  
 2.3.1(iv) R v Clayton 
The 2007 decision in Clayton was the next case to display the Court’s embrace of the 
APD.  The appeal in Clayton was brought by two appellants who had been stopped by the police 
at an impromptu road blockade erected by the police in response to a report of several men 
brandishing handguns in the parking lot of a strip club.  Police detained the appellants as they 
attempted to exit the parking lot.  Following questioning, a search of the car and its occupants 
revealed the presence of firearms precipitating the charges that were filed in the case.  Litigation 
in the case concentrated on determining the lawfulness of the police decision to detain the 
appellants.  In essence, the SCC approved the use of a “Mann stop”106 in the context of a vehicle 
stop to detain the driver and his passenger.  Writing for the majority, Madam Justice Abella 
found that the police actions “were reasonable”107 and “sufficiently tailored to the 
circumstances”108 such that the “detention was [held to be] constitutionally permissible.”109  It 
was on the basis of the precedent established in Mann that the Court failed to identify any 
violation of the appellants’ Charter rights under s. 9.  Some of the more worrisome aspects of the 
Court’s fact-finding process and the ruling in the case will be reviewed in subsequent chapters. 
Although concurring in the ultimate disposition of the case, Mr. Justice Binnie authored 
an erudite judgment in which he proposed a new analytical approach for how common law 
police powers should be assessed.  Justices Fish and LeBel joined Binnie J. in supporting the 
approach he championed.  In recognition of the “growing elasticity of the concept of common 
law police powers,”110 Binnie J. opined that any such powers, if they are to be legally affirmed, 
“must…be subjected to explicit Charter analysis.”111  In short, the Binnie-LeBel-Fish triumvirate 
reasoned that judicial analysis in cases like Mann or Clayton should parallel ordinary s. 1 
analysis under the test established by the Court in R v Oakes.112  The most appreciable hazard in 
the majority approach, according to Binnie J., is that by “[c]onflating in a Waterfield-type 	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analysis the consideration of the individual’s [Charter] rights and society’s s. 1 interests…[this] 
sidestep[s] the real policy debate in which competing individual and societal interests are 
required to be clearly articulated in the established framework for Charter analysis”113 and only 
“add[s] to the problematic elasticity”114 of discretionary police powers.  The minority went on to 
lament the fact that in applying the APD, the Court in essence enables the state litigants to 
circumvent the requirements of the Charter under s. 1. 115  Continuing in this vein Binnie J. 
expressed the view that Dedman analysis and s. 1 analysis are not duplicative of one another and 
the latter Charter-based standard is a higher one to meet.116  Therefore, under the position 
advanced by the minority in Clayton it would be possible for a common law power asserted by 
the police/Crown to survive Waterfield analysis, but still fail the Oakes test.117   Indeed, even 
though in every instance where Waterfield/Dedman-reasoning has been engaged by the Court it 
has led to either the expansion of police powers or results otherwise favouring the Crown, the 
eventuality contemplated by the dissent in Clayton should continue to be seen as tenable, at least 
theoretically. 
 Nevertheless, and in spite of the bold remarks of the Binnie J.-led contingency, the 
minority was still prepared to potentially engage in judicial lawmaking and to create common 
law police powers.  While we can find reason to be sympathetic to the difficult realities faced by 
courts and police alike, this does not justify circumventing the constitutional order and having 
the Court step into fill the void.  To their credit the minority openly invited Parliamentary 
intervention “to address the issue of police powers in a comprehensive way”118 and even pointed 
to other common law jurisdictions as examples that Canadian legislators might consider 
replicating.   
Drawing attention to one of the principal problems associated with the Court’s utilization 
of the APD, Professor Richard Jochelson explains that: 
The Court encourages dialogic silence when it used the ancillary powers test, an 
embedded (tacitly hidden) jurisprudential tool, to create police powers.  This in turn 
allows Parliament—its attention not forced to address the issue—to [continue] avoid[ing] 	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the policy debate inherent in the legislative process.  The Court, on the basis of its own 
policy objectives and in the absence of legislative process, is allowed to create de facto 
police powers in lieu of Parliament.119 
 
Quite simply, the SCC cannot engage in a dialogue with Parliament “when it assumes the role of 
legislator, particularly when it assumes the Court has ‘enacted’ a policy that comports with 
governmental objectives”120 enabling the state greater control over crime.  In applying the 
adjudicative model they prescribe, the minority found that police actions were overbroad in their 
scope and identified a violation of s. 9 of the Charter.  Thus, if the opinion of Binnie J. had 
garnered a wider plurality of support and prevailed in the case, we might have anticipated a 
legislative response from Parliament.   
 The ruling of the majority in Clayton is appreciably different from those in Dedman, 
Godoy, and Mann in that it failed to confer an enduring power upon the police.  In this way it 
resembles Stenning and Knowlton, the earliest cases to utilize Waterfield.  While it may be 
appealing at first blush to think judgments such as Clayton are preferable to those that introduce 
freestanding powers in that they are essentially confined to the exigencies of the case, I suggest 
that these decisions are actually more troubling and should give us greater reason to be 
concerned about the SCC’s use of the APD.121  Both types of powers suffer from the usual flaws 
of being non-democratic and imposed retroactively.  However, in cases like Godoy, Mann and as 
we shall see shortly in Kang-Brown, there is at least an effort made to structure and confine 
police powers.  This is not so with Clayton-style decisions.  Rather, these judgments present a 
bare contest on whether or not whatever the police chose to do was reasonable.  Given that this 
assessment will always be made on after the fact and virtually always in cases involving a 
factually guilty accused, there is reason to be suspect of the fairness and proportionality of these 
assessments. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Richard Jochelson, “Crossing the Rubicon: Of Sniffer Dogs, Justifications, and Preemptive 
Deference” (2008) 13 Rev Const Stud 209 at 236 [Jochelson, “Crossing”]. 
120 Ibid at 235. 
121 See Coughlan, “Common Law”, supra note 8 at 266 where he offers the view that, “the 
Supreme Court seems to have begun to interpret the ancillary powers doctrine in a way which 
ceases to think of the police as having actual ‘powers’ at all, but rather as whether we should 
retroactively approve or disapprove of the decision made on the spot by the individual officer. If 
a court approves, the power existed: if a court did not approve, the power did not exist. 
Ultimately that approach would challenge foundational notions of our criminal justice system, 
because it will amount to rule by people, not by law.” 
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 2.3.1(v) R v Kang-Brown and R v AM 
The twin cases of Kang-Brown and AM marked the next occasion in which the SCC 
deployed the APD.  What we find in these companion cases is a continuation of the Supreme 
Court’s demonstrated willingness “to reserve its power to create new police search powers, in the 
absence of any legislative impetus, while in its disposition [finding] the actions of the police 
unreasonable”122 on the facts before them.    
Using criminal profiling tactics devised by American law enforcement agencies,123 the 
police in Kang-Brown focused their attention on the South Asian accused who was traveling 
through a Greyhound bus terminal—a place the police considered to be a possible site of drug 
trafficking—even though they had no specific information to warrant suspicion of either the 
accused or the location.  The search conducted in AM was of a high school building with the 
police acting on an open invitation that had been given to them by the principal to search for 
drugs.  The police were not investigating any specific occurrence or complaint.  In both cases, 
the SCC held that the illicit drugs uncovered by the police had been secured through 
unconstitutional means and went on to exclude the ill-gotten evidence under s. 24(2) analysis.  
This, of course, says nothing about the Court’s determination of the general propriety of the 
asserted police powers that were challenged by each of those accused.   Putting aside the 
dispositions in these cases and taking a more expansive view, I suggest that at the macro-level it 
was the police combined with the state’s interest in “crime control”124 that were the real winners.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Richard Jochelson, “Multidimensional Analysis as a Window into Activism Scholarship: 
Searching for Meaning with Sniffer Dogs” (2009) 24 Can JL & Soc 231 at 231. 
123 David M Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an 
Equality-Based Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall LJ 145 at 151.  As a 
leading scholar on the prevalence of racial profiling by Canadian law enforcement, Tanovich has 
been a frequent critic of these police tactics. See also David M Tanovich, The Colour of Justice 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 91-94; David M Tanovich, “Operation Pipeline and Racial 
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(2008) 55 CR (6th) 379.  These investigative techniques have, however, drawn, the ire of other 
commentators including Don Stuart, “The Charter Is a Vital Living Tree and Not a Weed to Be 
Stunted: Justice Moldaver Has Overstated” (2006) 21 NCJL 245 at 252; Sonia N Lawrence & 
Toni Williams, “Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the Borders of Canadian Sentencing” (2006) 
56 UTLJ 285 at footnote 169. 
124 Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1968) at 153. 
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It is safe to say that in the overwhelming number of cases once the litigation process has 
been exhausted or otherwise terminated by an individual litigant, that his or her interest in any 
legal issue implicated by their case sharply wanes.  This is not so with the state.  Its interest 
extends far more widely and endures beyond the exigencies or particular circumstances of a 
given case.  In Chapter Three, I will present the argument that cases like Kang-Brown, Mann and 
Godoy can be conceptualized as state-initiated contests in which the government has, through its 
various agents, selected individuals to be guinea pigs in the criminal process and the subjects of 
criminal prosecutions to determine, inter alia, the limits of police powers.  Without further 
pursuing this path of inquiry here, suffice it to say that the Crown wins more (and more often) 
than it loses.  And even where they “lose” as in Kang-Brown, still they gain more from the 
perspective of crime control on a go-forward basis. 
Returning to the instant cases, it must be noted that no statute authorized the police use of 
drug detecting dogs during criminal investigations.125  Thus, the legality of the warrantless use of 
sniffer dogs by police to search bags containing personal property was the central legal issue 
before the Court. 126 After reserving its decision for a period of 11 months,127 the Court splintered 
on a number of sub-issues making the decision extremely complex and challenging to 
interpret.128  Concerning the assessment of the ability of the police to use sniffer dogs during 
criminal investigations, a cobbled together majority of the Court ruled that police can, at 
common law,129 initiate sniffer dog searches against citizens and their personal effects on a 
warrantless basis.130   To do so, however, the investigating officers must have formed a 
“reasonable suspicion”131 in relation to a subject or object that is to be searched.  In this way the 
decision mirrored the standard set out in Mann to govern BIDs.132   Prior to effecting a search 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”, supra note 10 at 45. 
126 Jochelson, “Crossing”, supra note 119 at 217-218. 
127 Don Stuart, “Revitalising Section 8: Individualised Reasonable Suspicion is a Sound 
Compromise for Routine Dog Sniff Use” (2008) 55 CR (6th) 376 at 376. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Steven Penney, “Conceptions of Privacy: A Comment on R. v. Kang-Brown and R. v. A.M.” 
(2008) 46 Alta L Rev 203 at 203. 
130 Gerry Ferguson & Benjamin L Berger, “Recent Developments in Canadian Criminal Law” 
(2009) 33 Crim LJ 263 at 271. 
131 For commentary see David Dalrymple, “Reasonable Suspicion: Two Competing Approaches” 
(2011) 84 CR (6th) 94. 
132 Jochelson, “Crossing”, supra note 119 at 206. 
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against an individual using a sniffer dog, the police are required to possess a reasonable 
suspicion that is particularized to the individual that is to be stopped and searched.133    
In deciding these cases, the SCC was divided sharply over the assessment of the 
lawfulness of the impugned police actions, and more importantly on the legitimacy of using the 
APD.  Of the eight sets of reasons that were cumulatively rendered in Kang-Brown and AM, only 
two warrant closer scrutiny and both were issued in Kang-Brown.  Let us now compare the 
divergent positions asserted by LeBel J. and Binnie J. on the core issue in the cases: the Court’s 
role in assessing the legality of state actions and the formulation of any common law police 
powers.  Beginning with the judgment of Mr. Justice LeBel, it is interesting first to see who sided 
with him in these cases.  The stalwart support of Fish J. was hardly surprising given that he and 
Justice LeBel had sat in league in Mann, Orbanski and Clayton previously.  However, few could 
have predicted that Madam Justice Charron who authored the majority opinion in Orbanski and 
Madam Justice Abella who less than a year earlier delivered the judgment of the Court in 
Clayton would reverse course and align with Justices LeBel and Fish.  But they did.  And, did so 
without offering any explanation for this reorientation.  Yet, what is even more startling is the 
altered direction taken by Mr. Justice Binnie in which he not only broke ranks with LeBel and 
Fish JJs, but he completely resiled from the dissenting position he asserted in Clayton. 
Turning first to the judgment of LeBel J., we find a deep concern for the institutional 
division of labour between the SCC and Parliament.   It is a judgment that attempts to revive the 
jurisprudential legacy of former Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest who previously 
expressed grave concerns about the Court-led expansions of coercive state power. According to 
LeBel J., “any perceived gap in the present state of the law on police investigative powers arising 
from the use of sniffer dogs is a matter better left to Parliament.”134  This is harmonious with the 
idea that “courts must remain alive and sensitive to the fact that they are ultimately the guardians 
of constitutional rules, principles and values.”135  In addition, existing judicial “precedents do not 
mean the Court should always expand common law rules, in order to address perceived gaps in 
police powers or apprehended inaction by Parliament.”136  As noted by the minority of justices, 
when the Court grants license to liberty-impairing police powers, “ironically, this erosion [of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”, supra note 10 at 42.   
134 Kang-Brown, supra note 7 at para 4. 
135 Ibid at para 7. 
136 Ibid at para 6. 
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civil liberties] derive[s] not from state action or from the laws of Parliament, but from decisions 
of the court themselves.”137  Heeding its own caution, this four-member segment of the Court 
refused any “attempt to create or discover a common law police power”138 in these appeals.  
They were not prepared to have the Court slide further down this slippery slope.139 
Looking now at the judgment that prevailed within the “polarized”140 Court, we find a 
starkly different orientation asserted by Binnie J., who was joined directly by Chief Justice 
McLachlin and inferentially by Justices Deschamps, Rothstein and Bastarache.  Amongst this 
consortium of judges the only discrepancies to arise surrounded the requisite standard to be 
applied before a dog sniff search could be considered lawful.  While ultimately the Mann-based 
standard of a “reasonable suspicion” was declared, Bastarache J. was more hawkish and would 
have actually gone even further down the path to crime control by permitting the police to use 
sniffer dogs on the basis of a mere generalized suspicion.  For her part, Deschamps J. agreed that 
a “reasonable suspicion” was the appropriate standard to be applied, but disagreed with the 
dominant position, which found that the police had not satisfied such in the cases.  All of the 
justices in this camp were, however, prepared and willing to confer new common law police 
powers, which they did.   
Although again professing to welcome parliamentary intervention,141 as he did in 
Clayton,142 Justice Binnie this time refused to abide “an approach that effectively renders sniffer 
dogs useless until Parliament chooses to enact legislation.”143  Finding this to be unpalatable and 
unduly burdensome on the police, Binnie J. later stated, “it is not necessary for the police to keep 
returning to Parliament for authority to make use of [investigative] tools deployed in full public 
view.”144  This is at odds with the SCC’s earlier recognition of the low-visibility nature of police-
citizen encounters.145  Moreover, it fails to explain why the police should be absolved from 
adhering to the strictures of the principle of legality, or, why we should accept that one of the 	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138 Ibid at para 17. 
139 See Joseph R Marin, “R. v. Mann: Further Down the Slippery Slope” (2005) 42 Alta L Rev 
1123 [Marin, “Slippery Slope”]. 
140 Kang-Brown, supra note 7 at para 19. 
141 Ibid at para 22. 
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basic premises behind the rule of law be undercut given that at the time of the occurrence the 
scope (and existence) of the asserted police powers were both unknown and unknowable.   
Nevertheless, the continuation of this paradigm has been tacitly encouraged by the actions of the 
SCC in these cases and expressly supported in Kang-Brown where it was asserted by Binnie J. 
that: 
In fairness to litigants, the Court ought not…waver unpredictably between the 
willingness of the Court to explore adjustments in the common law of detention or search 
and seizure based on reasonable suspicion…and the ‘hands off’ or ‘leave it to Parliament’ 
attitude…How are litigants to anticipate whether they will find the Court in a ‘can do’ 
mode or a ‘leave it to Parliament’ mode?  In my view, Mann and Clayton resolved the 
Court’s attitude to this particular area of common law police powers in favour of the 
former.  We have crossed the Rubicon.146 
 
None of this, however, dislodges the more basic point that at all times Parliament remains 
capable (subject only to the constraints imposed by the Charter) of granting the impugned 
powers to the police that are being sought through the litigation process.  What makes the 
announcement of the Court’s traversal of the adjudicative Rubicon all the more confounding is 
the identity of the author.  Ironically, in delivering the Court’s last—and purportedly final—word 
on the subject in Kang-Brown, Binnie J. has himself become “an odd godfather”147 for common 
law ancillary police powers.   
2.4 Chapter Conclusion  
The rise of Waterfield in Canada reflects an uncommon development of the common law.  
This “Candianization,”148 and co-opting of the original test that we find within APD 
jurisprudence has dramatically impacted the law governing exercises of coercive power by 
Canadian police forces.  Whereas there was “minimal precedential value in the post hoc 
determination of whether [or not] the police acted”149 reasonably under the original Waterfield 
test, cases decided under the reconstituted “Waterfield/Dedman”150 test, in contradistinction, are 
of considerable jurisprudential importance.  This is true in the narrow sense that any powers 
generated by the Supreme Court are themselves applicable in future cases and serve as the 
platform to then broaden existing common law ancillary powers.  It is also true in a broader 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Kang-Brown, supra note 7 at para 22 [emphasis added]. 
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sense, in that, the spawning of novel powers by the SCC tends to propel the further judicial 
expansion of police powers at every court level, which, in turn, helps to reify the practice under 
Waterfield.  The reformation of Waterfield has been the catalyst emboldening the Court to 
undertake farther-reaching exercises of judicial lawmaking, whilst wading deeper into the waters 
of policymaking where it does not belong.  To the extent that the Court has enlarged the ambit of 
its common law lawmaking authority under Waterfield/Dedman, the growth of state power has 
expanded in lockstep where the APD has been dispatched in Canadian criminal law.  This 
development is inessential for the government if its goal is to achieve such results and secure 
greater police powers for its investigative agents; and, for its part, the Court, insofar as it accrues 
a greater role in the formation of criminal law and procedure through the APD, so too, does it 
depart from its role as the safekeeper of constitutional rights for Canadians.  While this 
phenomenon can be untangled and these institutions can return to their proper quarters, the Court 
cannot simultaneously decouple itself from the stinging charges of judicial activism and maintain 
the APD.  
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Chapter Three: Police Powers and the Limitations of Judge-Made Law 
3.0 Overview 
 Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) announcement in R v Kang-
Brown1 that “We have crossed the Rubicon,”2 it becomes necessary for us to probe 
deeper into this statement and try to determine what it entails for the continued litigation 
of police powers.  As a preliminary observation, the “we” that is referred to in this 
declaration has at least two meanings and is aimed at an equal number of subjects.  First, 
when read as a personal pronoun, the “royal we” is addressed to the justices of the 
Supreme Court.  Importantly, it is also asserted on their behalf to indicate that the Court, 
as an institution, has embarked upon a new path and is committed to a particular 
jurisprudential philosophy.  Although open to the obvious challenge that Mr. Justice 
Binnie was not speaking for a unanimous Court, he was speaking for a dominant plurality 
of it and did express the prevailing view in the case.  Moreover, the force of these words 
remains undiminished by any subsequent decision of the high court.  This position has 
endured even as the composition of the Court has changed over time.  Second, it was the 
express intention of Binnie J. to signal to everyone—lawmakers, lower courts, legal 
counsel, the police and citizens-cum-litigants alike—that collectively, we, are all standing 
on new legal terrain.  Where it was once considered to be anomalous,3 or, thought 
inappropriate for the Court to expand coercive state power at common law in criminal 
cases,4 the ruling in Kang-Brown makes it clear that when questions arise about the scope 
or existence of police powers, the ancillary powers doctrine (APD) will now ordinarily be 
applied by the Supreme Court.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 SCR 456 [Kang-Brown]. 
2 Ibid at para 22. 
3 James Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out the Ancillary Powers Implications of the Dog Sniff 
Cases” (2009) 47 SCLR (2d) 35 at 36 [Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”].  See also Don 
Stuart, “Godoy: The Supreme Reverts to the Ancillary Powers Doctrine to Fill a Gap in 
Police Power” (1999) 21 CR (5th) 225 [Stuart, “Godoy”.] 
4 For example, it was by a unanimous Court in R v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36 at para 35, 60 
CCC (3d) 460 [Wong] that, “[I]t does not sit well for the courts, as the protectors of our 
fundamental rights, to widen the possibility of encroachments on these personal liberties. 
It falls to Parliament to make incursions on fundamental rights if it is of the view that 
they are needed for the protection of the public in a properly balanced system of criminal 
justice.” 
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In championing the APD, the Court professed a concern for predictability and 
fairness to those engaged in criminal litigation.5  Indeed, these dual concerns formed the 
basis of the Court’s justification for staking its claim on the other side of the adjudicative 
Rubicon.  By asserting these objectives the Court has given us both the criteria and the 
benchmarks against which we can measure the utility of the APD as a lawmaking tool.  
In light of the Supreme Court’s self-expressed transition into “‘can do’ mode,”6 it is 
prudent to explore the efficacy of the Court’s rationale and assess whether the 
“Waterfield/Dedman test”7 is capable of delivering on the twin promises that have been 
made on its behalf.  Using the metrics of predictability and fairness, I will isolate 
problems associated with judge-made law generally, before delving into particular 
troubles arising from the Supreme Court’s application of the APD.  As I proceed to 
interrogate these terms, allow me to state at the outset what I mean by them.  
Predictability is easily defined.  It is met when the law delivers clarity about what the 
expectations or demands are upon those subject to a given rule.  When the law is 
predictable it is capable of providing guidance to individuals when determining their 
actions and alerting them in advance of the potential repercussions arising from a chosen 
course of conduct.  Fairness is, at first blush, a more elusive concept.  It can mean 
different things in different contexts and it is inherently more subjective in nature, 
particularly when considering it in substantive terms.  There the beauty (or blight) is in 
the eye of the beholder.  However, that is not how I shall be conceptualizing it.  Rather, I 
will be evaluating “fairness” in terms of process and procedural regularity whilst 
maintaining an agnostic view of the actual content of the powers created by the Court.   
In this respect the APD is quite different from the Parliamentary process and, as I will 
show, far less fair.   
 For its part, the SCC offers little assistance, functionally speaking, in unpacking 
the contents of this taxonomy and the presented division of terms.  Accordingly, there is 
some difficulty apparent in trying to untangle where a concern rooted in predictability 
ends and where a fairness-based concern begins.  There is simply too much overlap for 
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them to be easily (or artificially) severed.  That said, in organizing this critique, we can 
divide our concerns broadly into two main areas: first, those concerning the efficacy of 
the doctrine and its capacity to specify clearly-defined limits for the exercise of state 
power during criminal investigations; and second, the more fundamental and principle-
based challenges that surround the APD and the legitimacy of common law police 
powers within the constitutional framework.  
Accordingly, I will contest the capability of ancillary powers doctrine 
jurisprudence to provide the sort of predictability and certainty in the law that is desirable 
for all stakeholders.  There are a number of procedural impediments and constraints built 
into the court structure and adjudicative processes that detract from the ability of judges 
to fulfill this objective.  These deficiencies relate primarily to the ad hoc, fact-specific 
nature of criminal proceedings.  There are, however, further collateral problems that 
emerge whenever the APD is engaged and these too will be illuminated.  The troubles 
here are traceable to the design and mandate that is given to courts.   Additionally, I will 
separately challenge the fairness-based prong of the Court’s justification.  In particular, I 
will argue that this concern has been fundamentally mischaracterized given that the state 
invariably stands as one of the litigants in criminal cases.  In this task, I will explore how 
the government is uniquely situated in its ability to enact, enforce and prosecute the 
criminal law; and why it is thus inappropriate—and equally unnecessary—for the state to 
seek to broaden its powers in the context of a criminal trial or a subsequent appeal.  In 
this chapter attention will be devoted to recent Supreme Court decisions where the APD 
has been utilized, including R v Mann,8 R v Clayton,9 Kang-Brown10 and its companion 
case R v AM.11 
3.1 Predictability-Based Concerns 
 3.1.1 Institutional Shortcomings  
Unlike administrative tribunals that deal exclusively with a defined scope of 
subject-matter, Canadian courts are tasked with resolving disputes in an array of matters. 
Judges are thus generalists heading non-specialized bodies.  Courts are also designed to 	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be reactive institutions and cannot be faulted for either the volume or nature of the cases 
brought before them.  Principally, judicial decisions resolve finite problems in a series of 
one-off contests, so any criticism of the judiciary for dealing with issues on a case-by-
case basis is thus misplaced.  The piecemeal construction of case law is axiomatic of the 
court function.  Indeed, it is a defining feature of common law legal systems and the only 
way for non-statutory law to develop under such regimes.  In and of itself this is not 
problematic, however these characteristics do not lend themselves to the development of 
a comprehensive and logically sequenced body of rules.  Nor, I would add, does it sit 
well for courts to be the entity seen to be expanding the coercive reach of the state.  
Another signature element of the “judicial process”12 is the manner in which facts are 
found.  Courts are repositories of evidence, which they must then assess and weigh on an 
ex post facto basis.  They do not conduct independent research or undertake their own 
fact-finding missions.13  Judges are instead reliant upon the materials marshaled by those 
participating in litigation to inform their analysis in a given dispute. This has the effect of 
narrowing the scope of information that is available to their decision-making processes.  
This stands in sharp contrast with the unlimited range of materials that may be considered 
by elected lawmakers when they are drafting (or amending) legislation and proposing 
policy changes.  In short, what may be a virtue in court proceedings and an integral 
component of the litigation process are commonly manifest as vices that impede the 
formation and implementation of policy choices.  Courts of course do have an effect on 
policymaking, but ordinarily these effects are incidental to its function.  However, recent 
jurisprudence under Waterfield has seemingly miscast these roles and displaced the 
burden of policymaking that properly rests with the government. 14  In these cases policy 
is reactively established by judges in response to actions taken by the police on their own 
accord.  Yet, unlike elected lawmakers who face re-election, judges are not accountable 
to the electorate and enjoy security in tenure.  This belies the non-democratic nature of 
judge-made law and is one of the many places where concerns about the predictive utility 
of the APD dovetails with those anchored in fairness.  The Court subordinates its own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See generally Roscoe Pound, “The Judicial Process in Action” (1955) 1 NYLF 11. 
13 Terence G Ison, “The Operational Realities of the Charter” (2012) 25 Can J Admin L 
& Prac 1 at 15 [Ison, “Operational Realities”]. 
14 Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
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proclamation that democracy is one of the bedrock principles underwriting the Canadian 
constitutional order when Waterfield/Dedman is used to make law.15   This is not 
assuaged by the tepid concession offered in R v Clayton that the APD is an imperfect 
solution to the problems the Court is attempting to stamp out.16  Additionally, courts are 
limited in the level of oversight that they can provide after the fact and are ill-equipped to 
supervise the policy choices that they implement.17  Against this backdrop, we cannot 
predict with any certainty which issues will be litigated, when they will arise or how 
courts across the country may choose to resolve them.   
3.1.2 Delays  
Developing the law and fleshing out doctrinal rules to govern police actions 
through a series of ad hoc judicial decisions is a time-consuming, multistep process.  
Delays are inherent in every stage of the criminal justice system.  Following an initial 
determination at trial, a case must be appealed, and then appealed again, before it is 
finally capable of being heard by the SCC.  The appellate process is complex and many 
steps are involved as a case ascends through the court system.18  The salient point is that 
the overall period of delay from the time that a police-citizen encounter occurs, until the 
SCC finally settles the matters in dispute can be quite significant and is often measured in 
terms of years.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court sometimes reserves its judgments in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 49, 161 DLR (4th) 385. 
16 Clayton, supra note 9 at para 76. 
17 See generally Steven Penney & James Stribopoulos, “‘Detention’ under the Charter 
after R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu” (2010) 51 (2d) SCLR 439.  See also the media reports 
detailing the overuse of strip searches by Toronto police in contravention with the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in R v Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 SCR 679. For example, 
see Jennifer Pagliaro, “Toronto police watchdog seeks to reduce ‘unnecessary’ strip 
searches”, Toronto Star (18 February 2013) online: Toronto Star 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/crime/2013/02/18/toronto_police_watchdog_seeks_to_red
uce_unnecessary_strip_searches.html>; and “60% of Toronto arrests lead to strip 
searches”, CBC News (17 August 2011) online: CBC News < 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2011/08/17/police-strip-searche.html>.  See 
also Timothy Appelby, “Toronto boy, 13, has gun charges stayed over ‘egregious’ police 
strip search”, The Globe and Mail (29 April 2013) online: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/toronto-boy-13-has-gun-charges-stayed-
over-egregious-police-strip-search/article11610186/>. 
18 See generally Stephen Coughlan, Criminal Procedure (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 
351-375 [Coughlan, Criminal]. 
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cases involving matters of criminal procedure and the exercise of police powers for 
inordinate lengths of time.19  Naturally, when this occurs it only prolongs the process of 
having an issue dispositively determined in the court system.  
Beyond the systemic and procedural delays that we find ingrained in the criminal 
justice system,20 further delays arise from the nature of the judicial function itself.  Courts 
are expected to exercise restraint in the opinions that they offer and convention holds that 
it is not appropriate for judges to stray from the issues at bar.  Avoiding the issuance of 
obiter dicta is commendable; however, we can take umbrage with a judicial refusal to 
deal with issues that are placed squarely before a court when it is competent to decide the 
matter.  This is especially so in respect of constitutional rights.  Yet there have been 
instances where the Supreme Court has flatly refused to address such issues.  For 
instance, in Mann21 the Court expressly declined to consider the effect of s. 10(b) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms22 when it gave the police the power to 
conduct brief investigative detentions (BIDs).23  In the wake of Mann it could not be 
ascertained whether a person subjected to a BID was entitled to exercise his or her right 
to consult legal counsel.  As consequence of the Supreme Court’s omission, this 
determination was left to the full discretion of the police to be made in individual cases.   
It was not until five years later that the Court ended the uncertainty when it ruled in R v 
Suberu24 that an individual’s right to counsel is engaged at the commencement of a 
“Mann stop.”25  This should have been obvious in light of the SCC’s previous finding 
that BIDs are captured by s. 9 of the Charter.  Yet, it should be pointed out this was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Don Stuart, “Revitalising Section 8: Individualised Reasonable Suspicion is a Sound 
Compromise for Routine Dog Sniff Use” (2008) 55 CR (6th) 376 at 376.  See also Tim 
Quigley, “Was it Worth the Wait? The Supreme Court's New Approaches to Detention 
and Exclusion of Evidence” (2009) 66 CR (6th) 88 at 88. 
20 See generally Daniel M Scanlan, “Issues in Digital Evidence and Privacy: Enhanced 
Expectations of Privacy and Appellate Lag Times” (2012) 16 Can Crim L Rev 301 
[Scanlan, “Lag Times”]. 
21 Supra note 8. 
22 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
23 Mann, supra note 8 at para 22. 
24 2009 SCC 33 at para 2, [2009] 2 SCR 490 [Suberu]. 
25 Steve Coughlan, “Great Strides in Section 9 Jurisprudence” (2009) 66 CR (6th) 75 at 
81. 
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relatively expeditious timeframe to resolve the outstanding s. 10(b) issue when we 
consider that it took 11 years for the underlying lawfulness of BIDs to be determined by 
the Supreme Court after the Ontario Court of Appeal approved them for use in that 
province in R v Simpson.26  Indeed, beginning with the seminal case of Dedman v The 
Queen27 and the cases that it spawned,28 delays have long cast a shadow over the APD in 
Canadian criminal law. 
The principal harm that results from these indeterminate periods of delay is the 
underlying lack of clarity in the law and uncertainty that persists until such time as the 
SCC recognizes the existence of a police power.  When the Court stipulates ancillary 
police powers, it frequently does so in a way that leaves the outer limits of these powers 
undefined.  Therefore, it is difficult to see how the incremental amelioration of formal 
deficiencies in the law governing police powers by ad hoc decisions in particular cases 
improves the overall character from the perspective of predictability.  This is a problem 
for the APD and one that must be accounted for by its defenders.  Moreover, the 
inexactitude of state power presents practical problems for law enforcement, which, in 
turn, begets further litigation over the legality of police actions breeding further delays.  It 
also poses thorny conceptual questions for a legal system that is committed to the rule of 
law.  The latter concern will be addressed more fully when we consider the Court’s 
account of the APD in terms of assuring fairness.   
Before departing this discussion, I will attend to the arguments of those who 
would be willing to concede that delays are, in fact, inescapable in the judicial process 
but contend that the delays described above are equally applicable in circumstances 
where courts are asked to interpret statutory powers or in assessing the constitutionality 
of legislative provisions.  Of course, the same basic delays can arise. The difference then, 
is one of degree and directionality.  When Parliament introduces legislation and enacts a 
new legal rule it speaks with one voice and the law is implemented from the top-down.  
By comparison, any rules created under the APD emerge from the bottom-up and can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 (1993) 12 OR (3d) 182, 79 CCC (3d) 482. 
27 [1985] 2 SCR 2, 20 DLR (4th) 321 [Dedman].   
28 See the discussion in Janine Benedet et al, “30th Anniversary of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms: The Impact on Criminal Justice” (2012) 91 CR (6th) 71 at 86-88 
[Benedet, “The Impact”]. 
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created by any number of trial (or appellate-level) courts, which are each free under 
Waterfield to institute new police powers at common law.  Moreover, unlike legislation 
created by Parliament that is applicable uniformly across Canada, judge-made laws are 
only binding within the jurisdictional bounds of the court that propagated them.  Thus, 
the powers that are created by courts can (at least for a time)29 vary widely from one 
province or territory to the next.  Inter-jurisdictional court rulings may also conflict 
directly with each other.  The potential for an indeterminate number of police powers 
being spawned by lower courts is surely less predictable when compared with the 
alternative.  New legislation will sometimes be interpreted differently across jurisdictions 
before it is ultimately settled by the high court.  However, in the interim, the potentiality 
for a divergence of views is numerically more limited and finite in nature.  It is difficult 
to imagine any scenario in which the interpretation of a given piece of legislation could 
be construed in more than a handful of different ways.  This does not hold with judge-
made police powers.  Rather, these may be far more diffuse and freewheeling in both 
substance and quantity.  Thus, we find another reason to prefer the Parliamentary process 
over judicial avenues when it comes to the formation of new investigative powers and the 
conferral of them upon state agents.  Lastly, the additional volume of litigation that is 
propelled by lower court APD rulings diverts finite judicial resources away from other 
matters.  In this way, the adjudication of matters under Waterfield contributes to delays in 
the processing of other disputes on court dockets.30   For a court system that is bogged 
down by a scarcity of resources and concerned about access to justice,31 the recognition 
of these concerns should resonate.32  While heal-dragging by Parliament undoubtedly 
occurs, it is not inevitable.  Nor is it a legitimate reason for courts to enter the lawmaking 
fray.   
3.1.3 Lack of Clarity, Non-Comprehensiveness and Limit Testing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Scanlan, “Lag Times”, supra note 20 at 311. 
30 Ison, “Operational Requirements”, supra note 13 at 18. 
31 See generally Patricia Hughes & Mary Jane Mossman, “Re-Thinking Access to 
Criminal Justice in Canada: A Critical Review of Needs and Responses” (2002) 13 
Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 1; and Faisal Bhabha, “Institutionalizing Access-to-
Justice: Judicial, Legislative and Grassroots Dimensions” (2007) 33 Queen’s LJ 139. 
32 Ison, “Operational Requirements”, supra note 13 at 13-14 and 18. 
	   77	  
It has been observed that APD-based judgments have a tendency to yield more 
questions than answers.33  As a function of the Court’s case-by-case jurisprudence  we 
find a lack of thoroughness and an underlying inability to demarcate bright line limits.  
As Professor Kent Roach indicates, the ensuing uncertainty of the law “means that 
citizens and police officers have to live with a lack of clarity about the extent of their 
powers.”34  Consequently, the prospect of the misapplication of police powers and the 
overshooting of their authority in derogation of the Charter is increased.35  Measured in 
terms of its lack of thoroughness, such failures demonstrate the problems inherent when 
courts exceed their institutional capacities and begin creating unprecedented police 
powers.36  This deficit in clarity flows directly from the non-comprehensive nature in 
which judge-made law is assembled.  Where we gain a marginal level of clarity on a 
particular aspect of policing in a given case, many closely related issues remain in the 
penumbra.  For instance, beyond the s. 10(b) issue that was explicitly left unresolved in 
Mann, the Supreme Court in that case left many other questions related to the parameters 
of the common law detention and search powers it created unanswered.  The ancillary 
powers stipulated by the Court failed to provide sufficient guidance on a number of 
important aspects of BIDs including: the acceptable duration of a so-called brief 
investigative detention;37 when the Charter will apply to these detentions38 and under 
what circumstance a detainee’s right to counsel will be engaged;39 which party will bear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”, supra note 3 at 48. 
34 Kent Roach, “A Charter Reality Check: How Relevant Is the Charter to the Justness of 
Our Criminal Justice System?” (2008) 40 SCLR (2d) 717 at 754. 
35 Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”, supra note 3 at 48. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Lesley A McCoy, “Liberty’s Last Stand? Tracing the Limits of Investigative 
Detention” (2002) 46 CLQ 319 at 323-325 [McCoy, “Last Stand”].  See also James 
Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detentions 
After Mann” (2007) 52 CLQ 297 at 309 [Stribopoulos, “The Limits”]. 
38 Tim Quigley, “Mann, It’s a Disappointing Decision,” (2004) 21 CR (6th) 41 at 43 
[Quigley, “Disappointing”]. 
39 Eric V Gottardi, “R. v. Mann: Regulating State Intrusions in the Context of 
Investigative Detentions” (2004) 21 CR (6th) 27 at 37. 
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the onus of proof in establishing the reasonableness of a detention;40 how close the 
temporal and geographic nexus must be to permit a BID;41 the degree of imprecision or 
variance from the description provided to the police of a suspect that is nevertheless 
tolerable in electing to detain someone; when an incidental search will be held to be 
unnecessary and therefore unreasonable;42 whether a detainee can be moved43 or 
transported to another location;44 and whether, and if so, to what extent, the police are 
entitled to use force to effect or continue a detention.45  This of course a non-exhaustive 
list of the residual issues to be resolved through the adjudicate process.46  Although 
Suberu47 addressed some of these issues, many more still linger and await resolution.   
Similar difficulties envelop the powers generated by the Court in Kang-Brown, 
particularly where they intersect with the loose strands of Mann.48   
The vacancy of well-defined answers provided in APD cases is problematic for 
the reasons indicated above, but there are additional problems associated with it.   Even if 
one takes a disinterested view of the substance of the police powers conferred by the 
SCC and suspends any criticisms that may lurk on that front,49 there remains good reason 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Benjamin L Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 CR (6th) 58 at 63 
[Berger, “Erasure”].  See also David M Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling (2004) 41 
Alta L Rev 905 at 931 [Tanovich, “E-Racing”]. 
41 McCoy, “Last Stand”, supra note 37 at 328. 
42 Quigley, “Disappointing,” supra note 38 at 43. 
43 Michael A Johnston, “Come On Mann Don’t Search Me! A Case Comment on R. v. 
C.J.F.” (2009) 47 Alta L Rev 277 at 281. 
44 McCoy, “Last Stand”, supra note 37 at 325. 
45 Berger, “Erasure,” supra note 40 at 63.   
46 See also Alec Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause – Investigative Detention and Its 
Implications” (2007) 52 CLQ 327 at 336-337 where he asks the following barrage of 
questions: “How is someone to know if they are detained or just chatting with the officer?  
What sort of s. 10(a) reasons is a person entitled to in the absence of a specific 
charge?...What if a person starts to walk away in the mistaken belief that he or she need 
not remain unless there is an arrest?  Are they escaping lawful custody?  When are they 
liable to a conviction for assaulting or obstructing a police officer if they do not 
acquiesce?”  See generally Alec Fiszauf, The Law of Investigative Detention (Markham, 
ON: LexisNexis, 2008) [Fiszauf, The Law]. 
47 Supra note 24. 
48 See David Dalrymple, “Reasonable Suspicion: Two Competing Approaches” (2011) 
84 CR (6th) 94 [Dalrymple, “Reasonable Suspicion”]. 
49 For example see Graham Mayeda, “Between Principle and Pragmatism: The Decline of 
Principled Reasoning in the Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court” (2010) 50 SCLR (2d) 
	   79	  
for us to be concerned with the form of these powers.  Seldom are the holdings in 
Waterfield-based judgments clear-cut and careful study is required in order for these 
decisions to be interpreted properly.  Even legal scholars have expressed difficulty in 
gleaning precisely what the Court has declared and judgments may be open to more than 
one interpretation.50  This says much about the ancillary powers doctrine and its supposed 
delivery of predictability in the law.   
In addition to not being self-evident, the rules created by the Court are not self-
applying.  APD decisions rarely provide definitive rules to guide police in their decision-
making or stipulate prescriptive solutions to recurrent problems that arise during police-
citizen encounters.  Consequently, the police are thrust into the position of having to 
decipher the law that has been created and to then approximate the limits of their powers.  
Regrettably, research has shown that police forces are not particularly adept at 
interpreting and adapting to court decisions in order to bring their practices in line with 
judicial opinions.51  It stands to reason that the more speculative a rule, the more likely 
the police are to intrude upon citizens’ constitutional rights.  For example, owing to the 
lesser standard stipulated by the Court in Mann and Kang-Brown to detain and search 
someone, Canadians are now more susceptible to a greater range of warrantless intrusions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 at 44 [emphasis in original] [Mayeda, “Between Principle”], where it is asserted that, 
“[t]he relevant community of judgment is that which takes into account the actual parties 
that are involved in the litigation and the position of non-litigants who will be affected by 
the decision as represented by interveners.”  It is apparent that the potential for disparate 
(and abusive) policing of marginalized groups, including racialized Canadians have not 
been adequately taken into account during APD litigation.  As Mayeda proceeds to argue 
at 45, “[D]emocracy requires courts to provide justifications for the infringement of 
citizens’ rights that are responsive to the concerns of those whose rights are being 
infringed.  A deferential approach to government, on the other hand, promotes a view of 
democracy that is essentially majoritarian—it presumes that the legislative choices of a 
democratically elected body represent the interests of citizens.  However, [such a 
view]…fails to recognize that non-representative bodies like courts are sometimes better 
suited to promoting and protecting the rights of individuals whose interests are 
marginalized in the political forum, and whose interests are consequently not reflected in 
legislative policy choices.”   
50 Gerry Ferguson & Benjamin L Berger, “Recent Developments in Canadian Criminal 
Law” (2009) 33 Crim LJ 263 at 272.  
51 Ison, “Operational Requirements”, supra note 13 at 13. See also James Stribopoulos, 
“In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 
Queen’s LJ 1 at 49 [Stribopoulos, “In Search”].   
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upon their privacy.  Paralleling this, a greater number of unwarranted police actions are 
likely to occur as a consequence of the diminished standard of suspicion required to 
conduct a BID; and the nebulous way in which the Court chose to articulate the 
standard.52  Concerning the former, it is plain that the “reasonable suspicion”53 threshold 
can be satisfied by facts or information that is both less reliable and less credible than 
what is required to support reasonable grounds to arrest someone.54  In respect of the 
latter, what constitutes a “constellation of objectively discernible facts”55 is surely open 
to more than one plausible interpretation and will be situationally contingent.56  Without 
declarative laws to specify the limits of police power it has fallen to the courts to 
scrutinize the front-line interpretations made by the police, 57 and to either endorse or 
reject them after the fact.58  The making of this determination will vary from officer to 
officer and from judge to judge on the basis of his or her own “personal threshold of 
reasonable suspicion”59 on the same set of facts.  Hardly a harbinger of predictability in 
the law, or an effective assurance that due process rights will get their due attention 
during street-level law enforcement activities.  Cumulatively, the investigatory powers 
created by the Court remain ill-defined.  Hence, it is difficult to predict how the police 
will choose to exercise these powers, impossible to know when citizens will present a 
court challenge to the actions of the police or where a reviewing court will draw the 
dividing lines between civil liberties and the limits of coercive state authority.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Infra note 55. 
53 Kang-Brown, supra note 1 at paras 1 and 25.  For commentary see Tim Quigley, 
Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law, 2d ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 5-39 
[Quigley, Procedure]; and Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detention: A Critique of R. 
v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta L Rev 935 at 941 [Quigley, “Brief Investigatory”]. 
54 Ibid at 5-40.  See generally Dalrymple, “Reasonable Suspicion”, supra note 48 at 94. 
55 Mann, supra note 8 at para 27. 
56 Dalrymple, “Reasonable Suspicion”, supra note 48 at 95 and 100-101. 
57 Dennis Forcese, “Police and the Public” in Robin Neugebauer, ed, Criminal Injustice: 
Racism in the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000) at 175.  
58 See Michael Plaxton, “Police Powers After Dicey” (2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 99 [Plaxton, 
“Police Powers”], where a presumption in favour of police judgments and their exercises 
of discretionary authority is proposed. 
59 Dalrymple, “Reasonable Suspicion”, supra note 48 at 95. 
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Another deficiency with Waterfield, as an ex post facto test, is that it simply 
cannot deliver pre-event certainty to a particular police-citizen encounter.60  The APD is 
only triggered in cases where the Court has found that two conditions have been met: 
first, there is no legislative authorization for the contested police actions; and, second, an 
earlier judicial precedent has not endorsed the impugned police conduct.   Conceptually, 
in APD cases we find an arm of the state, the Crown, asking for the Court to declare the 
powers necessary to gain a conviction and enforce them retroactively against an accused.  
Waterfield cannot guide one’s actions or decision-making during the actual time that the 
incident occurs.  It can only confirm or deny the lawfulness of past conduct.  Hence, 
neither the officer who initiates the investigation nor the person who is the subject of it 
can be aware of the legality of the police actions being deployed at the time that they are 
asserted.  In short, the APD does nothing to prevent Charter violations before they occur 
and provides little shielding to guard against future breaches.       
         3.1.4 Deference to Police 
Deference to the police is a common thread running through the Supreme Court’s 
APD jurisprudence as Plaxton has observed.61  From a results standpoint, the SCC has 
never applied Waterfield in a manner consistent with the original English application of 
the test.62  In every instance where the Court has engaged Waterfield the result has been 
either: the recognition of police actions as lawful;63 the grant of new, freestanding 
common law powers;64 or, both.65   Sometimes deference is manifest by specifically 
condoning police actions that have been taken.  Other times the deference that is 
displayed takes on a more generalized form.  The latter occurs when, the Court, although 
rebuking particular police actions in a given case proceeds nonetheless with stipulating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Law of Police Authority: The McDonald Commission 
and the McLeod Report” (1985) 9 Dalhousie LJ 692. 
61 Plaxton, “Police Powers”, supra note 58 at 106-114. 
62 Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention in Canada” [2005] Crim LR 98 at 104 [Healy, 
“Investigative Detention”].   
63 R v Stenning, [1970] SCR 631, 10 DLR (3d) 224; R v Knowlton, [1974] SCR 443, 33 
DLR (3d) 755; and Clayton, supra note 9. 
64 Mann, supra note 8; Kang-Brown, supra note 1 and AM, supra note 11. 
65 Dedman, supra note 27 and R v Godoy, [1999] 1 SCR 311, 168 DLR (4th) 257 
[Godoy]. 
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ancillary police powers of general application.  These powers become entrenched and are 
designed to endure beyond the exigencies of the case in which they were created.  
Kang-Brown is illustrative of general deference to the police and crime control.  
It is a judgment where the Court disapproved of the police actions at the micro-level and 
in the context of the case, but condoned the investigative tactics in question at the macro-
level and cleared them for use in other cases.  In this case the SCC applied the APD to 
allow the use of sniffer dogs during a pre-arrest investigative detention.  In essence, what 
the police attempted was something akin to a “Mann stop”66 with the inclusion of a 
search dog to assist.  Only, as the Court found, they lacked a reasonable basis to suspect 
the accused and to detain him.67  Additionally, the SCC also concluded that the police 
could not point to a recent or ongoing offence that they were investigating, as Mann 
requires in order for a BID to be utilized.68  The police had no actual knowledge that 
anything illicit was occurring at the bus terminal.  They did not observe anything amiss 
firsthand.  Nor did they receive a tip from a third party that Mr. Kang-Brown was 
transporting narcotics.  Instead, they sought the cooperation of the accused, and for a time 
he was compliant.  But when he ceased to be so, the police brought in the sniffer dog to 
search his personal belongings.  The sole reason for the presence of the dog at the scene 
was to search for drugs.  Hence, the search that was conducted in Kang-Brown was, by 
definition, not a “Mann search.”69  It was directed at a fundamentally different purpose.  
As the Court stipulated in Mann, a search incidental to a BID, is a separate power and 
does not flow axiomatically from a valid detention.  The search power recognized in that 
case was limited to a protective pat-down where an officer could substantiate a legitimate 
concern of officer or public safety.  None of these criteria were met in Kang-Brown.  A 
majority of the Court concluded that the police lacked lawful grounds to commence a 
search, as there was never any safety concern raised.  An acquittal was entered, but 
without expressly stating so the SCC nevertheless went on to introduce further common 
law investigative powers into Canadian law.  This time, the Supreme Court granted the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Supra note 25. 
67 Kang-Brown, supra note 1 at para 26. 
68 Mann, supra note 8 at para 34. 
69 Michal Fairburn, “Mann Oh Man – We’ve Only Just Begun” (2005) 17 NJCL 171 at 
182. 
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police the authority to conduct a warrantless search for contraband unrelated to public or 
officer safety—and to utilize a dog in the evidence gathering process.  Therefore, even 
though the police were found to have acted unlawfully, they (along with all other 
Canadian police officers) were nevertheless rewarded with new investigative powers for 
use in future cases. 
The Court’s judgment in Clayton70 evinces a different sort of problem from the 
standpoint of predictability.  It is an example of specific deference to the discretion 
exercised by the police in that case, where officers decided to stop every motorist 
attempting to exit the premises.  This included the stopping of the accused’s vehicle even 
though it was not one of the vehicles explicitly described in the 911 call.  Ultimately, the 
Court did not identify anything amiss with the police tactics from a Charter standpoint 
and approved of the police actions, full stop.  Where Clayton differs from cases like 
Dedman v The Queen,71 R v Godoy,72 Mann and Kang-Brown is that it did not license any 
articulable and enduring police power.  At best the case impresses a watermark to assist 
in the demarcation of the limits of common law police powers.  But it can be used as a 
proxy or barometer to help the police estimate the lawfulness of an investigative tactic 
before initially implementing it.  There are problems abound with such a framework.73  
According to Professor Graham Mayeda:  
The majority does not engage in principled reasoning.  As a result, it is not clear 
how, in the absence of particularized suspicion, the power the Court grants to 
police properly balances the individual’s right to autonomy and privacy against 
the state’s interest in preventing handgun-related crimes.  All the Court seems to 
require is a close temporal connection between the call and the police response, 
and close physical proximity between the roadblock and the location of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Supra note 9. 
71 Supra note 27. 
72 Supra note 65. 
73 See Steve Coughlan & Glen Luther, Detention and Arrest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 
at 20 [Coughlan, Detention] where the authors express the view that, “[I]t remains a bit of 
mystery as to how a court should decide whether to apply the Waterfield test to a given 
situation...The current attitude seems to conflate the two branches of Waterfield into a 
single question that asks: ‘Do the police need this power to carry out their general 
duties?’ If so, the answers seems to be that ‘they shall have it.’”  
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alleged offence.  Neither of these requirements substitutes for the particularized 
suspicion of an individual…that would justify violating an individual’s rights.74 
 
Moreover, it was impossible for the police to know how a court would later deem their 
actions, but they were prepared to take that risk.  Evidently, once met by a fruitful 
investigation that ferreted out firearms, the Court’s deference was inclined to side with 
the police. The hazards present with a judgment like Clayton and the chain of reasoning 
underpinning it has been well-expressed by Coughlan.  As he argues, 
[C]ommon law powers are much less certain than statutory powers and therefore 
are less desirable for a number of reasons.  They remove predictability from the 
law, but beyond that they are easily susceptible to ‘slippage.’  Where the question 
‘Did the police have the power to do this?’ becomes roughly equivalent to ‘Did 
the police behave reasonably?’ there is a danger.  If we become accustomed to 
thinking of particular behavior as reasonable, then something close to it but not 
quite as respectful of rights can be seen as reasonable too.  But then that slight 
diminution becomes our new norm for ‘reasonable,’ and a further small step away 
is easy to justify—and so on, and so on.75 
 
Thus, we can rightly wonder about the utility of the s. 10(b) right recognized in Suberu in 
circumstances where the police assert themselves as being competent to do something 
that has no legislative foundation and that has not been previously approved by the 
judiciary.  What is a prudent lawyer to advise his or her client?  Should counsel anticipate 
“slippage”76 in the common law and that the police actions will be affirmed following 
judicial review?  Or, should the client be encouraged to remain silent and later launch an 
argument predicated upon the principle of legality?  This is seemingly the only avenue 
for an individual to pursue given that an argument under s. 1 of the Charter is rendered 
inapplicable under Waterfield. 
It has been suggested that where “an accused has been searched or detained in the 
absence of any statutory authority, courts have been faced with a choice between finding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Mayeda, “Between Principle”, supra note 49 at 63 [footnote omitted and emphasis in 
original]. 
75 Steve Coughlan, “Comment” in Janine Benedet et al, “30th Anniversary of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Impact on Criminal Justice” (2012) 91 
CR (6th) 71 at 91 [footnote omitted] [Coughlan, “Comment”]. 
76 Ibid. 
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a Charter violation or finding a new common law power authorizing the police action.” 77   
While the stark dichotomy presented is enticing in simplicity, it is inconsistent with the 
actual practice of the Court in APD jurisprudence.  Sometimes both have arisen within 
the same judgments.  As we saw in Mann and Kang-Brown, the Supreme Court identified 
Charter breaches and acquitted those accused, but the Court was nevertheless willing to 
carve out new police powers.  The falsity of this choice has also been revealed by 
judgments pointing in the opposite direction.  In Godoy, for instance, the Court did not 
identify a Charter violation and still went on to announce the existence of a new power to 
enter domiciles without a warrant.  The uniformity of the outcomes favouring “crime 
control” in APD cases alone should be enough to give us pause.  But, when combined 
with the Court’s expressed desire to provide predictability in the law there is even greater 
reason for concern. 
 3.2 Fairness Under Waterfield or Fairness Underwater? 
 3.2.1 Jurisdictional Concerns and the Uneven Development of the Law  
Elsewhere in this thesis I have described the common law police powers created 
by the SCC as being “unprecedented”78 in nature.  In doing so, I am mindful that this 
term risks confusion and invites misinterpretation.  Specifically, the characterization 
presented opens the door to the criticism that each of the powers conferred by the 
Supreme Court arose from the affirmation of a lower (trial or appellate-level) court 
decision, and as such, were built on the foundations of previous judicial precedents.  In a 
narrow sense this is of course correct.  However, this articulation overlooks a significant 
limitation that is inherent in the conception of ancillary police powers under Waterfield. 
There is a dimension of formal inequality that follows in lockstep with utilization of the 
APD by lower courts.  These matters have not been fully accounted for in the prevailing 
narrative about common law police powers in Canada and so they warrant further 
examination.  Specifically, I suggest that the powers created by the Supreme Court, 
though facially neutral, remain open to challenge on the basis of their inability to satisfy 
more substantive conceptions of equality.79 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Coughlan, Criminal, supra note 18 at 10. 
78 Stribopoulos, “Sniffing Out”, supra note 3 at 49.    
79 Supra note 49. 
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The construction of court-generated powers is constrained by the jurisdictional 
scope of the court propounding them.  Judges can only implement police powers within 
their territorial jurisdiction.  Moreover, even if we accept that informal pressure is exerted 
upwardly by lower court rulings to expand police powers,80 the actual authority and thrust 
of stare decisis is only ever directed downwardly.  Similarly, the opinion of one court is 
not binding upon another that is laterally situated with it.81  Consequently, only the 
Supreme Court is competent to authoritatively interpret criminal law and institute 
common law police powers on a national level.  Thus, until such time as the SCC 
approves of a particular police tactic, it cannot be said to exist in a province or territory 
that had not previously recognized the power stipulated by the Court on identical terms.  
Only in such situations could the ratification of the power be fairly viewed as having 
confirmed an earlier precedent.  Everywhere else, and under all other circumstances, the 
power can only be regarded as “unprecedented” in nature.  Thus, a decision of the high 
court declaring a common law police power will always be unprecedented.  This is 
significant given that criminal law is a matter of national concern and it should be applied 
uniformly across the nation.  As stated, these rulings do deliver formal equality by 
harmonizing the law and making it applicable to all.  This is a rare welcomed aspect of 
APD jurisprudence at the Supreme Court level.  Yet, we cannot allow these marginal 
gains to divert our attention from the reality that the SCC’s use of Waterfield 
simultaneously encourages lower courts to themselves apply the APD and these decisions 
cannot deliver the same harmonization to the law.  Nor can we lose sight of the fact that 
although everyone is amenable, at law, to BIDs and other discretionary police powers, it 
remains the case that, in fact and on Canadian streets, certain communities appear more 
susceptible to these forms of state intervention.82  
Although the existence of a police power in another jurisdiction is, at law, 
immaterial to the determination of its legality in the other jurisdiction, this does not mean 	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82 Fiszauf, The Law, supra note 46 at 5 and 35.  See also Kent Roach, “Making Progress 
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that the ruling by one court is not influential in the decision-making of another court.   
Increasingly, lower courts have been willing to bridge the gulf between the existing law 
and the actions of the police in the absence of recognized, pre-existing lawful authority.  
This has contributed significantly to the growth of police powers under Waterfield and 
the entrenchment of the APD itself in Canadian law.  As Quigley writes of this 
phenomenon:  
[T]here is a distressing tendency by the judiciary to create new common law 
police powers in response to particular fact situations…[which] are subsequently 
expanded by judges in other cases.  The result is an increase in police powers but 
without the checks and balances of democratic Parliamentary and public debate.83   
 
Of course, the lower court proclivity for fashioning novel police powers under Waterfield 
has been matched (and encouraged) by the SCC’s demonstrated predilection for 
approving them at common law.  One feeds into and reinforces the other.     
From an equality perspective, troubles arise whenever the courts in a particular 
province or territory choose to license police actions that were unauthorized by the 
Criminal Code84 or another federally competent statute.  As indicated, these newfound 
coercive powers become applicable in the place of their creation, but do not apply 
elsewhere.  Yet, in practical terms, there is little reason to think that any positive judicial 
precedent in favour of the police in another jurisdiction will have any effect other than to 
embolden the police in their actions.  Therefore, reports of a trial court decision 
upholding police actions at common law can be seen as suggestive that police in another 
jurisdiction might procure a similar result.  The likelihood of this is even greater should 
an appellate court decide in favour of expanding police powers.  If the police in one 
province are granted the ability to do something that is not authorized by statute then it is 
foreseeable that other police forces will institute similar practices if they believe them to 
be effective tools.  Conversely, the establishment of an adverse precedent by a lower 
court in another jurisdiction can be simultaneously discounted and ignored for the reason 
that I have asserted: it does not apply to them.  Surely, it is unfair that Canadian police 
officers can plausibly (and concurrently) present both arguments.    
3.2.2 Non-Representative Cases and Adjudicative Acontextualism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Quigley, Procedure, supra note 53 at 5-2. 
84 RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code]. 
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In many ways the cases confronted by the courts during APD litigation are 
outliers.  One effect of this, I will suggest is the obscuring of the fact that it is not simply 
the determination of the limits of police power, or, what some might refer to as a 
measuring of the “government’s right”85 to control crime in society that are at issue.  
Rather, the individual rights of Canadians as enshrined in the Charter are engaged and 
directly impacted by these court decisions.  Yet, when framed principally as contests 
about police actions the result has been the gradual diminution in the range of personal 
liberty.  The Court has consistently privileged security concerns over civil liberties when 
resolving these competing tensions under Waterfield.  If however, courts were to be 
presented with a fuller compendium of police-citizen encounters, we might then see a 
greater reluctance to grant common law powers to state agents and a judicial posture that 
is more attuned to equality-based concerns.86 
Procedural and resource advantages favour the state and contribute to the 
distortions found in these cases.  APD cases are illustrative of the convergence of the 
state’s singular interest in crime control being exercised through its various branches.  
This involves the police, prosecutors and legislators working symbiotically along the 
same vector and working towards the expansion of state power.87  Professor James Kelly 
has observed it that, “[u]nder the crime control model, the police, who work in 
conjunction with Crown prosecutors, are provided with wide- and far-reaching 
investigative techniques that serve to filter out factually weak cases and secure 
convictions through guilty pleas during the investigative phase.”88  It is axiomatic that the 
cases brought before the Court are ones in which the government’s agents have 
determined to be favourable and bode well in their quest to enlarge the ambit of state 
power.  Weaker cases can be weeded out, charges stayed and prosecutions discontinued 
in an effort to avoid the establishment of adverse precedents.  It also stands to reason that 
in cases where the police misconduct is egregious in nature that the Crown will exercise 
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86 Berger, “Erasure”, supra note 40 at 61-63.   
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its discretion and elect not to proceed against a factually guilty accused.89  Alternatively, 
in such cases the Crown could still attempt to come to terms on a disposition whereby the 
accused pleads guilty to an offence in exchange for having additional counts stayed or a 
less severe penalty.90  These are bargaining chips not held by individual citizens.  As an 
ever-present backdrop to Waterfield cases, these disparities and the imbalance in 
resources between the state and the individual must loom larger and be taken into account 
from the perspective of "fairness."   
Instances where law-abiding citizen have been needlessly subjected to coercive 
police measures without lawful justification are seldom the subject of civil litigation and 
rarely are police officers prosecuted criminally for behavior occurring in their capacity as 
officers.91  Non-adjudicative processes such as police complaint commissions also siphon 
off cases that might otherwise be brought as civil actions before courts.  Although such 
forums have been criticized for their impotency in redressing police misconduct,92 to the 
extent that legitimate complaints are diverted from the court system and into other 
remedial arenas for redress, it does serve to reduce the volume of cases coming before the 
judiciary.   Although nothing precludes citizens from challenging police actions in civil 
proceedings, it is clear that citizens seldom pursue such recourses.  In light of the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Vancouver (City) v Ward93 affirming an award of 
$5,000 damages arising from the strip search of an individual—himself a prominent 
litigation lawyer—who had been wrongly imprisoned by the police, it is unlikely that we 
will see a proliferation of similar cases being filed in civil court.94   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 For an example to the contrary see R v Bonds, 2010 ONCJ 561, 79 CR (6th) 119.  For 
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Fernwood Press, 1999) at 134-172; and David M Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: 
	   90	  
Concomitantly, cases involving members of the public who have been shown to 
be factually guilty of an offence predominate and appear disproportionately in 
courtrooms relative to the overall number of police investigations commenced against 
citizens.  As Stribopoulos asserts: 
Invariably, individuals who are in fact guilty of criminal wrongdoing make these 
sorts of Charter claims.  After all, these are the cases in which police action paid 
off, where a detention, arrest, search, or interrogation led to the acquisition of 
incriminating evidence and culminated in a prosecution.  Lost from view under 
this system for regulating police authority are cases involving innocent 
individuals whose civil rights were violated.95 
 
Most people are simply unaware of the precise limits of the powers possessed by the 
police or the protections available to them under the Charter.96  Accordingly, many 
innocent people will not pursue a remedy for the improper treatment they have 
experienced at the hands of the police.97  This is unfortunate for judicial determinations 
of police actions are thus contingent upon an individual bringing a challenge in the 
context of criminal proceedings in which he or she stands accused.  Yet, as Coughlan and 
Luther assert, “every criminal accused that brings a Charter challenge to police conduct 
in her case de facto represents other persons who may have been subjected to a similar 
police exercise of power.”98  Although the Court has noted this recently in R v Grant,99 it 
remains that challenges to state conduct are underutilized.  Seemingly, the absence of a 
large volume of cases implicating police misconduct in trial or appellate courts has an 
effect upon the judicial perspective of the police function and on the results that are 	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arrived at through court processes.  Plainly, the structuring of these ex post facto inquiries 
is viewed by the state as beneficial.  It is, however, less so from the vantage point of the 
accused, as the analytical “gaze”100 of the Court is frequently coloured by the gathering 
of contraband or the presence of criminality revealed through police actions.  Describing 
this dimension of Waterfield jurisprudence, Stribopoulos writes that, “[a]s a result, courts 
adjudicating these disputes are inclined to be sympathetic to state claims that the police 
behaved reasonably and should therefore be officially granted the power to do whatever it 
is that they did in acquiring the evidence tendered against the guilty accused.”101  The 
defensibility of such judicial reasoning is more tenable under s. 24(2) analysis where only 
the accused is affected by the court’s decision.102  However, by contrast, determinations 
under Waterfield carry with them immediate implications for everyone and the 
emergence of coercive powers that are effective against all.   
The point that must remain in focus throughout all of this is that the effect of any 
APD-based case is bigger than the rendering of a decision and carries consequences 
extending beyond those immediately embroiled in the litigation of a dispute.  The issues 
that are engaged are not confined to the resolution of individual cases or private disputes.  
Nor are the impacts of these judgments limited to the parties to the litigation. It is not 
simply a question of whether to convict or acquit someone accused of a criminal offence.  
Rather, these are cases that decide important issues in public law and have far-reaching 
implications on constitutional rights.  Any enlargement of state power impacts everyone.  
Therefore, the analysis within the APD, if it is to be regarded as legitimate, must account 
for the gravity of what is at stake in terms of the constitutional rights of individuals and 
for constitutionalism more broadly.  It must also confront another distressing current 
running through Waterfield in Canada: the marked overrepresentation of “racialized”103 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Second Vintage Books, 1995) at 184. 
101 Stribopoulos, “Crime Control”, supra note 95 at 360. 
102 See for example R v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36 at para 35, 60 CCC (3d) 460 and R v 
Kokesch, [1990] 3 SCR 3, 61 CCC (3d) 207 where notwithstanding the finding that the 
police acted wrongly and in breach of the Charter, the accused were convicted in each 
case.  Importantly, however, the police were not given further extensions of power to use 
in other cases. 
103 Tanovich, The Colour, supra note 94 at 1-3. 
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persons in cases where the underlying lawfulness of police assertions of authority over 
citizens is at issue.104   
3.2.3 “Guinea Pigging” and Gambling with Constitutional Rights 
When considering the ambit of judicially recognized police powers we must also 
be mindful of court rulings where the protections of the Charter are simply not engaged.  
Not infrequently such cases arise in the context of s. 8 litigation where it is found that an 
accused did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy.105  For instance, in R v 
Tessling106 the Court concluded that individuals do not enjoy a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the heat emanations from their homes or other places.  This finding vested the 
police with the right to use forward-looking infrared technology on an indiscriminate 
basis.  More recently, the SCC used similar reasoning to declare in R v Patrick107 that 
state investigators are free to gather and sift through garbage that has been discarded 
outside of one’s place of dwelling.  These are searches and seizures that fail to attract 
constitutional protection.  Hence, these are police actions that are left entirely unregulated 
and to the full discretion of the police themselves to administer.   
Packer wrote that, “[t]he criminal law is neither a slot machine nor a 
computer.”108 He was right.  Clearly, the police in these cases do not have the advance 
knowledge or certitude that is implied in the computer.  And, if the police do harbour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 It is to be noted those accused in Mann, Clayton, Kang-Brown are each members of 
minority communities.  In addition, so were the accused in R v Simpson, (1993) 12 OR 
(3d) 182, 79 CCC (3d) 482 and Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) which helped to lay the 
groundwork for the Court’s ruling in Mann.  Moreover, the subsequent jurisprudence 
about brief investigative detention in Grant, supra note 99 and Suberu, supra note 24 
again involved racialized Canadians.  Finally, and though not argued under Waterfield, 
the decision in R v Asante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38, [2003] 2 SCR 3 which addressed the 
limits of police power under provincial legislation in Ontario was similarly on facts 
involving a visible minority as the accused. 
105 For example see R v Edwards, [1996] 1 SCR 128, 132 DLR (4th) 31, which held that 
an individual did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s 
apartment; and R v Belnavis, [1997] 3 SCR 341, 151 DLR (4th) 443 where the Court 
concluded that a passenger in a motor-vehicle was not entitled to s. 8 protections.  See 
also R v Boersma, [1994] 2 SCR 488, 31 CR (4th) 386. 
106 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 SCR 432 [Tessling]. 
107 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 SCR 579 [Patrick]. 
108 Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1968) at 290 [Packer, The Limits]. 
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suspicions that they believe to be well-founded, the question that must then be asked, 
why, in these cases have the police forgone prior judicial authorization and not sought a 
warrant, particularly when telewarrants are readily available? Thus, they behave instead 
as one does seated before a slot machine and partake in a game of chance.  What is being 
gambled with, however, is not for the police (and the state more broadly) to play with in 
this manner.  For in effect they are gambling with the constitutional rights of citizens.  
Therefore, we must first ask, why, the Court has not insisted that the police, as state 
agents, utilize the powers that have legislated exclusively for their use by the state; and, 
second, and perhaps more importantly, why, the Court has viewed itself as competent to 
sidestep the law on the books and to supply the police with coercive powers? As we 
ponder these questions, the fact that the Court has provided not only the powers sought 
by the police, but also the legal basis for them should be discomfiting.  It is evident, 
however, that the police sometimes win outright in these contests and that the APD will 
not always be necessary, as Tessling and Patrick illustrate.  Although even when they 
“lose” it is difficult to see how they have incurred any loss.  The conceptual difficulty of 
equating compliance with the “principle of legality”109 (POL) with some detrimental loss 
is compounded by cases such as R v Wong110 and R v Duarte.111  In these cases, even 
though the police conduct was rebuked and the Court declined to create new common law 
powers, the accused were still convicted of the offences charged.  The particular police 
still prevailed against the particular persons they were targeting.  So in a narrow sense, 
the police nonetheless won.  It is only in a broad sense that the police could be possibly 
said to incur a detriment.  And, of course, that only holds if we presuppose that other 
police forces wish to engage in similar conduct.  To the extent that other prosecutions 
were pending and contingent upon the police conduct being upheld in Wong or Duarte 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 51 at 2. 
110 In Wong, supra note 4, the police conduct covert video surveillance in a hotel room 
and uncovered evidence of illegal gaming.  At the time of the investigation there was no 
statutory authorization for video surveillance.  Parliament responded to the Court’s 
judgment with the introduction of “general warrants” in s. 487.01.  For discussion see 
Steve Coughlan, “General Warrants at the Crossroads: Limit or Licence?” (2003) 10 CR 
(6th) 269 and Daniel W Watt, “General Warrants Take the Wrong Path: Challenging the 
Constitutionality of Section 487.01 of the Code” (2008) 12 Can Crim LR 297. 
111 [1990] 1 SCR 30, 65 DLR (4th) 240 [Duarte].  See also R v Wiggins, [1990] 1 SCR 
62, 53 CCC (3d) 476.  
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then the loss is more widespread.  But none of this dislodges the most basic point that, at 
all times Parliament was capable of granting the impugned powers to the police.  
Moreover, this is precisely what happened in the wake of Wong, Duarte and other cases 
like it where the Court has refused to confer powers on the police at common law.112  
When the SCC has upheld the POL in cases where it has been exposed that the police 
have acted without the foil of statutory authority, Parliament has consistently responded 
with legislation to redress the situation.  This provides a key benefit for citizens in that 
once powers are codified, they can be challenged under s. 1 of the Charter.  In this way, 
statutory powers are fairer from the vantage point of an accused and also from the wider 
community whose rights are also impacted and for whom the accused represents as de 
facto litigant. It should not be up to the police to use individuals as the ends through 
which to glean the limits of their powers.   
Although the police were denied convictions in Mann, Kang-Brown and AM, they 
were still awarded new, freestanding discretionary powers to be used in future cases.  In 
Mann, although the Court found the detention of the accused to be legitimate, it went on 
to hold that the search of the accused to have occurred in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court felt entitled to create enduring ancillary common law 
powers enabling law enforcement officers to detain, and subsequently search those 
individuals who have been detained by the police during BIDs. Viewed from the state’s 
perspective and seen through the lens of “crime control” it is a trade-off that is apt to pay 
exponential dividends, especially once it is conceded that “perfect”113 enforcement of the 
law is never possible anyway.114  Within the macro-level cost-benefit analysis of 
Waterfield the exclusion of evidence in one case and the possibility of an acquittal reflect 
the nominal costs that are paid by the state in exchange for the ongoing power to use 
similar tactics in an untold number of future cases.  Surely, there is “considerable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 In Duarte, ibid, the police tried to sidestep the requirements of Part IV.1 (now Part VI 
Invasion of Privacy) of the Criminal Code, which governs the use of surreptitious, 
listening devices in criminal investigations by having one of its agents participate and 
consent to the interception of the communications.  The Court struck down this practice.  
113 Michael Plaxton, “Offence Definitions, Conclusive Presumptions, and Slot Machines” 
(2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 145 at 164.   
114 Packer, The Limits, supra note 108 at 286. 
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irony”115 in the fact that notwithstanding the police exceeded their powers in breach of 
the Charter in both Mann and Kang-Brown, the Court still believed that “fairness” would 
be advanced by granting extensions of power to the police.   
Fairness inclines that we should have reservations about the Crown adopting 
unlicensed police actions and conducting what amounts to a quasi-reference case on the 
propriety of an asserted police power during the prosecution of an individual.  This is to 
use an accused as a “guinea pig”116 and to treat people as though they are merely the 
means to end.117  This sort of litigation is qualitatively different from situations where an 
accused challenges the constitutional bone fides of legislation or the exercise of known 
police powers.  There litigants are aware of the rules prospectively and call the state to 
answer for its actions under s. 1 analysis.  In these APD-based gambles, however, the 
police-Crown state axis is playing with the house’s money and has effectively nothing to 
lose.  Under this premise, the worst-case scenario for the state is not bad at all and it risks 
very little.  If the Court refuses to read-in or otherwise generate the power sought,118 the 
state has other channels to pursue it objective.  While there could be a time when the 
government perceives itself to be politically constrained in fashioning a legislative 
response to deliver additional or more intrusive powers on its agents, legally however, 
there is nothing that would prevent the state from doing so and implementing its desired 
ends.  Parliament remains entitled to enact virtually any law it chooses and deems to be 
desirable.  
Before moving onwards, there are two other issues that I wish to raise.  The first 
concerns the dearth of prosecutions brought by the Crown against police officers for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention”, supra note 62 at 99. 
116 Keramet Reiter, “Experimentation on Prisoners: Persistent Dilemmas in Rights and 
Regulations” (2009) 97 Cal L Rev 501 at 546. 
117 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, edited and translated by 
Mary J Gregor, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 38.  See also R George 
Wright, “Treating Persons As Ends In Themselves: The Legal Implications of a Kantian 
Principle” (2002) 36 U Rich L Rev 271.  
118 See R v Orbanski; R v Elias, 2005 SCC 37 at para 69, [2005] 2 SCR 3, where, writing 
in dissent, Mr. Justice LeBel characterized the approach taken by a majority of the Court 
as being tantamount to declaring: “If there is something missing in the statute, let us read 
in the necessary powers. Failing that, let us go to the common law and find or create 
something there.”  Unfortunately, the view of LeBel J. neatly and accurately encapsulates 
the Supreme Court’s current stance in police powers cases. 
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overzealous policing.  Typically, when police members are prosecuted it is for instances 
of criminality that relate to their conduct when off-duty acting in their capacity as private 
citizens and are thus clearly severable from policing activities.  Where police officers are 
brought before the courts as defendants for actions made in the course of their duties, and 
in their official capacity as state agents, such cases are likely to centre on allegations of 
excessive uses of force, or, willful actions that reveal the abuse of power.   What is 
missing for this landscape is the initiation of criminal proceedings against police officers 
who in the course of testing the limits of their authority, push the envelope a bit too far 
and run afoul of the Charter.  As Plaxton has observed, “police officers can be called to 
account for their day-to-day actions, and made to explain themselves in a criminal 
trial.”119  And, as he goes on to write, “where police officers misuse the powers given to 
them by Parliament, or exercise authority they do not have, they can no longer rely upon 
the defence of lawful authority, and they are in precisely the same position as any 
Canadian citizen who commits as assault, a kidnapping, or a theft.”120  Agreeing with this 
analysis, the question becomes why in a case like Mann or Kang-Brown the offending 
officers were not charged with false imprisonment, assault, or, some other criminal 
offence once the Court found them to have acted ultra vires their powers and in violation 
the Charter rights of Canadians?  Plainly, the Crown has no incentive to prosecute such 
individuals.  Indeed, it would be perverse for the Crown to rely upon the police actions to 
prosecute an individual accused to then turn around and prosecute the person or persons 
who enabled the original prosecution for their actions.  Yet, this realization should serve 
to draw attention to the repugnance of the APD.  If, however, the Crown were to take 
such actions it is foreseeable that this would have a chilling effect on police behaviour.  
Surely then, the police would be more reticent to gamble with the Charter rights of 
Canadians were they to face a realistic potential of being themselves held criminally 
liable for their investigative tactics.  Following the conviction of a police officer on this 
basis, one would expect there to be considerable pushback from police forces and 
demands for them to be given a clear mandate.  Hence, the observation of Plaxton, if 
taken in earnest by the Crown could provide the impetus necessary to provoke a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Plaxton, “Police Powers”, supra note 58 at 124 [emphasis in original]. 
120 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
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comprehensive legislative re-tooling of the law governing police powers in Canada.  
What form that might take is impossible to tell.  However, assuming that immunity was 
extended to police officers, in order to shield them from liability for unlawful actions 
undertaken in the course of their duties, an individual should still be seen as competent to 
seek a remedy under s. 24(1) or pursue an action against the state in civil court for the 
actions of its agents.  
Second, I wish to challenge what seems to be an underlying assumption that 
seems to have permeated cases such as Tessling and Patrick.  More precisely, it is the 
view that conduct that is not expressly proscribed by law remains available to the police. 
It is my view, that while this is true that anyone wishing to pursue any non-prohibited 
action remains free to do, this proposition does not hold in respect of police officers qua 
police officers.  Rather, in order for coercive police actions to be declared lawful they 
must be expressly endorsed by law.121  Therefore, where the Crown seeks to impose 
criminal sanctions against an accused, that individual is entitled to demand that the 
actions of the state agents that led to his or her detention and arrest were expressly 
authorized by law and that the substantive offence that is being prosecuted is expressly 
prohibited by law.  This is the default position in Canadian law.  Citizens are permitted to 
do as they please and behave in any manner they choose provided that their chosen 
course of action is not expressly prohibited.122  By contrast, the police, can only act and 
may only do that which the law has expressly authorized when acting in their official 
capacity as agents of the state.  On a superficial level, this is not inconsistent with Court’s 
pronouncement in Mann.  However, once subjected to greater scrutiny and the aberrant 
nature of the judicial precedents used to propagate common law police powers under the 
APD are revealed, the Court’s radical rejigging of the POL becomes unsustainable.  
Either the Court must declare the POL to be a dead letter—and in doing so, overturn a 
foundational pillar of Anglo-Canadian common law—or, it must require that coercive 
state actions be predicated upon statutory authorization, and thereafter assess the 
constitutional fitness of the legislation in question when called upon to do.  There is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Mann, supra note 8 at para 15. 
122 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1967) at 243. 
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middle ground position and nor is there any safe harbor on the other side of the Rubicon 
for the Court to take: these questions must be squarely confronted. 
Clearly, without any advance notice or warning that they will face jeopardy, a 
person is deprived of the opportunity to forgo the illicit activity.   This is the reason why 
the criminal law does not tolerate the imposition of judge-made common law offences.123  
In addition, without a legislative foundation for government action, individuals are 
dispossessed of their ability to challenge the state’s position and call them to account—as 
is the right of everyone under s. 1 of the Charter.  As I shall argue the force of this 
argument is equally applicable to the law of criminal procedure—the site at which judge-
made police powers have been created—as it is to the substantive criminal law.  To 
allow the one whilst proscribing the other is incongruous and illogical.    
3.2.4 Retrospectivity  
In APD cases, the focus of the inquiry is on the legality of the coercive authority 
that has been exercised by the police in the absence of statutory authorization.  Therefore, 
in these disputes the challenged police actions cannot fairly be regarded as “police 
powers” in the legal sense at the time they are asserted.   Rather, it is a display of power 
in the ordinary sense of the word by a state actor, which the Crown later adopts, and 
thereafter seeks the judicial seal of approval for long after the fact.  It follows that any 
law created under Waterfield was unknown—and in fact, unknowable—at the time that 
the police-citizen encounter took place.  In the words of Professor Glanville Williams, 
“[t]he law should tell us with reasonable clarity what it expects of us,”124 for any 
obscurity or obliqueness in the law yields both, “insufficient guidance to the citizen and 
correspondingly too wide a discretion to law-enforcement agencies,”125 which is as 
intolerable as it is unnecessary.126  Viewed from the perspective of the accused, who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Criminal Code, supra note 84, s 9. 
124 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2d ed (London: Stevens & Sons, 1983) 
at 7. 
125 Ibid. 
126 H Archibald Kaiser, “Gomboc: The Supreme Court Weakens the Search Warrant 
Requirement and Facilitates Police Investigations, Again” (2011) 79 CR (6th) 245 at 250.  
See also R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 at para 72, [2008] 1 SCR 96, where a unanimous 
Supreme Court led by Chief Justice McLachlin stated, “The divergence between the law 
on the books and the law as applied -- and the uncertainty and unpredictability that result 
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could not fairly have known or been able to predict what the Court would ultimately 
decide, the unfairness is manifest.  As is recognized in s. 9 of the Criminal Code, which 
forbids the creation of common law offences it is fundamentally unfair to punish 
someone without any advance warning of the jeopardy they face.127   
  Understood in this way, the architecture of APD-based prosecutions deeply 
detracts from the Court’s claim of using Waterfield as a means of advancing fairness in 
the litigation process.  When an individual is prosecuted and it is determined that the 
actions of the police were unauthorized by statute, yet after the fact deemed lawful, the 
accused has involuntarily become the means to the government’s end.  It is elemental as 
Dicey wrote,  
We mean in the first place that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to 
suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the 
ordinary legal manner before ordinary Courts of the land.  In this sense the rule 
of law is contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by 
persons in authority [whether in law or in fact] of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary 
powers of constraint.128 
 
Enforcement of the law must, of course, run concurrently with the law.  The two should 
be seen as seamless.  Importantly, it is only after the SCC has declared its position that a 
given police power is brought into being that it can be used to support police actions.  
The significance of this is that it can only happen long after the actual event.  When the 
Supreme Court hears a case, the lawfulness of the police conduct is unknown and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
-- exacts a price paid in the coin of injustice. First, it impairs the right of citizens to know 
what the law is in advance and govern their conduct accordingly -- a fundamental tenet of 
the rule of law.”  Welcome words, yet the strength (and practical meaning) of this 
pronouncement remains in question and must be evaluated in context.  When this is done 
and these remarks are read in light of the Court’s decision in United Nurses of Alberta v 
Alberta (Attorney General), [1992] 1 SCR 901, 89 DLR (4th) 609, which stands for the 
proposition that, at least insofar as the crime of contempt of court is concerned, the 
substance of criminal offences need not be codified as a constitutional imperative; and, of 
course, alongside the APD jurisprudence that has amassed under the McLachlin Court, 
the force and aspirational quality of them is diminished.  Although the Chief Justice’s 
rhetoric in Ferguson is agreeable, it would preferable to see it be given more meaningful 
effect in the form of a SCC refusal to broaden the ambit of police powers on, inter alia, 
the very basis that she has articulated in the passage quoted. 
127 Jerome Hall, “Nulla Poena Sine Lege” (1938) 47 Yale JL 165 at 165.    
128 AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 7th ed 
(London: Macmillan & Co, 1908) at 174. 
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scope of any power remains indeterminate until such time as the judgment is handed 
down.  This poses an irresolvable problem for the APD when it is confronted by the legal 
maxim nullum crime sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, which posits that there can be no 
crime without law and no punishment without law.129   
The retroactive application of law is unavoidable under the mechanics of the 
Waterfield test and arises by necessary implication.  Thus, the problem of 
“retrospectivity”130 in the law surfaces in every case where the ancillary powers doctrine 
is used to fashion a new police power.  One of the aims of the criminal law is to deter 
certain forms of conduct.  This objective cannot be realized, however, if at the time of an 
occurrence an individual was not given any reason to avoid the proscription that has been 
brought to their attention after the fact.131  Waterfield cannot provide pre-event certainty 
or guide conduct at the relevant time, given that any new common law powers it creates 
are only known to exist after the fact.  Furthermore, in light of the fact that we cannot 
know in which cases it will be advanced by the Crown or utilized by the Court, the 
lingering possibility of the creation of new law retrospectively at any given time 
introduces an element of uncertainty into the existing law.132   
To the extent that APD decisions do provide a measure of clarity to the law, these 
developments offer cold comfort to an accused who, like Mr. Dedman, Mr. Godoy, Mr. 
Farmer or Mr. Clayton were convicted on the basis of the Court’s retrospective 
announcement of police powers.  Even if cases like these reflect only a “kind of ‘one-off’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise 2d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 
20-21 [Stuart, Canadian Criminal].  See also Jonas Nilsson, “The Principle of Nullum 
Crimen Sine Lege” in Olaoluwa Olusanya, ed, Rethinking International Criminal Law: 
The Substantive Part (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2007) at 40; and Stefan 
Glaser, “Nullum Crimen Sine Lege” (1942) 24 J Comp Leg & Int’l L 29 at 32. 
130 See generally Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
131 Stuart, Canadian Criminal, supra note 128 at 25.  See also Stanley A Cohen, 
“Invasion of Privacy: Police and Electronic Surveillance in Canada" (1982) 27 McGill LJ 
619 at 633 where he remarks, “Human behaviour cannot be guided by law unless it is 
discoverable, open, clear and relatively stable.  Furthermore, since it is impossible for 
anyone to be guided [citizens and police officers alike] by a retroactive law, the law 
should only have application to future acts; that is, it should only be prospective in its 
operation.” 
132 Coughlan, Detention, supra note 73 at 19. 
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discontinuity from the knowability of the law,”133 the judicial process must still account 
for the fact that it is reliant upon individual citizens to make the law knowable and 
capable of communication to others.  When this is done, any gain made in predictability 
is lost and more than offset on the fairness side of the scale.  Nor can the acquittals in 
Mann, Kang-Brown and AM be taken to suggest that the individuals accused in those 
cases were treated as anything other than guinea pigs.  The only difference is that they 
were not punished on the basis of the Court retroactively affirming the police actions as 
lawful.  It is true that the creation of a common law police power is not the same thing as 
the creation of a common law offence.  However, from the perspective of an accused 
subjected to the criminal process it is a distinction without a difference.  This may be a 
step-removed from something that the law abhors,134 but it is closely enough related to 
warrant, at minimum, further explanation.  Especially, from a Supreme Court that has 
espoused its concern for fairness.   
 3.2.5 Separation of Powers and the Ancillary Powers Doctrine 
  3.2.5(i) Who Is Watching the Watchers With Waterfield?  
In R v Collins,135 the Court enunciated a test establishing the governing standard 
to assess the lawful propriety of searches falling within the purview s. 8 of the Charter.  
The state is required to establish on a balance of probabilities that the search meets the 
following criteria: it is authorized by law; the law authorizing the search is itself 
reasonable; and lastly, that the search has been conducted in a reasonable manner in order 
for it to be upheld as constitutional.136  Let us now consider the search powers that have 
been created via the APD in Mann and Kang-Brown.  These are searches that, by 
definition, will only occur before an arrest is made.  It follows axiomatically from this 
that these searches will be conducted without a warrant.  However, unlike searches 
incidental to a warrantless arrest that derive their lawful status from the reasonable and 
probable grounds necessary to make the arrest, searches incidental to a BID are permitted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Steve Coughlan, “Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law” (2007) 47 CR 
(6th) 266 at 268. 
134 Criminal Code, supra note 80, s 9. 
135 [1987] 1 SCR 265, 38 DLR (4th) 508 [Collins]. 
136 Jason A Nicol, “‘Stop in the Name of the Law’: Investigative Detention” (2002) 7 Can 
Crim LR 223 at 235.  
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on the lower threshold of a reasonable ground to suspect.  Thus, searches of this kind are 
prima facie unreasonable and the state must overcome the hurdles placed by Collins to 
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to it.  Difficulties arise from the 
fact that in course of generating these powers, the Court failed to explain how, and more 
importantly why, powers created at common law under Waterfield are to be regarded as 
reasonable laws in themselves, as Collins requires.  Rather, the Court seems content to 
ignore the issue and disregard questions surrounding the bone fides of its use of 
Waterfield as a source of police powers.  Although the Court did consider, and purported 
to apply the Collins test in its analysis in Mann, Kang-Brown and AM, I would argue that 
the Court failed to properly scrutinize its own unique—and instrumental—role in 
reaching the conclusions that it did.   
It is clear from the case authorities that the Court has concluded that Waterfield 
provides common law authorization for the power to briefly detain someone for 
investigative purposes when a reasonable suspicion is present.  This was the holding in 
Mann and the Court has since affirmed it.  Again, using Waterfield as its linchpin, the 
Court ruled in Mann that pat-down personal searches of detainees were permissible and 
thus authorized by law.  Clearly, the Court resolved the first branch of Collins.  The SCC 
was however equally unequivocal that the police did not act reasonably in conducting the 
searches in Mann on account of the unnecessarily invasive nature of the search, thereby 
falling short of the requirement stipulated in the third prong of Collins.   Similarly, it was 
held in Kang-Brown that because the police were acting purely on speculation, they had 
no reason to detain the accused in the first place.  To its credit the Court found the police 
acted wrongfully and overstepped their lawful authority in these particular instances.  But 
this misses the broader point.  It was only by sidestepping the second stage of Collins that 
the Court enabled itself to generate the novel powers that it did.  This is the more 
significant matter and carries greater consequences.   
Looking at the jurisprudence, and with the first and third branches out of the way, 
the stickiest issue remains: the resolution of the second branch of Collins.   How can it be 
said that the law authorizing the search is reasonable when it was effectively written by 
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the Court’s hand and never subjected to Charter scrutiny?137   The Supreme Court has 
conflated its Collins analysis with Waterfield.  Nowhere does the Court directly confront 
the question of whether the law authorizing the search is itself reasonable.  Rather, it is 
dealt with only through sheer avoidance.  Seemingly, it regards the question as 
unseemly—or needlessly redundant—but either way it does not provide us with an 
immediate answer. It was correctly stated in Mann that the “appeal mark[ed] the first 
opportunity for the Court to discuss whether a search incident to an investigative 
detention is authorized by law.”138  However, in answering the question that it posed in 
the affirmative—and establishing the springboard to the “Mann search” power—the SCC 
left us in the dark about how it derived its answer.  The Court’s inadvertence to squarely 
confront this fundamental question is remarkable.  This omission exposes a significant 
frailty within APD-based reasoning and the legal foundations upon which subsequent 
police powers have been forged.   Although, it is hardly surprising that the Court was not 
about to declare its own work unreasonable, it remains the case that it stands as the sole 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See Clayton, supra note 9 at 61, where Mr. Justice Binnie, before later reversing 
course and steering the Court across the Rubicon, wrote: 
It seems to me problematic in a case like this, however, to say the authorizing law 
is subject to Charter scrutiny without in fact subjecting the authorizing law to any 
recognizable Charter scrutiny. My preference is to conduct "Charter scrutiny" 
using our usual Charter framework of analysis rather than calling in aid a British 
case like Waterfield decided almost 20 years before the Canadian Charter came 
into existence. No reason is given by my colleague for creating a different scheme 
of Charter scrutiny for common law police powers from that which the courts 
have developed for statute law (and applied, as will be seen, to other areas of the 
common law). The Oakes test, unlike Waterfield, is based on the wording of the 
Charter itself. Moreover, common law police powers illustrate a serious 
difficulty, I believe, with my colleague's approach. On occasion an Attorney 
General will argue (as here) that a common law which authorizes police conduct 
that infringes individual Charter freedoms may be justified in the larger interest 
of society. In a number of cases we have held that a common law power may 
infringe a Charter right but nevertheless be upheld under s. 1, or as it is 
sometimes put, we have found a Charter infringement but not a Charter violation. 
Conflating in a Waterfield-type analysis the consideration of the individual's ss. 8 
and 9 rights and society's s. 1 interests can only add to the problematic elasticity 
of common law police powers, and sidestep the real policy debate in which 
competing individual and societal interests are required to be clearly articulated in 
the established framework of Charter analysis. 
138 Mann, supra note 8 at para 37.  
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source of the legal authorization for the powers it has bestowed.  The Court’s utilization 
of Waterfield as a self-authorizing, self-propelling and self-regulating precedent will be 
explored more fully in the next chapter. 
3.2.5(ii) The Bypassing of Section 1 Analysis 
Broadly stated, the process of judicial review in Canada involves a two-stage 
process; first, there must be an identifiable infringement of a Charter right; and where 
such a violation is found it must then be determined, secondly, whether the law in 
question can be justified under s.1 analysis.139  Hence, the finding of a Charter breach 
does not automatically inure a remedy for an accused.  Rather, in cases where a Charter 
violation has been identified by the Court, it must then consider whether the infringement 
of the right (or multiple legal rights) is nevertheless constitutionally permissible and to be 
tolerated.  However, as I have alluded to in this chapter when Waterfield is employed in 
APD cases, the SCC has consistently limited Charter rights by analyzing police powers, 
and purporting to balance them against individual rights without subjecting them to the 
Oakes test.140   This clearly bypasses the proportionality analysis that is to be undertaken 
pursuant to Section 1 of the Charter.  
It was declared by the Court in Clayton that:  
 [The test created under] Waterfield and Dedman is consistent with Charter values 
because it requires the state to justify the interference with liberty based on 
criteria which focus on whether the interference with liberty in necessary given 
the extent of the risk and the liberty at stake, and no more intrusive to liberty than 
reasonably necessary to address the risk...[and] [t]he standard of justification must 
be commensurate with the fundamental rights at stake.141   
 
Respectfully, it strains the imagination to see how the Court can plausibly present this 
argument, or, how it can equate an ex post facto assessment of the mere 
“reasonableness”142 of government actions with the more exacting onus that is placed 
upon the state during s. 1 analysis.  It is difficult to discern how permitting the police to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed Supplemented, vol 2 looseleaf 
(Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 36-21. 
140 Fiszauf, The Law, supra note 46 at 8. 
141 Clayton, supra note 9 at para 21. 
142 Richard Jochelson, “Multidimensional Analysis as a Window into Activism 
Scholarship: Searching for Meaning with Sniffer Dogs” (2009) 24 Can JL & Soc 231 at 
243 [Jochelson, “Multidimensional”]. 
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act in ways that threaten or directly intrude on Charter rights in the absence of express 
statutory authorization, can ever be regarded as reasonable or how this is reconcilable 
with the Court’s custodial role over constitutional rights.  As Mr. Justice Binnie, principal 
author and leading advocate for the Court’s post-Rubicon adjudicative model once stated, 
An asserted common law police power that is challenged on Charter grounds 
should be subjected to the usual Charter analysis that requires the Court to 
articulate the individual's asserted Charter right (here ss. 8 and 9) and measure it 
against the countervailing societal interests (s. 1) in an open and candid 
manner.  The growing elasticity of the concept of common law police powers 
must, I think, be subjected to explicit Charter analysis.143 
 
Although Binnie J. has made an about-face and since resiled from this position,144 the 
underlying logic of his view in Clayton remains compelling.  Indeed, no explanation was 
given for why we should no longer ascribe to this view—one that has continued to be 
championed by the dissenting justices in Kang-Brown and AM. 
 Unquestionably, one of the most troubling aspects of powers created under 
Waterfield is that they are not subjected to s. 1 analysis.145  This means that even where 
the Court has identified a Charter violation while forming an ancillary power, the 
accused is deprived of his or her right to demand that the government justify the actions 
of its agents.146  Looking at this through the lens of fairness, it is difficult to see how 
absolving one of the litigating parties, the state, of its responsibility under the constitution 
whilst simultaneously depriving the other party, the individual accused, of the ability to 
access assurances contained within the same constitutional instrument is in any way fair 
or equitable.  Moreover, these actions place the Court into a conceptually awkward 
position, while at the same time removing any incentive for Parliament to legislate police 
powers.147  For its part, the Supreme Court seems to have grown increasingly comfortable 
with doing the legwork for Parliament, but not the heavy-lifting required in providing a 
convincing explanation for why it has been willing (or why it sees itself as able) to 
generate police powers.  Nor has the SCC confronted the fact that by invoking the APD, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Clayton, supra note 9 at para 59. 
144 Stribopoulos, “Crime Control”, supra note 95 at 364.  Stribopoulos, “In Search”, 
supra note 51 at 5. 
145 Quigley, Procedure, supra note 53 at 5-34, 5-35 [footnote omitted]. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Jochelson, “Multidimensional”, supra note 142 at 236. 
	   106	  
the Court has exposed itself to a host of criticisms pertaining to its policymaking choices 
in the cases where it has been deployed.  Beyond the usual criticisms that may be levied 
about judicial decisions which have been reached in individual cases, this body of 
jurisprudence is susceptible to the more foundational charge that APD-based judgments 
are anchored in a self-designed, self-authorized common law power to permit the 
undertaking of these policymaking endeavors and thereby results from non-democratic 
footings.  In sum, although Waterfield has supplanted the Oakes test in police powers 
litigation, it is not an equivalent (nor legitimate) substitute.  Whereas the Oakes test in its 
proportionality assessment demands a consideration of the relative costs and benefits 
across the full spectrum of society, the determination that is made under Waterfield looks 
only at the particular actions of the police against an individual accused.  In simple terms, 
it is an “end run”148 around the Charter.  And, in circumventing the demands of s. 1, 
citizens are effectively dispossessed of  “a mechanism that would make it possible for 
[them] to oppose the State”149 and, inter alia, the range of coercive actions undertaken by 
police officers during criminal investigations.  
3.3 Chapter Conclusion  
As has been demonstrated, the powers created under the APD result from “a fact-
specific, ex post facto inquiry that is vague and speculative”150 in nature.  Accordingly, 
the process of forming ancillary common law powers is incapable of delivering 
predictability or securing fairness in the law.  Indeed, the Court’s use of 
Waterfield/Dedman provides a poor means of structuring, confining and regulating 
exercises of coercive state powers in Canada, especially when compared to what is 
possible under the alternative.151  This is not to besmirch judges or the general utility of 
adjudication.  Rather, it simply speaks to the nature of courts and the function of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Clayton, supra note 9 at para 79. 
149 Sébastien Lebel-Grenier, “The Charter and Legitimization of Judicial Activism” in 
Paul Howe & Peter H Russell, eds, Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) at 95. 
150 Don Stuart, “Comment” in Janine Benedet et al, “30th Anniversary of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Impact on Criminal Justice” (2012) 91 CR (6th) 71 
at 92.  See also Stuart,“Godoy”, supra note 3 at 226. 
151 Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1975) at 139.  
See also Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 51 at 72-73. 
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judiciary.  Many of the difficulties associated with judge-made law are attributable to the 
design, structure and operation of the courts.  Procedural rules and resource-based 
constraints make the adjudicative process ill-equipped to determine and thereafter 
implement important matters of public policy such as delimiting the bounds of police 
power.  The variables described—and the variability they present—are however part and 
parcel of the adjudication of common law police powers under the APD, which Binnie J. 
once referred to as the “least worst solution.”152 
Alternatively, the democratic process is more capable of securing predictability in 
the law and better situated to deliver fairness to those affected by it—which in the case of 
criminal and constitutional law is everyone.  There is simply nothing lost by the state if 
the Court were to close the APD door.  The government has other means available to 
pursue its ends.  Conversely, from the perspective of citizens, much would be gained by 
having the limits of police powers spelled out prospectively in legislative form.  Given 
that everyone is both owed and benefitted by clarity in the law,153 the enactment of 
statutory law is demonstrably preferable.   Beyond the greater degree of transparency it 
offers, the Parliamentary process also enables wider avenues for participation in the 
debate and subsequent formation of these policy choices.  This fundamentally alters the 
character and legitimacy in grants of coercive powers to state actors.  Moreover, by re-
opening the door for individuals to challenge government actions pursuant to the right 
contained in s. 1 of the Charter, which is presently being “backdoored”154 under the 
APD, this would mark a significant advancement in securing greater fairness between the 
litigants. 
Although espousing a litigant-centred approach in APD cases,155 the Court has 
actually used this characterization in order to advance its own self-styled utilitarian model 
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153 W Wesley Pue & Robert Diab, “The Gap in Canadian Police Powers: Canada Needs 
‘Public Order Policing’ Legislation” (2010) 28 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 87 at 89. 
154 See generally Quin M Sorenson, “Backdooring Batson: The Improper Use of Racial 
Memory and Other Peculiar Characteristics in Juror Challenges” (2003) 35 Colum Hum 
Rts L Rev 71; and Bennett L Gershman, “Prosecutorial Misconduct in Presenting 
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of judging.156  Eschewing meaningful Charter analysis in favour of Waterfield/Dedman, 
it is one that foregoes s. 1 analysis and extends the Court’s de facto lawmaking territory.  
I would argue, however, that this ground has not been formally (nor fully) ceded to the 
Court by Canada’s elected lawmakers.  Rather, Parliamentarians have been keen to avoid 
dealing with the thorny task of criminal law reform—including, the codification and 
regulation of police powers—and have been content to amass greater powers through this 
non-democratic process.  In this way, Parliament has only given the Court a conditional 
and limited-term lease in the lawmaking field, not a freehold grant.  To the extent that 
politicians have ceded ground to the judiciary, it has only been done in order to permit 
the seeds of Waterfield/Dedman to grow.  Seen in this light, the latitude that the Court 
enjoys is contingent upon it reaching results that are pro-government and remains 
otherwise revocable.  Thus, if Court were to reach a decision that was deemed 
unfavourable to the government’s interests, the SCC’s ability to establish criminal justice 
policy would be rescinded.  As history instructs, when the Court refuses to ameliorate the 
law in favour of the police and the state’s broadly-defined interest in “crime control” then 
Parliament is found to be adequately incentivized to enact legislation.   
Absent prodding,157 Parliament is loath to fulfill its duties and to undertake the 
task of modernizing the law governing police powers.  This is a longstanding problem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 David Luban, “Law’s Blindfold” in Michael Davis & Andrew Stark, eds, Conflict of 
Interest in the Professions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 40. 
157 Another way to conceptualize this problem is by reference to Newton’s Laws of 
Motion.  Although, I do not offer these physical laws as solutions or even as directed 
analogs to the metaphysical problems posed by the possibility of so-called “gaps” in the 
legal order, a brief allusion to them is nonetheless instructive.  It may be recalled, that the 
first of Newton’s law states that an object at rest will remain at rest, unless and until such 
time as an external force is applied to it.  To this we take Parliament as our object and an 
adverse judicial ruling to be the force exerting pressure upon it.  Skipping over the second 
law momentarily, the third law states that for every action there is an equal yet opposite 
reaction.  Thus, if we take the Court’s negative (as opposed to negativing) action, that of 
refusing to supply a police power found to be wanting, then we are apt to a legislative 
response providing the power necessary for the state to claim its agents acted lawfully in 
future cases touching upon the same issues.  On this point, the history of “dialogic” 
relations has established precisely such a relationship and Parliament has issued 
legislative replies to redress the problem (and reversing the illegality) faced by its agents.  
Returning now to the second law (and the loosest of these analogies) there we find an 
equation involving three variables: force, acceleration and mass.  Under this formula, the 
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and one that extends more broadly into the criminal law as a whole as a number of 
commentators have observed.  This project has been further hampered by the federal 
government’s elimination of the Law Reform Commission of Canada.  Clearly, the Court 
is content with the post-Rubicon status quo and the enlarged power that it enjoys within 
this framework.  Thus, the SCC is unlikely to provide any impetus leading to the 
democratic reform of the law governing exercises of coercive power by police.  In 
addition, it important to recognize that the charges of judicial activism that properly vest 
whenever the APD is utilized (and which envelop it fully) have yet to resonate 
sufficiently with members of the public or galvanize into political demands for the 
cessation of this judicial practice.  Hence, we find the absence of any formalized 
antagonism—or, indeed any objection coming from official corridors—to the Court’s 
self-led venture into these areas of lawmaking.  As I have argued, there has been no 
opposition forthcoming from the government because the results of APD jurisprudence 
have been consistently beneficial to the state.  Nor can we expect to see any resistance to 
this dynamic as long as the Crown remains content to advance arguments that are wholly 
reliant upon Waterfield/Dedman to justify police actions.  Evidently, the government is 
satisfied with the emergence of this doctrine and in being absolved of its legal 
responsibilities.  Specifically, the APD dispenses with the need for Parliament to legislate 
the powers possessed by its agents when investigating the conduct it has proscribed, and 
derivatively, under this model the government is able to evade accountability altogether 
under s. 1 of the Charter because in these cases it does not rely upon a legal source that is 
amenable to constitutional challenge to support its actions.  Accordingly, 
Waterfield/Dedman model is not only detrimental to utilization (and protection) of 
Charter rights, but stands as a direct affront to the designs of constitutionalism in Canada.  
Quite simply, the nation’s supreme law is not being properly observed or obeyed.  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
amount of force and the resulting acceleration necessary to move the mass of a resting 
body at a particular rate is equivalent and inversely proportionate to the mass of the 
object at rest.  The vectors of force and acceleration are trained in the same direction.  
Using these a proxies, a SCC judgment revealing the absence of a police power will 
provide a degree of force to jar Parliament from its objective place of rest and pull it 
away from its perch on the sidelines where there is a sufficient reaction from spectators 
(whether in the House of Commons, media reports or public outcry) to accelerate the 
legislative response. 
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should be seen as offensive to all fair-minded persons and its persistence should not be 
tolerated.  Therefore, it remains the task of commentators, defence counsel and legal 
advocates receiving intervener status in court proceedings and other non-governmental 
organizations to cast greater light on this inter-institutional dysfunction and to make the 
case for why this phenomenon should be immediately and forever discontinued.
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Chapter Four: Theorizing the Ancillary Powers Doctrine 
4.0 Overview  
The upsurge in the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) use and increased reliance 
upon the “ancillary powers doctrine”1 (APD) in the adjudication of criminal cases has 
rightfully elicited a strong reaction from jurists, legal practitioners and academics alike. 
Yet, in spite of the frequent and trenchant criticisms that have been levied against the 
Supreme Court’s APD jurisprudence, academic treatment of this topic nevertheless 
remains underdeveloped and critical blind spots persist.  The existing literature on the 
subject has been animated principally by critiques addressing doctrinal concerns and 
expositing the worrisome aspects of the substantive results it has yielded.  Illuminating 
the myriad problems associated with the Court’s APD rulings in “the Waterfield-Dedman 
line of cases”2 is surely a worthwhile pursuit.  It is not though, the whole of the matter. 
Indeed, we must not allow ourselves to focus solely on what the Court has said through it 
rulings anchored in “Waterfield/Dedman.”3  Instead, equal, if not more, critical attention 
must be paid to how the Court arrived at the place where it believed it was competent to 
speak at all in these cases—let alone in the manner that it has—and finally then, what 
these bouts of judicial impertinence says about the state of “constitutionalism”4 in Canada 
today.  It is folly to examine the fruits of the Court’s labour without seriously examining 
the tree that has borne them and the conditions that have allowed them to flourish.  
Hence, it is useful for us to examine this body of jurisprudence from the perspective of 
legal theory to see what it can tell us about the burgeoning tide of judge-made police 
powers.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 LH Leigh, Police Powers in England and Wales (London: Butterworths, 1975) at 
33.  See also Dedman v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 2 at para 67, 20 DLR (4th) 321 
[Dedman]; and R v Clayton, 2007 SCC 32 at para 16, [2007] 2 SCR 725 [Clayton]. 
2 R v Orbanski; R v Elias, 2005 SCC 37 at para 81, [2005] 2 SCR 3 [Orbanski]. 
3 R v Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18 at paras 50-52, 56 and 62, [2008] 1 SCR 456 [Kang-
Brown]. See also R v Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 at paras 114 and 191, [2010] 2 SCR 310.   
4 Richard Albert, “Counterconstitutionalism” (2008) 31 Dalhousie LJ 1 at 2.  Albert 
offers a helpful articulation of “constitutionalism” where in defining the term, he writes 
that, “Its purpose is, first, to design the structures of the state that will exercise authority 
within a defined territory and over a group of identifiable persons and, second, to define 
the border separating the citizen from the state.”   
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It has been suggested by Professor Allan Hutchinson that, “there is nothing so 
practical as a good theory.”5  Taking these words as an invitation, the objective of this 
chapter is to assist in the development of a theory that will help to better account for, and 
explain, the proliferation of common law police powers that we have witnessed since the 
passage of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6  To date, the Court has not 
advanced a compelling explanation for why its actions under Waterfield have been 
necessary,7 and, for its part, Parliament has not seen fit to demand one.  Nor has the 
government taken any actions to forestall the Court’s lawmaking ventures in this area.  
Rather, the “hands-on”8 approach of the SCC has been met by a noticeable absence of 
legislative energy from Parliament to correct the problems apprehended by the Court in 
these cases and a muted “dialogue”9 about police powers in Canada.  Thus, we have been 
left only with the meek assertion by the Court the reigning status quo is the “least worst 
solution”10 to the problems brought forth by the process of litigation.  This is hardly an 
apology and certainly not a principle-based justification for such adjudicative largesse.   
Furthermore, in my view, the Court must also substantiate a more cogent legal 
basis for its law generation under Waterfield/Dedman.  As I proceed to problematize 
these matters, I will call into question the only proffered legal source of authority that has 
been advanced by the Court to permit the kind of juridical lawmaking that we uniquely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Allan C Hutchinson, “Crits and Cricket: A Deconstructive Spin (Or Was It a Googly?)” 
in Richard F Devlin, ed, Canadian Perspective on Legal Theory (Toronto: Edmond 
Montgomery Publications, 1991) at 246. 
6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
7 Graham Mayeda, “Between Principle and Pragmatism: The Decline of Principled 
Reasoning in the Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court” (2010) 50 SCLR (2d) 41 at 88  
[Mayeda, “Between Principle”]. 
8 Aileen Kavanagh, “Constitutionalism, Counterterrorism, and the Courts: Changes in the 
British Constitutional Landscape” (2011) 9 Intl J Const L 172 at 174 [Kavanagh, 
“Constitutionalism”]. 
9 See generally Peter W Hogg, Allison A Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Charter 
Dialogue Revisited—Or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors”’ (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 
29 and Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter Of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)” 
(1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75.  See also Carissima Mathen, “Dialogue Theory, Judicial 
Review, and Judicial Supremacy: A Comment on ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited’” (2007) 
45 Osgoode Hall LJ 125. 
10 Clayton, supra note 1 at para 76. 
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find in APD cases.  It will be argued that the Court’s jurisprudence hinges solely upon a 
self-propagated, self-sustaining and self-justified grant of power; and, that as such, these 
case authorities have been ill-founded and are anchored in a radically misplaced use of 
judicial precedent.  It is, however, equally clear that the judgments of the Supreme Court 
and the police powers created through its application of the APD constitute binding case 
authorities and are valid in Canadian law.  Indeed, this much is beyond dispute.  Yet, 
even if these decisions—and the process through they have been derived—may not be 
ultra vires exercises judicial power, the Court’s prerogative and expressed preference to 
undertake the task of stipulating unprecedented expansions of state power is nevertheless 
objectionable.11  In other words, even if the “Trojan horse”12 that is Waterfield-Dedman 
has escaped from the barn and the APD is now commonly regarded as unimpeachable 
from a legal standpoint, still it remains an unseemly development and one that is 
unbefitting the judiciary, especially the SCC in the post-Charter era.  Put shortly, by 
resorting to the APD, the Court inescapably entangles itself in the realm of policymaking 
and partakes in actions that are fundamentally (and inherently) political in nature.13  This 
is an unwise position for courts to occupy.  Fortunately, for the Court it is within its 
power to reverse course and right the ship of constitutionalism in Canada.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Sébastien Lebel-Grenier, “The Charter and Legitimization of Judicial Activism” in 
Paul Howe & Peter H Russell, eds, Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) at 96-97 where he asserts that, “In fact, the 
adoption of the Charter has increased an antidemocratic tendency.  Despite the fact that 
the Supreme Court has stressed many times that the Canadian courts must interpret the 
Charter in such a way as to ensure that it does not become an ‘instrument of exclusion’ 
and they should assist ‘discrete and insular minorities,’ it remains that in practice the 
courts are an inappropriate forum for responding to such considerations.  They are not 
representative of the social realities to which they claim to respond and often address 
them with a certain lack of understanding mingled with good faith.  Moreover, and this is 
more serious, Charter justice is often not accessible to those who need it either because of 
a lack of information and education or insufficient means.  The latter problem has 
increased with federal government cutbacks to the assistance funds formerly available to 
support challenges to government measures. In fact, Supreme Court precedents dealing 
with the Charter have often led to the protection of interests a priori incompatible with 
those it claims to be of principal concern [emphasis added].” 
12 Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention in Canada” [2005] Crim LR 98 at 107.  
13 Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the 
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at iii, 4, 68 and 158 
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Using Professor Hans Kelsen as my chief interlocutor, I will employ the “theory 
of gaps”14 (TOG) that he has devised to construct the theoretical foundations of my 
objections to the Supreme Court’s use of Waterfield/Dedman as a means of extending the 
ambit of discretionary police powers and to support the overarching argument of this 
thesis: that the APD should be immediately and permanently discontinued.  As will be 
shown, the Kelsenian model of adjudication offers great utility in its ability to explain, 
first, how the APD is made applicable by Court in the cases where it is deployed, and 
second, why these policymaking incursions have been condoned, and not condemned, by 
Parliament.  My reasons for utilizing Kelsen’s theoretical model are simple and two-fold: 
first, the analysis offered by Kelsen is best conforms with my own conceptualization of 
the problems at hand and thus most reflective of the position that I advance in this thesis; 
second, and immediately related to the first point, the TOG is invaluable analytical tool 
because of its concentration on both the supply and demand-side of the equation.  In 
other words, the TOG succeeds in drawing our attention to the intersection of 
Parliamentary idleness and the overreaching of the Court in these cases.  Thus, the 
Kelsen-based critique that I present will aid conceptually in our understanding of the 
APD and the implications it holds for Canadian constitutionalism.  It is hoped that my 
efforts here will help propel, and contribute however modestly, to a re-framing and wider 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s APD lawmaking activities.  
4.1 The Kelsenian Model of Adjudication and the “Theory of Gaps” 
Although forming a unified and comprehensive account of juridical lawmaking, 
Kelsen’s “theory of gaps” (TOG), is in fact, a multivariable theory.  In my analysis, I will 
separate and distill the TOG into three parts, each of which is integral to the Kelsenian 
conception of the law and adjudication.  However, beyond being essential to Kelsen’s 
conceptual framework, my analysis will show that all of these interlocking components 
are directly applicable to the functioning and maintenance of the APD in Canada.   
Before proceeding further, I wish to make explicit something that was already indicated 
implicitly above and provide a qualifier about Kelsen’s gap theory.  What is offered is not 
a justification for the sort of judicial ingenuity and interventionist posture that we find in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, translated by Anders Wedberg 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1946) at 147 [Kelsen, General Theory]. 
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Waterfield-laden judgments.  Rather, what gap theorization presents is simply a 
plausible—and in my view, superlative—explanation for the sort of adjudicative 
maneuvering and non-democratic policymaking found in APD cases.  Using Kelsen’s 
theory as my vehicle, I will argue jointly for a reconceptualization of the Court’s 
utilization of the APD, and as well, the corresponding acceptance of it by Parliament.   
I will now briefly set out the key postulates of the theory of gaps.  First, Kelsen 
begins by espousing the view that the law is gapless in nature.15  The notion, that there 
are no gaps existent in the law, I will refer to as “K1.”  To accept this premise, and what 
constitutes “law” from the Kelsenian perspective, we need not invest ourselves fully in a 
positivist account of the law.  Rather, I suggest only that this view holds in relation to the 
criminal law and the powers that are vested in the police as state agents.  Either the police 
possess a particular power or they act ultra vires of their official capacity.  There is no 
middle ground, no penumbral zone and no ambiguity; under this view only those coercive 
powers that have been prospectively granted to the police through the democratic process 
can form the basis of legitimate exercises to state power.  That presupposes, of course, 
that the legislation conferring the power is constitutionally valid—either as confirmed 
through the process of judicial review under s. 1 or s. 52 of the Charter, or, alternatively, 
by the shield of s. 33 that permits the government to circumvent this process and 
immunize its legislation against such scrutiny.  Second, no matter how well-intentioned 
(or efficacious it is perceived to be in the result) that a court judgment may be, where a 
court purports to fill in a gap in the law, what is really occurring is that the actually valid 
law is being ignored by the judiciary and substituted with an outcome that is deemed 
more desirable in the eyes of the court.16  The process through which “so-called ‘gaps’ in 
the law”17 are created and filled by the judiciary we can label “K2.”  Third, the final pillar 
of this theory indicates that legislatures have to be willing to accept the policy choices of 
an overactive judiciary and neglective of their own legislative duties.18  For without such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid. 
16 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1967) at 246 [Kelsen, Pure Theory]. 
17 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Reinhart & Co, 1956) at 304 
[Kelsen, Principles]. 
18 Kelsen, Pure Theory, supra note 16 at 248. 
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intransigence on the part of lawmakers, it would be impossible for courts to make law 
and implement its preferred policy choices.  This institutional interplay in which courts 
take an overly “hands-on”19 approach whilst legislators assume a “hands off”20 posture, I 
will refer to as “K3.” 
Each of the features of Kelsen’s gap theory, of course, requires further unpacking.  
I will now isolate and examine each of the three planks in turn.  Along the way, I will 
demonstrate how the actions of the SCC and the inaction of Parliament bear all of the 
markings of the TOG posited by Kelsen.  Discussion of the individual components of 
Kelsen’s work do provide linkages to other theorists and also to other branches of theory. 
However, the pursuit of these other strands of analysis—though ripe for, and deserving 
of, further critical reflection—fall beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be 
explored.  For present purposes, I will limit my work to simply shining a light on some 
potential avenues (and their intersections) where additional research could help to 
broaden our understanding of these problems and also provide further weight to incline 
the collapse the APD. 
4.1.1 The Illusion of Gaps (K1)  
The most basic objection that I wish to raise about the SCC’s use of a “gap-filling 
power like Waterfield,”21 is the sheer presence of these supposed gaps in the law that 
render this lawmaking tool applicable in the eyes of the Court.  Therefore, I will begin 
my Kelsenian critique of judge-made police powers by contesting the existence of these 
supposed gaps in the law.22  This is an obvious first step given that the Court’s use of the 
APD in police powers cases is wholly contingent upon its identification of a hole or 
“gap”23 in the law.  Indeed, the practical importance of these “perceived gaps”24 cannot 
be overstated.  For without the proclamation of an identified gap in law, the APD remains 
immobilized and will not be triggered.  It is the identification of these lacunae that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Supra note 8. 
20 Kang-Brown, supra note 3 at para 22. 
21 Richard Jochelson, “Multidimensional Analysis as a Window into Activism 
Scholarship: Searching for Meaning with Sniffer Dogs” (2009) 24 Can JL & Soc 231 at 
245 [Jochelson, “Multidimensional”]. 
22 Kelsen, Principles, supra note 17 at 304. 
23 Orbanski, supra note 2 at para 83; and Kang-Brown, supra note 3 at paras 4, 6, and 50. 
24 Kang-Brown, supra note 3 at para 6. 
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served as the keys for the Court to unlock Waterfield/Dedman and to then fashion the sort 
of innovative judicial outcomes that we have witnessed in recent times.   
In my view, rather than locating gaps in the law, what the Supreme Court has 
actually done in APD cases is correctly identify gulfs between the actions of the police 
and the legal authorization for these actions at the time they were commenced.  Thus, my 
quarrel lies not in the identification of lacunae by the Court, but in the filling of them and 
in the unwarranted judicial re-jigging of the law.  That is where the harm lies.  Rather 
than referring to them as “gaps” as the Court has been apt to do,25 I suggest that it is 
preferable that we re-term these phenomena and identify them for what they objectively 
are: perceived legislative deficiencies.  No more and no less.  By adopting this 
nomenclature, we can more readily see how the Court’s conception of these lacunae 
presents a blind view of the source of these voids and miscasts our attention.  It is not as 
if these supposed holes in the law—which the Court see fits to mend using the APD—
have arisen inexplicably.   Whatever shortcomings exist within the range of lawfully 
recognized police powers from the perspective of the police-Crown, it must not be 
forgotten that either by legislative act or omission, these are solely the creation of 
Parliament.  Nor can we overlook the fact that the police, Crown and Parliament are 
aligned in these cases and seeking the same ends.  If we harken back to the previous 
chapter and bring into the discussion the Court’s proclaimed quest to deliver fairness, 
then surely the apparent void in the law is perceived differently on the basis of one’s 
vantage point or from which side of the aisle one is standing.  It is really only a gap from 
the perspective of the state and its agents.  For, from the perspective of the accused that is 
being prosecuted in an APD case, there is a clear discrepancy between what the police 
have done and what they were actually authorized to do.  Of course, the Supreme Court’s 
construction and subsequent filling of these gaps obfuscates both the source of these 
voids and the legal grounding for the Court’s re-making of the law in APD cases. 
Even if we assume, arguendo, that police actions, like those of the accused, have 
been negatively permitted insofar as they have not expressly proscribed, Kelsen posits 
that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid at para 50. 
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In this situation the court must dismiss the action even if it is directed against a 
permitted behavior of the [accused] by which a permitted behavior of the [police] 
is prevented or impaired…and the court has to acquit the accused.  The 
application of the valid law may be considered unsatisfactory in such a case 
because it refrains from protecting an interest which, from some points of view, is 
regarded as worthy of protection.  But since a legal order cannot protect all 
possible interests but only specific interests by prohibiting their violation it has to 
leave unprotected the ever-present counterinterests.26 
 
The determination of which interests are to be privileged in the law, and at what expense, 
are political questions that must be answered in the democratic forum and through the 
legislative process.  Quite simply, it is not for the police acting at their own behest (yet, at 
all times in the name of the state) to assert a particular interest in “crime control” and 
implement their chosen means of fulfilling these goals, as they define them.  Nor is it 
appropriate for the Crown to adopt these policy choices on behalf of the state after they 
have been unilaterally implemented by police forces.  From a law creation (and law 
enforcement) standpoint, this is akin to the tail wagging the dog.   
It is important thus that we distinguish between the offence committed by the 
accused, and the methods and manner in which the police uncovered it.  Plainly, the law 
has different aims depending on where (and at whom) it is aimed.  The substantive law 
that is applicable to the person who is the subject of a criminal investigation differs from 
the law of criminal procedure that governs the investigation and the officers conducting 
it.  For example, it is not disputed that the individuals prosecuted in R v Mann,27 Clayton 
and Kang-Brown were factually guilty of the offences charged.  In each case the accused 
were shown to have been in possession of contraband.  Interestingly, in these cases none 
of those accused were doing anything that was patently unlawful or objectively 
suspicious when their actions are framed in neutral terms.  No offence is committed by 
simply walking down a public street or bus terminal, or, in occupying a motor vehicle.  
These points were never in contest.  Instead, the issue in each case was the legality of 
police actions where the criminality of the accused was revealed and whether the police 
had acted lawfully in making these discoveries.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Kelsen, Pure Theory, supra note 16 at 243 [emphasis added]. 
27 R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 SCR 59 [Mann]. 
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Building on the previous point, Kelsen writes that, “the legally not prohibited, and 
in this sense permitted, behavior of an individual can be guaranteed by the legal order by 
obligating other individuals to tolerate this behavior, that is, not to prevent or impair it.”28  
From this, it follows that the police must tolerate the conduct of citizens if it has not been 
legally proscribed, even if they consider that conduct to be objectionable in nature or 
thought repugnant to them.  Similarly, the police must abide and tolerate the limits on 
their powers.  When the two sides do come into conflict, as often happens, in the streets 
and continuing thereafter in courtrooms, the judiciary is tasked with resolving the matter 
by giving effect to the law.  As Kelsen explains, when confronted with the task of 
resolving the competing claims of the litigating parties courts are faced with two (and 
only two) choices: 
Either the court ascertains that the defendant or accused has committed the delict 
as claimed by the plaintiff or public prosecutor and has thereby violated an 
obligation imposed on him by the legal order; then the court must find for the 
plaintiff or condemn the accused by ordering a sanction…Or the court ascertains 
that the defendant or accused has not committed the delict and therefore has not 
violated an obligation imposed on him by the legal order; then the court must 
dismiss the action or acquit the accused.29   
 
Applied to the police actions in Mann and Kang-Brown, it emerges that the individuals in 
those cases were exposed to unlawfully coercive treatment by the police and subjected to 
exercises of power inconsistent with actually valid law.   In the resolution of these cases, 
the Court’s finding of illegality of the part of the police was, to this point, consistent with 
the Kelsenian view.  However, the Court then fell into error according to Kelsen’s model 
when it took the further (and needless)30 steps of creating common law investigative 
powers to endure beyond these cases, as I will soon discuss in relation to K2.  Suffice it 
to say, that if we were to accept for the purposes of argument that Waterfield/Dedman 
represents a valid means to create newfound police powers, it remains to be answered 
how in cases like Kang-Brown and Mann, the Court’s decision to take things a step 
further than was necessary to resolve the issues at bar are not, by definition, obiter dicta 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Kelsen, Pure Theory, supra note 16 at 243. 
29 Ibid at 242.  
30 Sandra Berns, Concise Jurisprudence (Sydney: Federation Press, 1993) at 31 [Berns, 
Concise]. 
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statements lacking the force of law.  I would suggest that this remains an open question 
that dogs the Court’s APD jurisprudence and further mires any claims to its legitimacy.   
Plainly, if the state intends to exercise coercive authority over individuals in a manner 
that infringes on their personal liberty, then the government should set out the scope of 
any such measures expressly by enacting constitutionally compliant legislation.  
Otherwise, the actions of its agents are ill-founded and ultra vires shows of power.   
Under the Kelsenian model of adjudication, when the Court rejects police conduct 
that is not founded in legislation, it serves to protect the individual rights of citizens to 
remain free from state intrusion and gives effect to  “the negative rule that nobody must 
be forced to observe conduct to which he [or she] is not obliged by law.”31  Anchored in 
the POL, this rule is one that does not apply bilaterally and instead should operate in 
favour of citizens.  The judicial assertion of this proposition—the default position that I 
argued for in Chapter Three—is in no way punitive or even dismissive of the police who 
can still assert arguments under s. 24(2) in support of their actions.  Rather, the 
countervailing argument does not apply symmetrically in support of police officers by 
virtue of the fact that agents of the state when acting in their official capacities are 
imbued with additional statutory duties and powers that are inapplicable to (or 
inaccessible by) ordinary citizens.  Perhaps the clearest example—and strongest 
support—for this proposition comes from the asymmetry that we find in relation to arrest 
powers.  There we find that the lawful powers of arrest given to police officers, quite 
wisely, far outstrip those available to laypersons.  This is an appropriate division to make, 
but it is one that does sharply differentiate the legal position of the police on the one hand 
and citizens on the other.  Put simply, it is only when police members are off-duty can 
they can be said to stand on the same footing as ordinary citizens and exercise the same 
residually flexibility as the individuals they investigate.  Otherwise, police actions no 
matter how benign in nature must be expressly authorized by statute in order for them to 
comply with the POL and be considered lawful under the Kelsenian account of the law. 
As we ponder the SCC’s handling of legislative lacunae in police powers cases, it 
is important that we recognize the fact that the Court has been inconsistent in the 
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responses that it delivered.32  On this point Mr. Justice LeBel expressed the view in 
Kang-Brown that, “these [APD] precedents do not mean that the Court should always 
expand common law rules, in order to address perceived gaps in police powers or 
apprehended inaction by Parliament, especially when rights and interests as fundamental 
as personal privacy and autonomy are at stake.”33  Although Binnie J. ultimately 
professed his agreement with this basic proposition on behalf of the majority,34 there is an 
even sharper and logically prior point to be made in support of the position advanced by 
LeBel J.  It can be convincingly argued that any supposed gaps are, in both fact and law, 
illusory and any subjective assessment by jurists in locating a legislative omission or 
oversight is immaterial. Indeed, the strongest argument that there is to be made for the 
non-existence of “gaps” comes from the Supreme Court itself.   
For instance, in the case of R v Wong35 there was never any dispute about the fact 
that the law in force at the time did not provide the police with the power to use video 
surveillance technologies during criminal investigations.  Hence, by Kelsen’s terms, the 
“actually valid law”36 that was applicable in the case was abundantly clear.  The law 
plainly did not allow for this tactic to be used.  There was no a “gap” in the law.  To 
equate a “gap” with a legislative omission or to presume that something is absent on the 
basis of inadvertence is an erroneous claim and one that is purely speculative.  As another 
example, we can look to the ruling in Colet v The Queen,37 which is illustrative of what 
Kelsen terms “technical”38 or “the so-called true gaps.”39 The Court’s reasoning in Colet 
can be read as suggesting that the relevant legislation might very well have been errantly 
deficient in its drafting and lawmakers may have left an unintended hole in the law.  The 
difference between these and other gaps is not of kind, only degree.  In both Wong and 
Colet, the Court refused to sanctify the police actions.  More importantly, it refrained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Steve Coughlan & Glen Luther, Detention and Arrest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 13 
[Coughlan Detention]. 
33 Kang-Brown, supra note 3 at para 6 [emphasis added]. 
34 Ibid at para 51. 
35 [1990] 3 SCR 36, 60 CCC (3d) 460 [Wong]. 
36 Kelsen, General Theory, supra note 14 at 148. 
37 [1981] 1 SCR 2, 119 DLR (3d) 521. 
38 Kelsen, Pure Theory, supra note 16 at 249. 
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from engaging in the art of judicial lawmaking.  As Mr. Justice La Forest declared in 
Wong: 
[T]he respective roles of the courts and Parliament when Charter rights and 
freedoms are at issue. As I stated there, it does not sit well for the courts, as the 
protectors of our fundamental rights, to widen the possibility of encroachments on 
these personal liberties. It falls to Parliament to make incursions on fundamental 
rights if it is of the view that they are needed for the protection of the public in a 
properly balanced system of criminal justice.40 
 
Continuing in the same vein, La Forest J. wrote that, 
On my view of the matter, the courts would be forgetting their role as guardians 
of our fundamental liberties if they were to usurp the role of Parliament and 
purport to give their sanction to video surveillance by adapting for that purpose a 
code of procedure dealing with an altogether different surveillance technology. It 
is for Parliament, and Parliament alone, to set out the conditions under which law 
enforcement agencies may employ video surveillance technology in their fight 
against crime. Moreover, the same holds true for any other technology which the 
progress of science places at the disposal of the state in the years to come. Until 
such time as Parliament, in its wisdom, specifically provides for a code of conduct 
for a particular invasive technology, the courts should forebear from crafting 
procedures authorizing the deployment of the technology in question. The role of 
the courts should be limited to assessing the constitutionality of any legislation 
passed by Parliament which bears on the matter.41 
 
Although commentators such as Plaxton have argued effectively that the support for this 
position has waned in the Court,42 this position is only supportable in empirical terms.  
The task of dislodging the normative thrust of the “legality approach”43 remains for 	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propagating the APD and its proponents.  Arguments based in efficiency or the need for 
adjudicative finality present insufficient bases to permit the state to skirt it legislative 
responsibilities and circumvent the ability of citizens to insist that the government 
account for its chosen course of action and see that it is justifiable under s. 1 of the 
Charter.   
In addition, just because the police do not possess a particular investigative power 
it does not follow that they should have the tool that they desire.  Indeed, as Professor 
Arthur Lenhoff contends, “[t]he fact that a specific problem or situation is not dealt with 
in a piece of legislation dedicated to the whole subject matter need not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion of a ‘gap.’”44  This remains undiminished by the fact that a “consequence 
of the absence of a specific regulation might be the denial of relief as demanded”45 by the 
prosecution or the unavailability of tactics sought by the police.  If that should be seen as 
problematic, then the state can avail itself to the legislative sphere and correct the 
problem.  In this discussion, it would be remiss not mention that the Court’s rulings in 
Wong (and R v Wise)46 sparked a “dialogue” with Parliament and culminated in the 
introduction of new statutory powers.  In fact, a discussion of the legislation produced in 
response these to judgments will be featured in the discussion of K2.  In sum, it is not the 
recognition of the disparity between police actions and the scope of the legislative 
authority that it is problematic; instead, it is only when the Court purports to fill these 
supposed “gaps” that troubles arise.   
4.1.2 The Judicial Creation and Curing of Gaps (K2)  
Having previously delved into the reasoning process and the Court’s conflation of 
the two-prongs of the “Waterfield/Dedman test,”47 it now useful for us to consider the 
analytical machinations that leads the Court to utilize the APD in the cases where it is 
invoked.  Based on the existing corpus of jurisprudence it would appear that the SCC has 
quietly established a decision-tree to determine the lawfulness of police actions.  While 
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46 [1992] 1 SCR 527, 70 CCC (3d) 193. 
47 Kang-Brown, supra note 3 at para 50.  For discussion and analysis of this test see 
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there can be no assurance that the Court will remain wedded to the schematic that I set 
out, presently at least, we can separate the deliberative steps into three distinct stages.  
Before proceeding, however, it bears repeating that this reasoning process will only be 
engaged—and a so-called gap can only materialize—when Court chooses to ignore the 
canon of strict construction.   
First, the Court will look to see if the police actions have been authorized by 
statute.  Assuming that there is an identifiable statutory source of authority, the question 
then becomes whether the relevant legislation is constitutionally valid.  Further assuming 
that it found to be so, it remains to be determined whether the police complied with the 
strictures of the statute.  Second, where there is not express authorization to support the 
actions of the police, the Court will then explore whether there is any legislative 
provision that has a plausible nexus to the actions undertaken by the police.  If, such can 
be located, the next exercise becomes whether that legislation can be construed creatively 
enough or made sufficiently elastic to sustain a reading of the provision that would 
support the finding of an implied statutory power.48  Clearly, any judicial elucidation of a 
latent police power involves a second-guessing of legislative intent and engages the art of 
judicial prognostication.  This brand of judging simply reflects a sidestepping of the valid 
law and the substitution of it with the Court's own preferred policy choice.49  Third, and 
only after the other avenues have proven fruitless, will the Court be in a position to 
unbridle the APD.  Of course, once it has been unfurled the only limitations on the APD 
are those that Court chooses to self-impose.  Unlike the first two branches of the 
decision-tree, here an accused cannot advance arguments under s. 1 or 52 of the Charter, 
as there is no statutory authority and thus no legislation to be challenged.  Indeed, in this 
way, where the APD is used the Court stands on comparable footing with the police 
given that no legislation has authorized the actions that it has taken.  There is no 
legislative support for this sort of judicial lawmaking.  Rather, it has arisen only because 
of the Court's seizure and novel application of Waterfield.  It is through the methodology 
just described that the Court has found its entry point to engage in judicial lawmaking 
and to undertake the interventionist orientation that we find in APD-based decisions. 	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Under the Kelsenian view, the Court’s actions amount to a bald second-guessing 
of Parliament and its policies.  As stated, Kelsen is resolute in his assertion that “[t]he 
legal order cannot have any gaps.”50  Ironically, the Court is seemingly of the same view. 
Yet, the high court has taken a diametrically opposite interpretation of what this 
statement entails.  It would appear the SCC has taken the position that when presented 
with perceived legislative deficiencies another doctrine is simultaneously engaged—that 
of res ipsa loquitur—ostensibly compelling the use of the APD (or other lawmaking 
tools) and suggesting by implication that the Court had no other choice but to act and 
rectify any encountered legislative voids.  Derivatively, by taking this position the Courts 
allows itself to function as though it were the legislature and permits itself to alter the law 
when it purports to fill in the “gaps” that it has engineered.  The authority for the 
judiciary to take up this role as of law-creator derives, according to Kelsen, “indirectly, 
[and] by way of fiction.”51  As he explains, “It is the fiction that the legal order has a 
gap,—meaning that prevailing law cannot be applied to a concrete case because there is 
no general norm which refers to this case.”52  Thus, it remains inescapable that any 
“assumption of the court…that the legislator would have formulated the law differently if 
he had foreseen the case usually rests on an unprovable guess.”53  And, it is only by 
virtue of such second-guessing that one can point to a difference between a positive law 
that does exist and a desired law, which does not.54  As Kelsen observes, it is not 
unknown for legislation to contain something that is seen as nonsensical to some or even 
foolhardy, but bearing in mind that “laws are man-made, this is not impossible.”55  These 
laws and policies are however implemented democratically by the body of elected 
representatives that are uniquely qualified to establish government policy in the area of 
criminal law.  It follows then, that the SCC’s decisions in these cases reflect the 
substituted policy preferences of the Court on the issues illuminated during litigation.   
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On Kelsen’s account, if, the defect, or, perceived legislative deficiency as I prefer 
to call it, is seen as “unsatisfactory, unjust, [or] inequitable”56 then the Court is able to 
create new law that is able to overcome the undesired state of the law. This is nakedly 
revealed by Binnie J. in Clayton57 where he opined on the catalysts that had spurred the 
Court to act in APD cases.  As he explained,  
Authority was found in Dedman because of the major problem of road carnage 
produced by mixing alcohol and driving. The blockade in Murray was held to be 
authorized because of reliable information about "dangerous criminals in fresh 
flight" and the limited number of escape routes which made the blockade likely to 
be effective. "Imminent danger" characterized the situation in Godoy where the 
911 caller's message was suddenly terminated without explanation. In Simpson 
and Mann, the police power was held to authorize the stop because 
"individualized suspicion" of the persons being stopped tilted the balance in 
favour of police action.58 
 
It is therefore seen that the Court plays an important—and indeed, defining—role in the 
framing of the issues at stake before it.   Consequently, the vantage point that is taken 
will greatly influence how the judicial opinions in a given case will be tailored.  Given 
that the initial determination of the existence of a “gap” in the law is an inherently 
subjective one, it follows axiomatically that the choice of which materials and the content 
used to fill the gaps is equally subjective.  On this point, Kelsen offers the view that: 
The condition under which the judge is authorized to decide a given dispute as 
legislator is not—as the theory of gaps pretends—the fact that the application of 
the actually valid law is logically impossible, but the fact that the application of 
the actually valid law is—according to the opinion of the judge—legally-
politically inadequate.59 
 
In expounding on the inadequacy that may be apprehended by jurists Kelsen makes it 
clear that this is a judgment that is politically motivated and rooted in one’s own moral 
view of things.60  Thus, it is patently subjective and out of step with what it demanded of 
judges in their treatment of criminal matters.  Indeed, under this framework the SCC 	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60 Ibid at 149.  See also Kelsen, Pure Theory, supra note 16 at 248; and Kelsen, 
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itself acts as a fetter during this adjudicative process.  Under this construction not only is 
the preliminary determination of what constitutes a so-called “gap” left to the Court’s full 
discretion, but also the degree or width of the gap and ultimately the content with which 
it is subsequently filled.  Surely, it is quite unsatisfactory from a predictability standpoint 
that “the boundaries are never closed: it is always possible for new common law police 
powers to be created.”61  There is no legislative support for this sort of judicial 
lawmaking.  Any supposed shortcoming in the legislation can only be presented as a so-
called “gap”62 in the law if we accept the view that the police lacked an essential power 
that was unauthorized, and as a result were incapable of performing the job assigned to 
them, and further that this was contrary to the wishes of lawmakers.  It is apparent that 
the SCC has made the leaps needed, and seized upon these perceived gaps to create new 
police powers.  As the saying goes, “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”63 and it is 
clear from the body of Waterfield-based jurisprudence that the Court has concluded the 
law of police powers is awash in lacunae.  Furthermore, it has taken the position that 
when these holes are exposed through the litigation process, that it is its job to fill them—
and with whole cloth if need be.  Clearly, the ongoing and rancorous dissention within 
the ranks of the high court has not inhibited the use of the APD.  Nor can we ignore the 
fact that many of its pronouncements under Waterfield-Dedman have been enunciated 
following the finding of Charter violations committed by the police.  Further to this, they 
were propounded in a way that exceeded what was necessary to resolve the immediate 
issues before it, and were thus made in obiter.64  In the end, it seems that the Supreme 
Court’s patience has grown thin with Parliament and that in rendering judgment in APD 
cases that the Court has permitted pragmatism to triumph over principle.65   
As Coughlan writes,  
There seems to have been no case which has considered the possible interplay 
between section 487.01 of the Code (the general warrant provision, which allows 	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police to obtain a warrant to ‘do any thing’ that would constitute a seizure of a 
person, among other things) and the ancillary powers doctrine. The very purpose 
Parliament had in creating the general warrant provision was to eliminate possible 
‘gaps.’ No doubt in some circumstances their use would be cumbersome, but that 
is quite a different matter from saying that Parliament has not acted.66   
 
As Coughlan has illustrated the SCC’s decision to create a roadblock power in Clayton 
was in contravention of Parliamentary intent and thus consecrated through anti-
democratic means—and a clear usurpation of the lawmaking function.  Plainly, the 
impromptu ex post facto amendment made to the criminal law by the Court in that case 
was done to suit the alleged needs of the police and was undertaken without requiring 
anything more than the assertion of the police that they require such powers to do their 
job.67  It would have been preferable for the Court to have, after correctly determining 
that the police did not have the statutory power to initiate the roadblock, to decline from 
creating yet another new—and loosely defined—police power.  Had the desire to 
denounce gun possession not proven irresistible, then minimally, the Supreme Court 
should have followed the precedent that it established in Wong: convict a factually-guilty 
accused of the offence charged, but refrain from creating a freestanding common law 
police power.  While this would have been a cold comfort to Mssrs. Clayton and Farmer 
who would have encountered the same result and received no benefit from the Court, it 
would have been immeasurably better for Canadian criminal and constitutional law.  It 
may also have reopened the “dialogue”68 with Parliament.  The thrust of this point, 
however, was equally true in respect of the emergency assistance powers created in 
Godoy before this and it remained true in respect of the use of sniffer dogs in Kang-
Brown and AM. 
 4.1.2(i) Minding the Gaps That Have Been Manufactured 
It is of course true that legislators are not prescient and cannot conceive of every 
problem, as they come in many shapes and sizes.  They also have the capacity to appear 
and to be perceived differently on the basis of one’s vantage point.  This is quintessential 	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phenomenology.  Whatever problems or shortcomings exist within the range of lawfully 
recognized police powers from the perspective of the police-Crown, it must not be 
forgotten that these voids are solely the creation of government.  Parliament, and to a 
lesser extent the legislatures, are the organs authorized by the constitution to stipulate the 
general norms in society that are backed by legal sanctions.  While legislators can (and 
undoubtedly do) recognize the prospect that the norms that they have legislated may 
conceivably lead to unjust or inequitable results in some instances, they are incapable of 
foreseeing in advance all of the concrete cases where their legislative drafting will yield 
such unintended outcomes.69  This is not to deny the fact that lawmakers will not be able 
to envisage prospectively every future scenario and provide a contingency.  But that is 
life.  Sometimes the law will be ahead of the curve in society and other times it will lag as 
in Wong.  But it is not the Court’s job to guess.  Instead, it is the legislature’s task to 
correct a problem, if and when, they perceive there to be one.  The law has had to adapt 
to countless changes.  In the realm of criminal law, we find these incremental adaptations 
in relation to introduction internet-based offences combating cyber crime and continual 
updating of the legislation that classifies and outlaws new chemical compounds, 
declaring them as illicit drugs.  This is the nature of life in a democracy.  Things change 
and society must address them in one way or another.  But it is not for the judiciary to 
presume—or even to approximate from the earlier handling of arguably analogous 
matters—how the government of the people would have dealt with them.  Instead, the 
role of the court is to signal to everyone—lawmakers and the citizenry alike—that there 
is a new matter afoot.  It may or may not be regarded as problematic to the polity.  The 
point is that it is up to the government to decide how it will respond, if at all.  Sometimes 
the government will remain ahead of the litigation curve and legislate in contemplation or 
in response to changes in society.  However, where it has not done so, it is not for the 
Court to take the lead and to assume lawmaking authority that it does not legitimately 
hold.   
Another circumstance that must be accounted for are the occasions where the 
Court has spoken out of turn in constitutional “dialogue.”  For instance, I am in full 
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agreement with Coughlan who points out in his discussion of Clayton70 that the Supreme 
Court made a fundamental error in concluding that Parliament had not enacted any 
legislation touching upon the ability of the police to implement a roadblock.71  Rather, it 
is evident from a plain reading of the case that the Court in Clayton misconstrued 
legislative silence on a particular issue—that of the police authority to erect a road 
blockade in response to a 911 call—and then proceeded to mischaracterize this omission 
as though it were indicative of legislative silence generally on the range of authority 
given to its investigative agents.  Even if this errant view were to have been correct it still 
does not, of course, compel judicial intervention and the invocation of the APD.  Nor 
does it provide any answer to the question of  “why [in APD cases] the Court has never 
suggested that the failure to legislate should be seen as an intentional omission [and a 
conscious decision] on the part of legislators,”72 and one that is deserving of deference 
from the judiciary.  This analytical misstep did not merely colour the SCC’s treatment of 
the ultimate issue, it also stands as the linchpin for the Court’s decision to confer license 
upon itself to enter the policymaking field.  As Coughlan explains: 
A police roadblock is an investigative procedure which constitutes a search, and 
an unreasonable one if not authorized [by law].  No provision in the Criminal 
Code specifically authorizes roadblocks—which means that the police here could 
have obtained a general warrant under section 487.01 authorizing them to act as 
they did.  Further, under section 487.01(7) they could have obtained that general 
warrant by telephone, using the telewarrant provisions.  Parliament in fact has 
acted in a way to cover precisely this situation, and indeed virtually all situations, 
since section 487.01 allows a warrant ‘to do any thing.’73 
 
Hence, we find a rejection of the valid law and see that it was supplanted by the Court’s 
preferred resolution to the matter.  Another troublesome aspect of Clayton is that it only 
became necessary for the Court to engage the APD because the police did not utilize the 
law on the books. While it is true that: 
The police might claim that there was not time in this situation even to obtain a 
telewarrant, since immediate action was necessary.  In that regard it is worth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Supra note 1. 
71 Steve Coughlan, “Arbitrary Detention: Whither—or Wither?—Section 9”  (2008) 40 
SCLR (2d) 147 [Coughlan, “Arbitrary Detention”]. 
72 Coughlan, Detention, supra note 32 at 18. 
73 Coughlan, “Arbitrary Detention”, supra note 71 at 175 [emphasis added and footnote 
omitted].
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noting Parliament’s action in creating section 487.11 of the Criminal Code, 
allowing some powers to be exercised in exigent circumstances where grounds for 
a warrant exist but it is impracticable to obtain one.  Note, though, that although 
Parliament made that provision available for search warrants in section 487, it 
did not make them available for general warrants in section 487.01.  On the other 
hand, this ‘exigent circumstances’ exception, which was added to the Code after 
the general warrant provisions, does apply to section 492.1 tracking warrants, 
which were added to the Code at the same time as general warrants.  It seems 
hard to escape the conclusion that Parliament deliberately did not make the 
powers available under general warrants available without judicial scrutiny in 
exigent circumstances.  That deliberate decision is not an ‘absence of 
Parliamentary action’ [as Binnie J. claimed in Clayton]: it is a conscious policy 
choice.  Further, it is a conscious policy choice ignored and contradicted by [the 
Supreme Court’s decision] creating a common law power to exactly the opposite 
effect.74  
 
It would be immeasurable preferable for the Crown to arguing that the police actions 
were supported by legislation such is found in s. 487.01 than to avail itself to the common 
law.  The chief reason for this is that it would mean that the police have acted prima facie 
in accordance with the law and it would re-open the door to an accused to challenge the 
constitutionality of this legislation.  In the context of this discussion it is worth 
remembering that the catalyst for the above-mentioned amendments to the Criminal Code 
was the earlier decisions of the SCC in Wong (and R v Wise)75 where the Court exercised 
restraint in a manner consistent with its role as protector of constitutional rights, mindful 
of its own limited institutional competencies, and refused to create new laws ameliorating 
the position of the state.  
  4.1.2(ii) The Unorthodox Use of Precedent 
Given that one of the primary purposes of this chapter is to raise questions about 
the Supreme Court’s use of the APD here is an obvious one to be asked: 
[I]f the common law is to be developed in accordance with Charter values, and 
the Charter is to be interpreted to constrain—not create—state action, then how 
could the learned [justices] give powers to police that did not previously exist?76 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid at 175-176 [footnote omitted]. 
75 [1992] 1 SCR 527, 70 CCC (3d) 193 [Wise]. 
76 Aman S Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and Growing Judicial  
Deference to Police” (2001) 45 CLQ 198 at 201. 
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The answer to this question, it would seem, lies in Dedman;77 a judgment which has 
refused to lay dead.  Instead, it has been reincarnated and gathered sufficient strength to 
do the Supreme Court’s heavy lifting and to usher the Court across the Rubicon.    
There is no legislation in place that authorizes the Court to act as a lawmaker in 
the manner that it does in APD cases.  And, if there were to be such a rule, let us be clear 
about what the rule would be providing the judiciary.  As Kelsen explains, 
[It would amount to a] rule authorizing the law-applying organs not to apply 
existing law but to create a new law in case the application of existing law is, 
though logically possible, morally or politically unsatisfactory, [and the conferral 
of] an extraordinary lawmaking power upon the law-applying organs.78   
 
Although Parliament has been recalcitrant in its handling of matters pertaining to police 
powers—and criminal law reform, in general—no such delegation of authority has been 
made by it in favour the Court.  Surely then, it is even more extraordinary that the 
Supreme Court has been engaged in this sort of freewheeling law production without any 
formal license to do so.  Indeed, the only positive rule enabling such judicial lawmaking 
powers is the self-propagating one that was consecrated by the Court itself in Dedman 
and as built upon in the line of APD cases that have followed in its wake.  It is only from 
that seminal decision where the Supreme Court arrogated to itself the ability to delineate 
ancillary common law powers that the Court can present any legal justification for the 
investigative powers it has spawned.  What emerges from this is the creation of a contest 
between two competing common law rules.  On the one hand, we have the principle of 
legality (POL) and on the other, we find a rule that declares, in essence, that the Court has 
the authority to create ad hoc police powers whenever it deems this to be necessary and 
sees fit to do so on the basis of Waterfield/Dedman.  The former is, of course, a bedrock 
common law rule providing for residual liberty in favour of citizens—and concomitantly, 
demanding from the state that any coercive actions taken against citizens be founded on 
lawful authority—while the latter, is a newfound common law rule that speaks only to the 
purported competency of the judiciary to expand state power.  Concerning the latter, it is 
apparent also that the Court sees the rule that it has contrived as being capable of 
supporting not only the generation of new police powers, but also in applying them 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Supra note 1. 
78 Kelsen, Principles, supra note 17 at 306. 
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retroactively against an accused as the cases of Dedman, Clayton and R v Godoy79 
illustrate.  Plainly, the two rules are brought into direct collision in these cases and they 
are diametrically opposed.  However, given that the Court’s unorthodox use of precedent 
pits the common law rule it has created through Waterfield/Dedman against another 
common law rule, it is little wonder that the Court has chosen to prefer the rule bolstering 
its lawmaking ability.  Distilled further, what this amounts to is a contest between two 
competing views wherein the proponent of one of the positions, the Court, is also 
responsible for determining the outcome of the dispute.  This is a radical idea, but one 
that fairly attaches to the Supreme Court’s APD jurisprudence.  Seen in this light, the 
Court’s role in APD cases becomes somewhat akin (if not, is tantamount) to that of a 
party to the litigation and quasi-participant to the adversarial process.  Once again, this is 
as unseemly as it is unnecessary.  
Upon closer examination and going back to R v Stenning,80 the introduction of 
Waterfield to Canadian criminal law, it is apparent that there is very little factual 
similarity between the two cases.  The facts in Stenning have nothing to do with those in 
Waterfield.   Had Waterfield dealt with a scenario closely approximating those in 
Stenning—and assuming further that the then existing Canadian case authorities were 
silent on the issue—it might have made sense to look to Waterfield as a persuasive, non-
binding authority.   However, to find a common denominator between these two cases, 
we must cast a very broad net and say that the police were investigating reported crimes 
to find any nexus between them. Advancing in our review of the case, we do not find any 
immediate improvements.  Thus, when we look at the Court’s reliance upon Waterfield in 
Dedman, again we find the absence of any analogous factual circumstances and this trend 
has continued virtually unabated throughout the Waterfield/Dedman line of cases.   As we 
move into the Charter era to glance back at R v Godoy,81 the first post-Dedman judgment 
to apply the APD, this point is brought into even sharper focus.  There is no close 
analogy between the actions of the police in these cases.  The facts bear no resemblance 
whatsoever to each other.  The use of Dedman by the Court in Mann is equally jarring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 [1999] 1 SCR 311, 168 DLR (4th) 257 [Godoy]. 
80 [1970] SCR 631, 10 DLR (3d) 224. 
81 Supra note 79. 
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and again for the same reason. The precedent in that case had no immediate application to 
the matters in issue.  Dedman dealt with the random stopping of motorists for the 
purposes of investigating driver impairment, Mann dealt with the targeted detention of an 
individual walking along a sidewalk (a pedestrian) in the vicinity of a recently reported 
crime.  In short, the substance of the police power created by the Court in Dedman had 
nothing to do with the substantive investigative power that it went on to declare in Mann.  
Instead, the Court’s earlier precedent was used purposively and as the means for the 
Court to find a way to remediate the problem that it had identified, that of police 
impotence to detain persons short of arrest.  Thus, the Court conjured up Dedman and 
leveraged it as the vehicle to licence itself competent to create new police powers.   Put 
another way, we must now read Dedman as standing for two separate and very different 
propositions: first, it can be cited as authority enabling the police to conduct checkstops 
to investigate sobriety; and secondly, when confronted with a “gap” or other problem that 
it wishes to correct, the Court has the power to make curative solutions at common law.  
In respect of the former, the incremental adaptation of the ruling in Dedman is found in 
the R v Hufsky82-R v Ladouceur83 line of authorities.  This is in line with the orthodoxies 
of stare decisis.  By contrast, the latter represent an unorthodox—and indeed, radical—
contortion of our understanding of the use of precedents in the common law.  And so, 
here we find another basis to oppose the APD. 
Similarly, the announcement of the road blockage power in Clayton was not 
anchored in the substance of Dedman as Binnie J. noted in his judgment.84  It was, 
however, firmly rooted in Waterfield and the adjudicative process that birthed it.  Only  
on the heels of Mann do we find in Kang-Brown, the fodder that would support the sort 
of analogy-based reasoning that is associated with the development of legal principles at 
common law.  Strangely, this is not a point of emphasis in the Court’s reasoning.  It is not 
presented as a Mann stop plus the inclusion of a dog sniff search.  Understood in this 
way, the Court’s novel interpretation—and the subsequent application—of judicial 
precedents in cases where the APD is utilized stands out starkly and is even more novel 
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83 [1990] 1 SCR 1257, 56 CCC (3d) 22. 
84 Clayton, supra note 1 at paras 85-86. 
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in nature than any of the actual police powers that have been created under it.  Properly 
understood, the APD is not only a means of generating ancillary common law police 
powers; it is also the sole common law authority enabling the judicial lawmaking found 
in these cases.  Hence, and contrary to Court’s suggestion,85 the use of the APD is 
nothing like the sort of measured, incremental development of legal principles that is 
ordinarily associated with evolution of the common law.  
In order to tap into its self-professed lawmaking powers under Waterfield and 
deploy APD-based reasoning, the Court must either reject or choose to disregard each of 
the following: its own earlier precedents disavowing such activities;86 the ongoing 
opposition to this judicial practice as expressed by the dissenting members within its own 
ranks;87 the Kelsenian theory of gaps; conventional application of the principle of 
legality; and, finally, certain statutory provisions bearing on these issues.88  Even when 
viewed in isolation, any one of these objections and strands of argument should be 
sufficient to call the SCC’s foray into lawmaking into question.  However, when taken 
together, the force of the opposition to this species of judge-made law becomes 
formidable and demands a compelling justification from those who would have us accept 
it as a legitimate dimension of Canadian constitutionalism.  None of this is assuaged by 
remarks contained in Supreme Court judgments signaling the trite fact that Parliament is 
capable of legislating police powers or in the veiled invitations that have been given to 
government to do so.89  Respectfully, the Court’s actions speak far louder than its words, 
especially when viewed in the context of Parliament’s lingering idleness.  What is also 
interesting in the discussion of SCC precedents and the TOG is the fact the Court did not 
speak of any “gaps” in R v Suberu90 when it held that s. 10(b) rights are engaged at the 
moment a BID crystallizes.  Surely, there is some bitter irony in this given that the Court 
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88 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 487.01. 
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itself was directly implicated in the persistence of this hole in the law, but also in the fact 
that the provision of the Charter contains the phrase “without delay.” 
4.1.2(iii) An Oblique Form of Judicial Activism 
It is beyond dispute that when courts depart from the terrain of statutory 
interpretation and law application they enter on to the field of law creation and into the 
domain of policymaking.   Once judges begin to act as policymakers, they expose 
themselves to an array of criticisms broadly defined as “judicial activism.”  I am in 
agreement with Stribopoulos that the Court’s creation of police powers via the APD 
reflects “a form of ‘judicial activism’ under the Charter that has largely escaped 
academic or public scrutiny.”91 However, it is not of the kind most commonly associated 
with the phrase.  Many of the critiques centre upon the desirability of having a few select 
individuals who have been unelected (and do not face re-election) and enjoy tenure in 
their positions, equipped with the power to overturn laws that have been democratically 
enacted.  In answer to this charge, jurists in Canada have a powerful reply at their 
disposal.  Indeed, courts can offer as a full-defence, the reality that all of the powers they 
enjoy in this regard were given to them by the legislature—either directly through the 
Charter and post-Charter legislation, or, through acquiescence and by allowing pre-
existing common law authorities (ones that can be overwritten through legislative action) 
to remain in force.  Let us pause thus briefly to differentiate what transpires under 
Waterfield/Dedman from other forms of juridical lawmaking and judicial remedies.  To 
be clear, the focus of my thesis—and preoccupation of this chapter—is on the Court’s use 
of the APD as a lawmaking tool in the area of criminal procedure.  That said, it is helpful 
to distinguish the APD from other forms of judicial lawmaking that occurs under the 
Charter.  For instance, it could be claimed that the Court regularly engages in lawmaking 
under s. 15 of the Charter.  However, this is distinguishable on two important bases: first, 
there is an appreciable difference between the extension of legal rights or other benefits 
to individuals and the removal or diminishment of civil liberties and the range protection 
available under the Charter; and second, there is actual legislative support for the sort of 
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lawmaking that occurs under s. 15 and it is contained in the language of that section 
itself.  There is nothing comparable about the lawmaking that happens under the APD, 
which is supportable only by judicial precedents created by the Court itself.   
 Linking this back to the TOG, it is worth mentioning that in cases where the Court 
strikes down legislation that it has found to be unconstitutional, a natural consequence of 
such ruling is the creation of a gap in the law.   Such a description is even more apt in 
cases where the Court severs and finds inoperative a portion of otherwise valid 
legislation.  In such cases, the exact contours of a gap are traceable against the backdrop 
of the legislative scheme that remains in force minus the ultra vires or otherwise Charter 
offending provisions.  This however is not the sort of gap that is contemplated by 
Kelsen’s theory.  Importantly, where the Court renders judgment against the state in the 
manner just described it does so pursuant to the powers entrusted to it in Charter.  This is 
in stark contrast with what occurs when the Court renders judgment in favour of the state 
by expanding police power via Waterfield/Dedman where it is only the Court’s own 
precedent that supports its ability to make such rulings.  Plainly, there would be no reason 
for the government to accept any adjudicative repudiation of its legislation by the 
judiciary if the authority allowing for such a contingency had not been expressly granted 
to the courts.  Otherwise, the proffered judgment would amount to nothing more than a 
rogue judicial pronouncement that could rightly be ignored.  Logically then, there is no 
reason for us to accept the Court’s expansion of its judicial prerogative in the opposite 
direction to favour the state—particularly when it is utilized in a way that reduces the 
range of constitutional protections and marginalizes the Charter rights granted to 
individuals.  In my view, the lawmaking powers of the Court, just like the powers of the 
police secured through Waterfield, are ill-gotten.  One is descendant from the other.  In 
short, the Charter rights of Canadians have been watered down as a result of the Court’s 
adoption and active transformation of Waterfield.   
4.1.3 The Convergent Expansion of State and Judicial Power (K3) 
Canadian constitutionalism and the administration of the criminal justice system 
can be said to be well-functioning when the following conditions are met: Parliament 
passes laws through the democratic process; citizens have access to a forum to challenge 
the legislation; and the judiciary is there to rule upon the constitutionality of the statutory 
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provisions and ensure that police actions conform with the Charter.92  Not incidentally, 
this matches with the pillars of the Kelsenian framework.  Under the APD, however, each 
of these attributes have been either been thwarted or abandoned.  In addition, the 
machinations of the APD have undercut the foundational principles of “democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities,”93 that uphold the 
framework for law and governance in Canada.  Hence, there is a need to unravel the 
“politicolegal”94 backcloth that enmeshes APD jurisprudence and attempt to see where 
things have gone awry. 
Although it is apparent that the Court is deeply entangled in these matters, it is 
only implicated in the supply-side of the equation.  The demand-side of the problem is 
attributable solely to the government and also warrants further interrogation.  This, in 
turn, entails a brief look at the prevailing socio-political context that has allowed the APD 
to take root in Canadian criminal law.  Putting aside the content of the law that has been 
developed to govern the exercise of police powers and the manner in which it has been 
created two things are immediately discernable: first, we can identify a trend that has 
seen the Court adopt an increasingly “hands-on”95 adjudicative tack;96 and, second, 
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95 Supra note 8. 
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matched to this we find that Parliament, has taken a decidedly “hands off”97 approach to 
the structuring of police powers.  The recalcitrant posture taken by Parliamentarians has 
not only facilitated, but also tacitly encouraged, the more robust judicial intervention that 
has transpired.  The emergence of this inter-institutional dynamic has been propelled by 
“the abdication of the legislator in favor of the judge,”98 which is the quintessence of K3.  
Absent this piece of the puzzle, the legislative neglect of Parliament in our case, the TOG 
would be impossible.  Indeed, this is belied by the history of the “dialogic”99 relations 
between the Supreme Court and Parliament; and, one could not have been accomplished 
without the other.  Stated differently, if Parliament wanted to foreclose the Court’s use of 
the APD it could do so by comprehensively legislating the range of powers that its 
agents, the police, may use during criminal investigations.  That it has not done so is 
telling.   Instead, we have been left situation in which both institutions are shown to have 
needlessly strayed from their respective and necessary roles.   
4.1.3(i) Lopsided Outcomes 
I concur with Luther that, “[n]o test should be adopted without an objective look 
at the result achieved by the application thereof.”100 Thus, while it is fine (and logically 
unimpeachable) for Binnie J. to remark that, “I am not suggesting that in a particular case 
the outcome [of an APD case] will always or even generally be in favour of the existence 
of a police power”101 as he did in Kang-Brown when leading the charge across the 
Rubicon, it is a statement that nonetheless rings hollow when measured against the 
Court’s actual record in applying Waterfield/Dedman.  The SCC’s rulings in these cases 
have uniformly led to the expansion of state power.  This is true even in cases where the 
police have run afoul and have been found to have acted illegally.102  Indeed, to 
understand why the government has tolerated these judicial misadventures, we need not 
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look any further than the substantive results where the APD has been utilized.  When this 
is done it is clear that Waterfield has functioned as a failsafe for the government and its 
prosecutorial agents.  In short, the APD has been a boon for the state.  This fact must 
loom large when think about the APD.  If Waterfield/Dedman were to have been applied 
in a way that did not enlarge police power, it might be regarded as more effective in 
delivering evenhanded balancing.  But this has never happened and so the lopsidedness 
must be taken seriously.103  As Mr. Justice LeBel observed in Orbanski,104  
The doctrine would now be encapsulated in the principle that what they police 
[claim to] need, the police get, by judicial fiat if all else fails or if the legislature 
finds the adoption of legislation to be unnecessary or unwarranted.  The courts 
would limit Charter rights to the full extent necessary to achieve the purpose of 
meeting the [professed] needs of the police.  The creation and justification for the 
limit [placed on Canadians’ Charter rights] would arise out of an initiative of the 
courts [rather than through legislation enacted by government].105 
 
In essence, nothing is ventured and everything is gained by Parliament when the APD is 
utilized.  The muted “dialogue” and the dearth of legislative responses that have followed 
APD judgments does, however, speak volumes.   
4.2 Chapter Conclusion 
Through Kelsen’s theory, I have explored the formation of common law police 
powers in Canada. I have demonstrated that the APD is needless feature of Canadian 
criminal law and one for which no compelling justification has been advanced.  As 
Mayeda points out, the Supreme Court has “never explain[ed] why it is legitimate for 
courts to fill in the gaps of incomplete government legislation on police powers when the 
conferral of such powers involves striking the [supposedly] right balance between public 
security and individual liberty.”106  Indeed, based on the words and actions of the Court 
in APD cases, we remain flummoxed in our understanding of what the high court has 
rightly accomplished in this line of authorities and why it has embarked upon its chosen 
path.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has thus far succeeded in propounding 	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freestanding (and frequently nebulous) ancillary powers without seriously calling into 
question the legitimacy of the practice.  The advent of this adjudicative phenomenon 
“wrongfoots”107 the administration and development of criminal and constitutional law in 
Canada, and has effectively miscast the prevailing discourse on the Court’s lawmaking 
function in this area.  The critical attention that has been paid to the doctrinal rules 
created by the Supreme Court through its Waterfield-based judgments in these cases has 
been well warranted.  However, it remains the case that not enough of the right questions 
have been asked and concomitantly proper answers from the Court have not been 
received.   
In a remark that is apropos of the Court’s usage of the APD in criminal cases, 
Thomas Pynchon once quipped that, “[i]f they can get you asking the wrong questions, 
they don't have to worry about answers.”108  This neatly captures one of the most pressing 
problems surrounding the increasing volume and breadth of judicially-created police 
powers in Canada: the absence of a compelling justification (legal or otherwise) for the 
sheer existence of the APD on the jurisprudential landscape given that it is utterly 
unnecessary.  For its part, the Court, has effectively eluded this question and sought 
refuge on the other side of the Rubicon.  Moreover, the SCC has tried to dissuade further 
interrogation of its actions and quell criticism by declaring “we,” meaning both 
commentators and the Court itself, ought not “try to re-cross the Rubicon to retrieve the 
fallen flag of the Dedman dissent.”109  Respectfully, however, it is not (and certainly no 
longer) for Binnie J. to make declarations of this sort or attempt to relegate the APD 
merely to “a matter of historical and academic interest,”110 as he termed it in Clayton. 
Therefore, as we continue to ponder what Professor H. Archibald Kaiser has 
described as the “Court’s tolerant, incrementalist, case-by-case analytical approach”111 to 
the resolution of cases pitting the state’s interest in detecting and prosecuting crime, 
against the rights of citizens to remain presumptively free from governmental intrusion, 
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the question of why the government does not simply confer the powers that it wishes for 
its agents directly looms large, and must be vociferously asked.  Parliament not only has 
the ability to do this, but also is uniquely competent to legislate in the area of criminal 
law, and is its obligation to discharge.  Quite simply, it is unacceptable for the state to be 
making these requests through the litigation process, and for the Court to accede to them.   
By placing emphasis on the fact that it is a request for power by the state, and that the 
Court is free and capable of refusing,112 it emerges that the Court has consciously chosen 
to adopt a narrative that is consistent with the broadening of its own lawmaking power.  It 
is, however, wholly irreconcilable with it own earlier pronouncements, and reflects a 
disavowal of the declared role as the safe-keepers of Charter rights.  In taking this path 
and in expanding its capacity for law creation, the Supreme Court, has in turn 
aggrandized the law generation abilities of lower courts on a commensurate basis.  
Moreover, the further that the Court goes down this misguided path the more it becomes 
duplicitous in the non-democratic enlargement of state power.  It also becomes 
institutionally duplicative as a law-creating body, doubling the efforts of Parliament to 
control crime.  Yet, it is apparent that under the existing framework, however, that 
challenges to the Court’s insistence upon filling in perceived legislative deficiencies will 
not emanate from the Crown.  Consequently, the APD remains effectively immune from 
opposition.  Under the APD, the state has ventured little and gained greatly.  In addition, 
it has not been waylaid by its legislative idleness.  In short, the APD has been a boon for 
the state. 
For the reasons argued in Chapter Three, not only is it unnecessary for the 
government to seek to broaden its investigative and coercive powers through the 
adjudicative process, the state must be taken to be aware of the limits of the powers they 
have invested in their agents.  Thus, it is unfair for the Crown to argue that these deficits 
in police powers were not previously determined by or known the state.  Moreover, any 
supposed deficiency can be cured.  But the only appropriate way for the government to 
do so is through the legislative process.  Also, in the context of s. 24(2) an argument 
predicated on ignorance of the law should be summarily dismissed.  Instead, of resorting 	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to ad hoc judicial lawmaking to correct the discrete problems raised in particular cases, 
the Court should instead render judgment against the state and find the investigative 
actions illegal.  And, it must stop there.  Although, one would think this to be an obvious 
point, the Supreme Court’s ruling in, inter alia, Mann and Kang-Brown demonstrate how 
the Court has taken to refashioning the common law and introducing new freestanding 
powers into Canadian law even in cases where the actual police conduct has been found 
to violate the Charter.   
As Professor Sandra Berns writes, “[j]udicial power is, by its very nature, not 
open to abstention.  The posture of judicial deference is itself an activist 
posture.”113   Thus, as Professor Lon Fuller concurs, “judges must decide the case”114 that 
is presented to them.  Importantly, it does not amount to a non-decision or an act of 
judicial abstention where a court refuses to make up for legislative shortcomings.115 
Hence, the finding of a gap in police powers does not lead inexorably to the conclusion 
that courts must fill a legislative lacuna whenever one is encountered.  Declining to make 
up law is not tantamount to the Court doing nothing.  Rather, it is applying the law as it 
stands.  All that is required once a matter is before the court it is that a decision be 
rendered.  If there is any abdication of responsibility to attributed, then this traceable to 
the legislature, not the judiciary.  Courts should simply give effect to the principle of 
legality and find against the state, whose agents have acted unilaterally and in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the ROL.  This would place the issue squarely back in the hands 
of Parliament to address it as they see fit.  If it evokes a strong public reaction or is 
otherwise viewed by lawmakers as a matter of pressing importance then a legislative 
response is apt to be forthcoming.  This is the history of dialogic relations between the 	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Supreme Court and Parliament concerning police investigatory powers.  Corrections of 
government policy are only properly made in the legislative arena. The Court acquits 
itself well by staying within the confines of its own silo and not straying from the 
institutional mandate it has been given.  The APD is no substitute for s. 1 analysis and the 
more searching inquiry that it demands—nor analogous to the burden that the state is 
obliged to displace.116   If the government wishes to imbue its agents with additional 
coercive powers or to equip them with new investigative tactics, then it should take the 
positive steps available at its disposal and introduce legislation spelling out these 
changes.  Once the law has been altered through the democratic process, citizens (along 
with the police, lawyers and judges) will have public notice of the changed circumstances 
and the information needed to prospectively guide their actions and decision-making.  Of 
course, this also enables individuals to contest the legislation on constitutional grounds 
thereby re-open the door to s. 1 analysis, which has been shuttered by the APD.  All of 
these reflect benefits to be welcomed.  In sum, if there are “gaps” in the law, then it is for 
Parliament, not the Court, to bridge them.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
5.0 Overview 
Throughout the course of this thesis, I have investigated and critically engaged 
with the issues surrounding the proliferation of common law police powers in Canada.  In 
the process I have reviewed the relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC), and in particular, its use of the ancillary powers doctrine (APD) in the 
determination of the limits, scope and basis of police powers.  I have also examined and 
brought challenge to the underlying source of the Court’s professed lawmaking authority 
under “Waterfield/Dedman.”1  The pertinent academic literature on the subject has 
similarly been canvassed.  It has been my aim to build upon this scholarship and to help 
contribute to our understanding of the problems reflected by the presence of the APD on 
the landscape of Canadian criminal and constitutional law.  My research into the 
development of the APD has illuminated a myriad of problems associated with it.  The 
deleterious effects can be gleaned from—and are traceable to—the manner in which 
institutions purport to exercise their authority within the APD-based framework, whether 
based in law or merely in de facto terms, and in how the constitutional rights enjoyed by 
Canadians have come to be undervalued and under-protected against governmental 
intrusion in the process.  Accordingly, I have taken the position that the APD is not 
simply an unnecessary feature of Canadian law, but a pernicious one that is detrimental to 
the vitality of constitutionalism in Canada and that should be jettisoned immediately. 
Ultimately, it remains my argument that while we are right to be acutely 
concerned with where the lines demarcating the bounds of permissible state conduct are 
drawn, in principle, it matters a great deal more by whom they are drawn and how the 
state’s adherence to them is subsequently measured.  For, if the procedural apparatus 
designed to supervise the substantive limits placed upon state power falters, or, is altered 
and itself eroded, it follows that there is no meaningful countercurrent to stem the 
escalating tide of coercive state action and to see that constitutional limits are upheld.  
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Indeed, if the “checks and balances”2 that the constitutional framework demands are 
absented then the auditing party, the Court, instead becomes the underwriter of state 
exercises of power that abridge civil liberties.  Surely, only a perverse conception of the 
Supreme Court’s self-acknowledged duty to act as the “guardians of the Constitution and 
of individuals’ rights under it”3 can support such a dystopian paradigm; one in which 
constitutional rights, alongside the institutional architecture designed to preserve them, 
are able to conjointly atrophy.  While unsettling, this portrait nevertheless provides an 
accurate depiction of the law—and legal system—governing the exercise of police 
powers against members of the Canadian public and the socio-political conditions that 
have enabled it.  Under the reigning Waterfield/Dedman paradigm, neither Parliament nor 
the Court is properly fulfilling the functions that they have been assigned and entrusted to 
perform; and, consequently, the conventions of constitutionalism have been 
undemocratically rearranged on a de facto basis.  The APD is inconsistent with the 
principles of constitutional democracy that underpin the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.4  It is also discordant with the best traditions of the Anglo-Canadian common 
law in the area of criminal law and procedure.   Accordingly, the prevailing status quo is 
unacceptable and ripe for abolition.  What is required instead is the reemergence of 
mutuality and institutional independence as envisioned in Canada’s constitutional 
instruments. 
5.1 Re-conceptualizing and Correcting the Problems Presented by the APD 
 5.1.1 Reframing What Is At Stake and What Has Gone Awry     
The underlying premise of these cases must be more carefully scrutinized and 
challenged more vigorously.  Far too often the issues are cast as quasi-plebiscites on 
whether or not the police are entitled to do something.  Of course, this obfuscates the fact 
that, in most instances,5 the police have already preemptively (and acting unilaterally at 	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their own behest) gone ahead with the actions they are championing in court.  It also 
overlooks the fact that, if, there is any apparent ambiguity about the legality of police 
actions, or, ascertainable voids in the powers stipulated in policing legislation, the source 
of these lacunae is the state.  This stark reality and its implications cannot be overstated.  
From a purely procedural standpoint, there is nothing to prevent the state from enacting 
legislation to confer the powers that are sought by the police in these cases.  This fact 
must not be forgotten, for, in my view the legislature is sole place that is competent to 
impose burdens on citizens that are backed by criminal sanction, which it is entitled to do 
at any time.  Moreover, from a substantive point of view, save for the requirements of the 
Charter, the government is also free to enact any legislation it chooses and equip its 
agents with whatever powers it deems to be appropriate or necessary. The Court’s task is 
to oversee these legislative measures, and in appropriate instances, to act as an editor by 
modifying the laws that have been passed by Parliament to achieve constitutional 
compliance.  It is not, however, for the SCC to become itself the author of laws that 
imperil the most basic rights and freedoms of Canadians.  Yet, this is exactly what it has 
done in the instances where it has resorted to the APD.  
The Court is supposed to closely supervise the actions of the police in order to see 
that the actual measures taken by them are in conformity with the Charter and to signal 
where they fall short of constitutional thresholds.  Yet, the analytical “gaze”6 of the 
judiciary in these cases is frequently coloured by fact the police actions have revealed the 
presence of criminality or the gathering of contraband, which “exerts a subtle pressure to 
uphold police conduct,”7 defer to police decision-making and to incline results favouring 
the expansion of police powers on a freestanding basis.  By proceeding from this 
platform, the outcomes reached in cases where the APD is utilized read as though 
predetermined and as if addressing rhetorical questions about the existence of police 
powers that are to be answered only in the affirmative.  Evidence of criminality on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a reference case.  However, contemporaneously, police forces in British Columbia saw 
no such need for caution and more constrained approach, choosing instead to take the 
actions that they unilaterally deemed appropriate irrespective of the future consequences.   
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Second Vintage Books, 1995) at 184. 
7 James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the 
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part of an individual is an improper basis to sustain a jaundiced view of individual rights 
generally or to enlarge the ambit of state power.  Nor can the identification of criminal 
conduct on the part of an individual blind us to the fact that the illicit actions of the 
accused were only exposed through investigatory gambling and the reckless treatment of 
Charter rights by the police for whom it was impossible to know in advance that a 
reviewing court would later side with them and uphold their actions as lawful.  In 
addition, where the Crown’s argument for a conviction is contingent upon 
Waterfield/Dedman and the recognition of a new police power, an individual accused is 
required to be treated as a “guinea pig” in the litigation process for the purposes of 
expositing the scope of police powers.  This is another inescapable (and unwholesome) 
feature of the APD.  Surely, seen in this light, these imbalances and inequities should 
resonate as greater and more pressing concerns than whether or not a factually guilty 
person evades conviction.  Indeed, when considering cases of this kind it is imperative 
that we remind ourselves that lying at the heart of the APD jurisprudence are questions 
about the limits of coercive powers that may be visited upon all citizens by the 
instrumentalities of the state.8  Hence, what is really at stake and what is being exposed to 
irrevocable harm in APD cases are the constitutional rights of Canadians and protection 
against the use of coercive government power.  Conversely, the police in these cases 
stand to lose nothing apart from the potential exclusion of ill-gotten evidence under s. 
24(2) analysis and a possible acquittal of a factually guilty accused.  This lopsidedness 
detracts further from the APD as a means of law creation in democratic state and sits at 
odds with conventional conceptions of the rule of law; not to mention that these 
judgments are an affront to the principle that bars the retroactive application criminal 
sanctions against those who have been “guinea pigged” in these prosecutions.  
It is therefore unacceptable to allow these issues to be so narrowly and one-
dimensionally framed for us by the Court, particularly when done (as it invariably is) in a 
manner that miscasts the core matters at hand and disproportionately favours the state’s 
interest in law enforcement as the precedential outcomes reveal.  When this occurs it 
leads the Court to look not only at the propriety (legality) of the powers sought by the 	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police, but also the desirability (efficacy) of these powers.  And while only the former is a 
legitimate concern for the Supreme Court’s consideration, regrettably, it would seem that 
is nevertheless the latter, which has increasingly inclined the Court towards supplying the 
powers claimed by the police on the basis of a simple “assertion that they need the 
power.”9  This type of pseudo-proportionality analysis10 overemphasizes certain variables 
and excludes others (notably equality-based concerns)11 altogether.   In addition, given 
that the APD is not a legitimate replacement for Section 1 analysis, as I have previously 
argued, it must be empathically denounced.  
As I have demonstrated, the APD rests on precarious footings in Canadian law 
and is, at law, driven solely by the Court’s radical and unorthodox use of precedent.  It is 
thus a self-delivered grant of lawmaking power by the Court for use by the judiciary.  If 
we are to accept the APD as a legitimate lawmaking vehicle, then the task of justifying 
the rise of common law police powers under the APD falls to its proponents, passive 
(Parliament and certain commentators)12 and active (police agencies and Crown counsel) 
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Preemptive Deference” (2008) 13 Rev Const Stud 209 at 219-224.  
11 See especially Graham Mayeda, “Between Principle and Pragmatism: The Decline of 
Principled Reasoning in the Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court” (2010) 50 SCLR (2d) 
41 at 44-45.  See also Benjamin L Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 
CR (6th) 58 at 62. 
12 For example see Michael Plaxton, “Police Powers After Dicey” (2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 
99, where it is proposed that police officers be regarded as administrative actors and their 
decision-making be presumptively entitled to deference.  See also Malcolm Thorburn, 
“Two Conceptions of Equality Before the (Criminal) Law” in Francois Tanguay-Renaud 
and James Stribopoulos eds, Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian 
Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational and International Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) at 3.  See also Don Stuart, “Criminal Justice in the 
McLachlin Court: Many More Kudos Than Brickbats” in David A Wright & Adam M 
Dodek, eds, Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2011) at 348 [emphasis added] where he suggests that, “Both citizens and the police 
officer need to know what state powers are in advance.  But what of Parliament’s inaction 
on the many recommendation by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in the 1980s to 
clarify police powers?  And what of Parliament’s record of the past fifteen years of 
almost always favouring arguments of law and order expediency and listening to like-
minded lobby groups—in this context, police and prosecutors?  There is now a significant 
body of caselaw since the Charter to suggest that, in applying the ancillary powers 
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alike, and those who directly propagate its use (judges, led by the SCC).  Its defenders 
must also account for the Supreme Court’s decision to needlessly embroil itself in 
contentious matters of social policy and why the Court’s insertion into these heady waters 
is to be seen as acceptable.  Alternatively, if the APD is to be regarded as merely a 
stopgap measure and temporary fix as the Court has outwardly asserted—that is, to be 
excused rather than granted the safe harbour and housing of a full justification—then we 
must ask what the underlying problem is and strive to articulate it precisely so that it can 
be squarely confronted.  As I have shown the problem cannot be simply the hazard that 
an individual accused who has been shown to be factually guilty of some offence or 
another might escape conviction.  The inclusion of remedial provisions in the Charter 
makes this clear.  Equally apparent, missteps made by state actors during criminal 
investigations are not automatically fatal to the government’s quest to punish 
wrongdoers.  Therefore, a one-off evasion of criminal liability by someone is surely not 
an adequate basis to endlessly expand the coercive arm of the state and its punitive reach 
over everyone.  This is particularly so given that the state retains at its disposal the full 
currency of the legislative process and can take corrective action to better enable its law 
enforcement agents, if it so chooses, following a court decision that refuses to recognize a 
an asserted non-statutory power.  Thus, there is no reason to prefer the ad hoc policy 
choices of an unelected (and tenured) judiciary to those reached through the democratic 
process by those who been chosen to the task and can be held politically accountable for 
their decisions.  Beyond affirming the intrinsic value of democracy, the Parliamentary 
process carries with it the additional benefits of transparency and prospectivity.  
Moreover, the democratic arena has the capacity to deliver statutory provisions that are 
more comprehensiveness and that offer greater clarity in the law than can any court 
decision.  
Furthermore, opposition to the Court’s creation of common law police powers and 
the skirting off s.1 analysis must take into account the fact that the powers created under 
the APD are typically not confined to the exigencies the particular case brought before it 
for resolution.  Rather, the established record of Supreme Court’s rulings under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
doctrine, our independent judges do a much better job than Parliament in balancing 
minority rights of accused against the interests of law enforcement and public safety.”  
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Waterfield/Dedman shows that these decisions regularly result in the stipulation of 
freestanding investigative powers to which everyone is subject—at least, in law, if not in 
fact.13  These judgments also reflect a marked advancement of the Supreme Court’s 
“crime control”14 orientation.  This imbalance is perhaps is best exemplified by the 
decisions in R v Mann15 and R v Kang-Brown16 where notwithstanding the finding that 
the police exceeded their actual authority, violated the Charter and impermissibly used 
coercive power against citizens, the Court went ahead to declare unprecedented and 
enduring powers for use in future cases.  Judgments such as these fail to evince a 
principled and even-handed approach to the countervailing civil liberties concerns that 
are both systemically and structural underrepresented in litigation—particularly where s. 
1 is rendered inapplicable as it is in APD cases.  Accordingly, this paradigm must be 
roundly rejected and replaced by an adjudicative approach that is alive to the competing 
claims of citizens, which it must be pointed out are, owing to their anchoring in 
constitutionally entrenched rights, more deserving of judicial affirmation than are the 
facile, ex post facto pleas of the police for enriched discretionary powers.  Additionally, 
this positioning would be in keeping with the professed guardianship role of the Court.  
The simple solution for the Court is henceforth to analyze police powers with reference to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 It is indisputable that the powers created in APD cases are, at law, applicable to 
everyone equally and can be utilized against anyone by the police.  Therefore, in 
propounding these facially neutral powers, the requirements of formal equality in the law 
are met by Court-generated rules.  Equally, however, there is reason to be suspicious 
about the manner in which these discretionary powers exercised in situations of low-
visibility are actually deployed and how evenly they will be dispensed across the 
spectrum society.  In light of the mounting body of evidence detailing instances and 
institutional patterns of racial (and ethnic) profiling by police, it becomes difficult to 
accept that these rules, in fact, satisfy more substantive conceptions of equality.  It is 
nothing (if not interesting) that all of the recent APD cases have featured racialized 
Canadians—a point that the Court has heretofore given inadequate attention.  For 
commentary about racial profiling see David M Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: 
Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006).  See also Steve Coughlan & Glen 
Luther, Detention and Arrest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 64-68; and Todd Gordon, 
Cops, Crime and Capitalism: The Law-and-Order Agenda in Canada (Halifax: 
Fernwood Press, 2006) at 22-25, 47-50 and 124-128. 
14 Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1968) at 153.   
15 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 SCR 59. 
16 Supra note 1. 
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Charter standards and subject these exercises of state power to constitutional scrutiny 
under s.1 analysis.   This is the normal procedure.  Thus, the sidestepping of this 
mechanism illuminates the extraordinary character of ancillary common law police 
powers and the source of judicial lawmaking under Waterfield/Dedman. 
If the “Waterfield/Dedman test”17 is to be maintained in Canadian criminal law, at 
all, then it should circumscribed on the narrowest of terms and used only in two sets of 
circumstances: first, the test could be used to assist the Crown in an inquiry under s. 24(2) 
on the admissibility of evidence; and, second, the test could be utilized in the assessment 
of a remedial request brought by an innocent person pursuant to s. 24(1) to vindicate the 
breach of one’s Charter rights that have occurred at the hands of the police.18  However, 
and for the reasons that I have argued, it should no longer be used asserted as a legal 
basis for the generation of unprecedented police powers or the foundation for juridical 
lawmaking powers in Canada. 
5.1.2 Restoring Institutional Roles and Responsibilities 
Canadian law has long since communicated its abhorrence for common law based 
offences.  In a symmetrical way, it is time for the law to definitively denounce the 
judicial veiling of coercive exercises of state authority in the absence of competent 
authorizing legislation, or, what have come to be known as ancillary common law police 
powers.  The elimination of this practice would be both logically consistent with the 
removal of judge-made common law offences and normatively preferable.  Presently 
however, the APD stands not only as the chief vehicle through which freestanding police 
powers are generated at common law, but as a primary source of police powers in Canada 
writ large.  This is unfortunate and badly in need of reversal.  Not only does this reflect 
disfavourably upon the democratic and judicial institutions that underpin Canadian 
constitutionalism, but the emergence of this phenomenon also offers an unsettling 
bellwether for the sturdiness and durability of Charter rights.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid at paras 50-51. 
18 See generally Kent Roach, “A Promising Spring for Charter Damages: Ward v. 
Vancouver” (2011) 29 NJCL 135. 
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Unquestionably, there remains “serious deficiencies in the scattered collection of 
statutory and common law rule that make up the law of police powers in Canada.”19 
However, the insertion of the Court as the diviner of ad hoc, non-comprehensive police 
powers does a disservice in the correction of these shortcomings.   These problems are 
only perpetuated and the resulting harms are exacerbated by judicial intervention and 
misguided attempts to ameliorate the law.  If the police are to have a particular power, 
then as agents of the state, it is for the state to give it to them.  The judiciary should not 
dole out grants (or extensions) of coercive powers.20  Rather, “the institutional value of 
effective law making and the proper roles of Parliament and the courts”21 should be 
respected as the SCC unanimously stated in R v Ferguson.22  As the court of last resort in 
the adjudicative hierarchy, the Supreme Court’s role in the domain of criminal law should 
be to assess legislation for constitutional validity and then to determine whether 
government actions have been lawfully applied.  Whenever police or legislators lapse in 
meeting their constitutional obligations, the Court must be there to point out these 
shortcomings and vigorously disclaim them.  This is how the Canadian criminal justice 
system was designed and it is what the law demands.  The judiciary does not exist to do 
the government’s bidding.  Nor is inappropriate for the Court to attempt to correct 
identified errors and make up for any perceived omissions in legislation or state policy.  
If either is found, then the judiciary should signal these problems by rendering judgment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Stribopoulos, “In Search”, supra note 7 at 4.  
20 For example, see Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679 at paras 107-108, 93 DLR 
(4th) 1 [emphasis added] where in a concurring judgment in Mr. Justice La Forest 
differentiated between the institutional role entrusted to the judiciary and that which is the 
domain of the legislature in the context of police powers.  As La Forest J. wrote,  
[T]his Court has repeatedly stated…that it was not the business of the courts to 
invent schemes that had the effect of increasing police powers…The rationale for 
this was not so much the complexity of possible schemes…but rather that this could 
distract the courts from their fundamental duty under the Charter to protect the 
rights guaranteed to the individual…The simple fact is, as I noted before, that it is 
for Parliament and the legislatures to make laws.  It is the duty of the courts to see 
that those laws conform to constitutional norms and declare them invalid if they do 
not.  This imposes pressure on legislative bodies to stay within the confines of their 
constitutional powers from the outset.  Reliance should not be placed on the courts 
to repair invalid laws. 
21 R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 at para 72, [2008] 1 SCR 281. 
22 Ibid. 
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against the state.  It thereafter falls to the state to devise a new course of action and to 
determine a recourse that is constitutionally compliant.  In the context of criminal 
proceedings, the Court must forbear from filling any of the supposed “gaps”23 in police 
powers and instead anchor its rulings in the principle of legality.  When the Crown, on 
behalf of the state, is seeking a power deemed to be necessary to secure a conviction or 
sustain a prosecution—then the Court must remind the prosecuting party that at all times 
it is within the state’s power to proactively confer the desired investigative power or 
powers on its agents.  The government should not be rewarded for inattention to its 
legislative mandate or absolved its responsibilities.  Nor should the Court be permitted to 
enlarge its own lawmaking powers and allowed to pick up the slack, if and when, it see 
fit do so. 
Naturally, correction of this problem posed by the presence of the APD in Canada 
rests with parties most responsible for its occurrence.  Thus, either Parliament must take 
on the challenge of modernizing the legislative framework that governs police conduct, 
or, the Supreme Court must give meaningful effect to the principle of legality (POL).  In 
actual fact both of these efforts are necessary and to be keenly encouraged.  For its part, 
Parliament can avail itself to legislation that has been passed in comparable 
“sophisticated constitutional democrac[ies]”24 such as England,25 Australia26 and New 
Zealand27 when determining how to best ensure that the police possess “sufficient power 
to protect the public and to enforce [the law], but not so much power that the police 
become a law unto themselves.”28  The task of the Court is simpler.  The high court must 
simply insist that when undertaking actions that threaten personal liberty, the police, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 R v Orbanski; R v Elias, 2005 SCC 37 at para 83, [2005] 2 SCR 3 and Kang-Brown, 
supra note 1 at paras 4, 6 and 50. 
24 Craig Brannagan, “Police Misconduct and Public Accountability: A Commentary on  
Recent Trends in the Canadian Justice System” (2011) 30 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 
61 at 62. 
25 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK), 1984, c 60. 
26 Police Powers (Vehicle Interception) Act 2000 (Tas), 2000, No. 46; Law Enforcement 
(Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), 2002, No 103; and Police Powers and 
Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), 2000, No 5. 
27 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), 1961, No 43. 
28 Dennis Forcese, “Police and the Public” in Robin Neugebauer, ed, Criminal Injustice: 
Racism in the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000) at 180. 
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state actors, do so under the canopy of a pre-announced statutory provision sanctioning 
their actions.  Where the state is unable to point to any legislation authorizing the actions 
of its agents—and satisfy the POL—then issues must be resolved in favour of the accused 
person and the unauthorized police conduct must be flatly rebuked.   As history shows, 
the reinstitution of this model of adjudication would likely serve to re-open a long stalled 
“dialogue”29 with Parliament about the permissible exercises of police powers in Canada 
and culminate in the enactment of democratically devised policing legislation.  We can 
hope further that a new statutory regime will be alive to civil libertarian concerns and 
respectful of constitutional standards.  But should Parliament fail in this regard and over-
privilege the interests of the police at the expense of citizens’ rights then the Court must 
boldly declare this, confirm the vitality of the Charter and uphold the supreme law of the 
land to which all persons and government institutions are bound.  However, until such 
time as there is another ideological shift within the ranks of the SCC and the moral 
conviction to re-cross the Rubicon, or, sufficient public pressure is brought to bear on 
elected politicians to reform the law governing exercises of police power, then little is apt 
to change.  Given that there has been little occasion for such optimism about the 
eventuality of either contingency in recent memory, it is prudent that members of the 
academic community, those working for non-governmental organizations and thoughtful 
Canadians alike, continue to further expose the plaguing problems of the APD.   
5.2 Concluding Thoughts 
During the construction of my arguments, I have sought to isolate and separately 
problematize the Court’s usage in the supply of coercive investigative powers to agents 
of the state on the one hand and the continued demand that has been made for them by 
the state during the litigation process on the other.  Each of these components has been 
integral to the development and sustainment of the APD in Canada. Without the 
legislative inattentiveness of Parliament to police powers, or, the subsequent condonation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 at paras 136-142, 156 DLR (4th) 385; and R v 
Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668 at paras 20 and 57, 180 DLR (4th) 1.  See also Peter W Hogg, 
Allison A Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited—Or ‘Much 
Ado About Metaphors”’ (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 29 and Peter W Hogg & Allison 
A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislatures (Or Perhaps The 
Charter Of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75. 
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from government of the Court’s accretion of the non-statutorily based lawmaking powers 
revealed by these judgments, the APD would not have arisen and could not have been 
allowed to flourish to the degree that it has in Canadian law.  As I have argued, the 
reluctance of Parliament to forestall the judicial creation of common law police powers is 
attributable to the fact that the Court’s utilization of the APD has resulted uniformly in 
the expansion of state power.  Yet, if the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under 
Waterfield/Dedman had not also led simultaneously (and unflinchingly) to the expansion 
of its own lawmaking authority, then it is unlikely that the high court would have chosen 
to this burden to bear.  Put shortly, the non-democratic extension of state power over 
citizens for use during criminal investigations that has been precipitated through the APD 
reveals that the country’s legislative, judicial and executive branches are now each 
intertwined in this milieu.  Hence, we find symbiotic relations that have delivered 
significant benefits to the codependent institutions involved—the police, Crown counsel, 
Parliamentarians and the judiciary.  These aggrandizements, however, have come at great 
expense to the constitutional order and the costs have been paid in the diminishment of 
civil liberties and the currency of Charter rights.  Moreover, this institutional disordering 
that has been occasioned through ad hoc, undemocratic means serves to contribute to 
broader anti-democratic tendencies existing in society.  All of this is out of step with 
actual framework for law and governance in Canada, and so, for this reasons alone, the 
prevailing dynamic exposed in this thesis should be repudiated.   
It is hoped that these matters shall soon gather greater critical attention and find a 
more central location in the public discourse about how to best preserve the individual 
rights and freedoms of Canadians against untoward—and undemocratic—encroachment 
from the state.  As I have outlined in this thesis, only modest reforms and the restoration 
of certain constitutional and common law principles are required to return the regulation 
of police conduct (alongside the concomitant protection and preservation of constitutional 
rights) to a well-functioning state.  All that is required to meet this benchmark is a legal 
system in which Parliamentarians enact laws, police act pursuant to the authority vested 
in them by these statutory provisions, citizens are able to bring constitutional challenges 
to the enabling legislation and to demand the court ensures that Charter rights are 
respected and that the police comply with the limits of the law; these conditions and 
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criteria, if met, would signify that Canadian institutions are working properly and serving 
the interests of the public.  These are small asks to be made.  The trouble with the APD is 
that it fails on each of these rudimentary metrics.
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